KYRGYZSTAN

EXTENDED MIGRATION PROFILE

2010-2015
This Extended Migration Profile was prepared in the framework of the Global Programme Mainstreaming Migration into Development Strategies implemented by the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Development Programme with the financial support of the Government of Switzerland.

The document is based on data from the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, the State Migration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, the State Registration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic, the State Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic.

This document is intended for representatives of governments, international and non-governmental organizations concerned with governance in the field of migration, as well as experts and researchers.

The information presented in this study may not necessarily reflect the views and positions of NISS KR, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic, State Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, State Migration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, State Registration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, IOM, UNDP and the Government of Switzerland, and it does not affect the privileges and immunities enjoyed by IOM as an intergovernmental organization in the Kyrgyz Republic.

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<td>AUCA</td>
<td>American University in Central Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>UN Convention on the Rights of the Child</td>
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<td>DRPCA</td>
<td>Department for Registration of Population and Civil Acts</td>
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<tr>
<td>EADB</td>
<td>Eurasian Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAEU</td>
<td>Eurasian Economic Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>Federal Migration Service (of the Russian Federation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCO</td>
<td>Inter-Church Organization for Development Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>KGS</td>
<td>Kyrgyz soms</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIHS</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan Integrated Household Survey</td>
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<td>KR</td>
<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFS</td>
<td>Labour Force Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>LiK</td>
<td>Life in Kyrgyzstan survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>MES</td>
<td>Ministry of Education and Science</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIA</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>MLMY</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth</td>
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<tr>
<td>MYLE</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth, Labour and Employment</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NISS</td>
<td>National Institute of Strategic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Statistical Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBS</td>
<td>State Border Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCNS</td>
<td>State Committee for National Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>State Registration Service</td>
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UAE  United Arab Emirates
UN   United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Fund for Population Affairs
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USA  United States of America
USD  United States Dollars
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WHO  World Health Organization
Kyrgyz Republic – Basic facts

**Geography:**

| Total area¹ | 199,900 square km |

**Economics and development:**

| GDP per capita² | USD 1,325 | 2014 |
| Human Development Index³ | 0,628 | 2014 |
| Sustainable Development Index ranking | 125 | 2014 |

**Population:**

| Total permanently resident population | 5,776,600 people | 2014 |

| Of whom⁶ |
| - Male | 2,856,600 people |
| - Female | 2,920,000 people |

| Estimated population forecast⁷ | 11,600,000 people | 2050 |

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¹ National Statistical Committee


⁴ Available from http://boorsok.ru/tag/denezhnye-perevody/


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<th>Number of foreigners: ⁸</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Registered as permanent residents</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Granted immigrant status</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Registered</td>
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**International migration:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Net international migration per 1,000 people ⁹</th>
<th>-6.16 / 1,000 people</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>International rating for net migration ¹⁰</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>2015</td>
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⁸ Department for Registration of Population and Civil Acts
⁹ Index Mundi. Available from http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=kg&v=27
The words “migration” and “migrant” do not have universally-agreed definition ... Migrants can if desired be widely defined as “transient” people, and all sorts of qualifications can be added to narrow the concept to certain individual groups. Therefore, the question of who migrants are is intertwined with the question of which is defining who migrants are .... The most interesting thing is that nowhere does Russian law clearly establish who migrants are, and therefore attributing all of these concepts to categories with current legal status can only be arbitrary.

Sergey Abashin “Central Asian Migration: practices, local community, transnationalism” 11.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This migration profile was prepared in the framework of the Global Programme for inclusion in the migration component of the development strategy, implemented by the International Organization for Migration and the United Nations Development Programme, and with financial support from the Government of Switzerland. It evaluates the situation in the migration field in the period 2010-14, and uses statistics and analysis of all types and forms of movement: to, within and from Kyrgyzstan. The analysis by the authors is based on a template developed by IOM experts and is intended to answer key questions about changes in trends of migration policy, the principal driving forces behind movement of the population, and the impact of immigration and emigration on Kyrgyzstan’s society and state.

The methodological approach used for the migration profile includes a desk review of analytical reports and publications, and official documents; statistical analysis of data from the National Statistical Committee, the World Bank, departmental statistics, and quantitative research samples (“Life in Kyrgyzstan”), econometric calculations and analysis of the influence of migration on various aspects of development of society and state in Kyrgyzstan, as well as legal analysis of tendencies in legislation in the area of migration.

The main findings of the migration profile can be summarised in three key aspects of migration processes:

A) Statistical records and levels of knowledge of migration processes

Despite the fact that migration issues have in a way been mainstreamed into political and research agendas, there were a large number of knowledge gaps and a lack of data to explain phenomena and trends, as well as a large number of myths, which are perceived as axiomatic and “migrate” from document to document.

11 Etnografiya migratsii [Ethnography of Migration], Volume 4, 2012, pp. 3-13
Despite improvements and widening of the statistical data set on migration in the last three to five years, some poorly understood questions remain. These include internal migration, labour migration to Kyrgyzstan, and emigration for education. It is possible that these data gaps reflect underestimation of immigration to Kyrgyzstan and internal migration because of the predominant image of Kyrgyzstan as a source country of migrant workers. At the same time, even data on emigration of Kyrgyzstani citizens still does not provide a full picture of the system and mechanisms of migration flows, and official documents from Kyrgyzstan on labour migration, as a rule, are based on the statistics of Russia’s Federal Migration Service. There is no full-scale migration data gathering by any state agency. All state bodies with an interest in migration issues rely on data collected by the State Border Service (SBS) for analysis of the migration situation. SBS data is collected with the help of an automatized border control system that only records border crossing with data on citizenship and their recorded purpose of journey. Because of the lack of an inter-agency information system and single database, it is not possible to get a full picture of mobility of Kyrgyzstani nationals and foreign nationals entering and leaving the country.

A lack of significant research in the field of immigration and immigration policy in Kyrgyzstan had led to an absence of data concerning socio-demographic characteristics of the immigration flow and thus hinders development and implementation of an effective immigration policy.

Recording of internal migration within Kyrgyzstan follows the Russian model of legal distinction between place of residence and place of stay, and reflects a state policy of minimizing its responsibility for regional development. The country has not developed a methodology to estimate the number of people with dual citizenship (Kyrgyzstani and Russian; Kyrgyzstani and Kazakhstani).

**B) Policies governing migration**

Kyrgyzstan’s legislative base in the field of migration contains a large quantity of laws and regulations, most of which are secondary legislation. This is because the key legislative base for migration includes many references to rules and provisions - generalized and declarative - that duplicate each other. In addition, until recently, regulations rapidly became obsolete, and there therefore was a constant need to change them because of frequent changes of Government and changes to its composition.

The de jure institutional mechanism for migration governance includes a wide range of agencies with their own duties, which together provide a comprehensive governance approach. However, the de facto model is significantly different: some agencies are not actually involved in managing migration processes, as their mandates in relation to migration issues are not clearly formulated and interaction between agencies is ineffective. A number of important aspects of migration management (in particular, the adaptation of returning migrants, the integration of immigrants and so on) are not regulated by legislation, and no state bodies are mandated to implement such activities.

Internal migration issues are reduced at governance level to a discourse on “socio-economic problems” with regard to ensuring social guarantees, access to social services and the well-being of internal migrants, preventing “criminalization” in the migrant environment, and so on, while duties such as upholding the legitimate rights of citizens guaranteed in legislation to free movement are not a priority: this leads to high social and human costs for migrants.
Key actors from diaspora organizations abroad and private employment agencies were uncritical in their description of state migration policy on external labour migration. Diasporas, according to the research, are unable to fulfil government requests to mobilise the investment potential of external migrants, to defend the rights of migrants, and to propagate the civic (and ethnic) identity of Kyrgyzstanis abroad. The proportion of Kyrgyzstanis who have found work abroad through private employment agencies is not statistically significant, and their experience has not received a sufficient degree of analysis and evaluation.

With respect to internal migration, aggregated statistical data, including unemployment or employment figures for the country, cannot serve as the basis for public policy for regional economic development, as regional data often display considerably different trends from the average.

C) Trends in migration processes in Kyrgyzstan

The largest scale and most dynamic flow of internal and external migration concerning Kyrgyzstan continues to be labour migration. The main causes of labour migration are primarily economic and political, and are linked to inadequate development of employment systems and demographic indicators of labour resources, the limited effectiveness of public policy governance in the field of labour and employment, and work efficiency and quality of jobs.

Kyrgyzstan’s economy can be characterised by decreasing efficiency (productivity) of labour, increasing discrepancy between the rates of growth of labour productivity and wages, an increased proportion of unqualified workers, and a growth in the share who have not received vocational training.

External labour migration has a dominant position in the Kyrgyz Republic’s migration policy by virtue of volume, by political significance, and also from the perspective of short-term economic benefits.

Making up more than 90 per cent of outflow from Kyrgyzstan, labour migration to the Russian Federation has created a high degree of political and economic dependence in Kyrgyzstan on Russia.

The predominant theme in internal migration within Kyrgyzstan between 2010 and 2014 was extreme inequality in regional development, and lack of development in labour and capital markets.

Internal migration is “unidirectional”: from the regions to Bishkek city and the surrounding Chuy Oblast. This has led to an aggravation of socio-economic problems: growth in tension in the overpopulated capital and its metropolitan area as a result of struggles for limited land resources, poorer economic prospects for regional development, and a growth in conflicts because of “replacement” migration flow from the country’s border areas.

The economic effects of internal migration on households in the regions remain invisible to the State and society, as remittances from internal migration are difficult to measures and have not been studied.

A number of aspects of the interrelationship between migration and development factors require close examination and the rejection of myths and assumptions. These include population aging and depopulation of the regions, the impact of immigration flows into the
Kyrgyz Republic on the “marriage market” and on the birth rate, and the impact of migration on conflict levels in families and on deviant behaviour among children, among others.

One of the important social push factors to migration is the impact on migrant households and families, as the decision to make the trip does not rest with an individual man or woman: instead it is a kind of family strategy to diversify sources of income, minimize household risk and expand access to financial resources.

Nevertheless, like elsewhere in Central Asia, women leaving Kyrgyzstan for external labour migration, particularly young women, face significant negative attitudes and barriers when compared with internal migration. Overall, the proportion of women engaged in internal migration is higher than that of men.

Migration has a real impact on the gender regime and sex ratios, both within the migration flow and in the left-behind community. The internal migratory behaviour of men and women is asymmetric: gender migration risks lead to a decline in migratory activity by men in times of economic crisis, when women become more active.

Changes in the proportions of female and male external and internal migrants and their age structure lead to real changes in the labour market, the marriage market, the value systems of men and women, as well as the socio-economic, political and cultural situation in both the sending and receiving communities.

In Kyrgyzstan’s information and media space, the topic of labour immigration and the illegal presence of foreign migrant workers in Kyrgyzstan is examined mainly in connection with corruption in migration licensing and governance bodies, or the national security threat posed by illegal immigrants (who usually in such cases have criminal identities).

Politicians usually evaluate immigration by analogy with external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan, and in terms of economic benefits. The Government even justifies the export of education services in terms of economic benefits. This approach prevents the study of social and cultural aspects of immigration into the Kyrgyz Republic, dehumanizes the migration process and inhibits protection of the rights and support for the human potential of immigrants receiving education in the Kyrgyz Republic in accordance with the country’s ratified international migration law instruments. In the end, it comes down to the same economic costs.

The area of foreign investment, along with human resources, is rarely a subject of socio-economic and political analysis in Kyrgyzstan. When it comes to benefits and costs, it seems that the effectiveness of foreign investment in development is debatable. Statistics show that enterprises with foreign capital account for a large share of Kyrgyzstan’s economy, increasing the proportion of imports by more than a third while they account for less than a quarter of exports.

The socio-demographic characteristics of Kyrgyzstani migrant workers abroad that require special attention include: the increasing number who leave the country before reaching the age of 18; the fact that more than half of the migrant workers (65 per cent) are natives of southern Kyrgyzstan (including Batken Oblast, from which almost 35 per cent of the working-age population has left for Russia); and the fact that according to Russian researchers, more than 40 per cent of migrants would like to acquire Russian citizenship and stay in Russia forever.
While migrant remittances clearly have a positive impact on macroeconomic indicators in the countries of origin and destination, at the micro-level they can also lead to negative consequences: a growth in prices of land and property, and increased inflation in these sectors; a trend to replace income from work with remittances, and an increased share of economically inactive citizens; increased conspicuous consumption, including on weddings and other celebrations; and increased conflict within families.

Transfers cannot be considered as an investment, thereby confirming the expenditure policy of the households receiving remittances, where consumption prevails over investment. Unproductive use of remittances, and limited investment in children’s education and healthcare, can be explained in part by the limited services offered in the regions (the poor quality of educational services, the devaluation of education in the labour market and so on). There are still no effective measures being taken to promote return migration and adaptation of returning citizens to local markets.

Kyrgyzstan is a source, transit and destination country for trafficking in persons for labour exploitation, slavery and sexual exploitation of women, children and men. The destination countries for labour exploitation and slavery of trafficked men, women and children from Kyrgyzstan are mainly Russia and Kazakhstan and, more rarely, Turkey or the United Arab Emirates, as well as Kyrgyzstan itself. Most Kyrgyzstani victims of trafficking are women.

The main recommendations of the Extended Migration Profile of the Kyrgyz Republic 2010-2015

On effective recording of migration flows:

1. It would be advisable to create an interagency information system with common electronic database for all relevant state agencies (SCNS, SBS, SRS, MFA, MIA and others), organizations (“Manas International Airport” Joint Company, “Kyrgyz Temir Jolu” state enterprise) and companies (air companies, hotels, etc.) which have links to internal and external migration.

2. If foreign nationals change their declared motive and length of stay in Kyrgyzstan, it is important to study the reasons behind this and the socio-demographic profile of such foreign nationals, in order to optimise immigration policy.

3. It is advisable to introduce at governmental level an alternative registration system for Kyrgyzstani nationals (based on arrival / departure sheets). This could be in the form of an electronic database of biometric data using an “identification number” as a prerequisite for all financial and other transactions with the state and business.

4. As with identification numbers for Kyrgyzstani nationals, when granting resident permits to foreign nationals, stateless persons and asylum seekers, digital codes should be issued through which they can receive access to services provided by the state and local government.

5. Enhance exchange of information and statistical data, and improve methodologies for collecting statistical information on the most important issues pertaining to migration to / from Kyrgyzstan. It is particularly important to include a gender perspective in data collection and development of methodology.
6. The statistical registration system for foreign nationals and stateless persons should include disaggregation by sex, age, country of origin, and so on. This will facilitate clearer understanding of the specifics of migratory behaviour of foreign nationals.

7. Including all competent structures in the system for reporting migratory movements, and coordination on data exchange will enable better tracking of the movements of Kyrgyzstani nationals (and therefore more effective planning and provision of state and municipal services), and also provide more complete information on the movements of foreign nationals and stateless persons in Kyrgyzstan.

8. To facilitate better and fuller use of statistical data from the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey, the Labour Force Survey, and other regular surveys, access should be opened to databases for migration researchers, while ensuring data protection for personal information.

9. Explore the possibility of granting the authorised body for migration the function and duty of collecting data from all interested state and municipal bodies.

On drafting and optimising migration legislation, and policy and strategy development:

1. Conduct a review of migration legislation from a critical perspective to assess the relevance of various duties in the regulation of internal and external migration, and, based on this, develop recommendations to optimise migration policy, including the institutional mechanism for migration governance.

2. Consider codifying migration legislation in order to resolve duplications, remove conflicts and include regulations on “bottlenecks” in migration governance. The migration code should be based on a balance of the key objectives of an effective migration policy: economic pragmatism of the state, national security and protecting the human rights of citizens.

3. The drafting and development of migration laws and regulations should form part of an integrated state approach to regulating employment, economic activity, unemployment, and wage policy in Kyrgyzstan.

4. Develop and introduce an integrated medium-term Government plan for migration governance (internal and external) that includes concrete policy measures in the (related) fields of unemployment, employment, wage policy and labour, social protection, integration and adaptation of migrant workers and immigrants in Kyrgyzstan, information policy, and so on. This should include costings.

5. Increasing demographic pressures necessitate finding new and effective approaches to shift focus from job creation to creation of quality jobs that could be an alternative to emigration.

6. Based on migration policy experience, develop and implement effective tools to determine the need for foreign workers (including labour market tests, lists of professions with shortages, quotas linked to the size of the economically active population, and so on) and to regulate foreign labour in enterprises in Kyrgyzstan. In particular, it is important to consider introducing acceptable rules to recruit foreign workers both by economic sector, and for individual enterprises created with foreign capital.
On researching various aspects of migration to optimise migration governance policy and practice:

1. Research the impact of the land market on migration behaviour by Kyrgyzstani nationals (by geographical area) and develop a package of recommendations to develop legislation and practice on land use.

2. If the declared reason for and length of stay by foreign nationals in Kyrgyzstan changes, it is important to study the reasons and the socio-demographic profile of these foreign nationals, in order to optimise immigration policy.

3. Consider conducting an integrated assessment of the effectiveness of national policy regarding kayrylmans [ethnic Kyrgyz citizens of other countries who choose to move to Kyrgyzstan under a simplified naturalisation procedure] and to develop recommendations to ensure equal opportunities for receiving the status and realising their rights.

4. Include in medium-term and long-term strategies and plans the activities of state research and academic structures to study current issues in migration to and from Kyrgyzstan (including changing population dynamics, territory, the “marriage market” and so on).

5. Research the impact of the land market on migration behaviour by Kyrgyzstani citizens (by geographical area) and develop a package of recommendations to develop legislation and practice on land use.

6. Because of the significant amount of data presented in the migration profile, consider publishing a thematic series of publications on migration issues.

To enhance the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for migration governance:

1. Consider issuing a Government decision to charge various governance bodies with implementation of aspects of migration policy that are not today implemented, or are on the periphery of the Government’s attention. This includes integration of kayrylmans of all ages, genders, employment statuses and so forth; and reintegration of migrant workers and their families after their return from a long period abroad. More active involvement of local government bodies in the institutional framework for managing migration is also important. Given the supranational nature of human rights, the ombudsman’s mandate should include the duty to protect the rights of immigrants.

2. International organizations, the Ministry of Culture, Information and Tourism, and the mandated body on migration must develop an action plan and strategy to integrate immigrants and re-integrate returned migrant workers (help to realise the needs and interests of immigrants studying in Kyrgyzstan, guarantee non-discrimination and observance of human rights in the creation of state information policy, and so on).

3. Government action plans on migration policy should clearly set out short-term and medium-term objectives, process indicators and results.
Section A. Trends and characteristics of migration

In literally less than a century, since the second half of the twentieth century, the phenomenon of migration has been transformed from a local and regional understanding to a global one. And these changes require development of coordinated international efforts to resolve new situations and requirements caused by mass and diverse (by character and destination) movement of people. Belarusian international law researcher A. Pokhlebaeva stated that: ‘The concept of “migration” is not even mentioned in either the United Nations (UN) Charter or the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, though ‘the right to freedom of movement and residence’ is legally enshrined in the latter as a basic human right However, this right is not elaborated, and no definition of “migration” is given. In this connection, it should be noted that international law does not give a general understanding of migration.” Since the 1970s and 1980s, international organizations such as IOM and later the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Economic Court, among others, have followed the UN’s International Law Commission in developing the universal legal term “migration”.

Despite the fact that many different definitions of migration and migrants have been formulated, most of them do not give a clear understanding of the legal status of migrant workers, the international legal specifics and legal regulation of the phenomenon: some of the definitions focused on certain categories of workers, but did not cover others.13

The IOM-EU Handbook of terminology in the field of migration gives the following definitions:14

Migration: A process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants.

Migrant: At the international level, no universally accepted definition of migrant exists. The term migrant is usually understood to cover all cases where the decision to migrate is taken freely by the individual concerned for reasons of “personal convenience” and without intervention of an external compelling factor. This term therefore applies to persons, and family members, moving to another country or region to better their material or social conditions and improve the prospect for themselves or their family.

Terminology issues have not been an issue of acute public debate in state policy, though it is clear that there is a diversity of approaches in various documents. This can be seen when

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12 A. Pokhlebaeva, “Ponyatiye migratsii i yeye klassifikatsiya [Understanding migration and its classification]”, Zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo prava i mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Journal of International Law and International Relations], 3 (2005). Available from http://evolutio.info/content/view/765/113/ Though migration was actively researched in the Soviet Union in the 1960s-80s, the research focused on rural-urban migration and on shuttle migration. In the 1990s, migration acquired the context of ethnic and forced migration, and repatriation. For more details see Zh. Zayonchkovska, I. Molodikova, and V. Mukomel’, “Metodologiya i metody izucheniya migratsionnykh protsessov [Methodology and methods for study of migration processes]”, Centre for Migration Research (Moscow, 2007)


Section A. Trends and characteristics of migration

comparing the term “migration” as introduced in Kyrgyzstani legislation, and the term as used in the Government’s “Unified Report on Migration in Kyrgyzstan”.

Thus, the Law On External Migration of 17 July 2000\[^{15}\] gives the following definition:

> Migration is the movement of physical persons for various reasons from the Kyrgyz Republic to other States and from other States to the Kyrgyz Republic, and also within the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, with the aim of permanent or temporary change in place of residence.

This definition is obviously intended to cover the whole range of categories of migrants, including the transitory migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and others. At the same time, use of the term “place of residence” introduces a restrictive component, because the term is defined as follows: “a place where a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic permanently or primarily lives”.\[^{16}\]

In addition to the restrictive wording above, there is also an inability to determine the legal status of subjects of migration. This makes them vulnerable and complicates the job of determining the scope of international migration.\[^{17}\] The “Unified Report on Migration in Kyrgyzstan” defines: “Population migration (Latin: migratio – relocation) as the movement of people from one region (country, world) to another, in some cases, large groups and long distances”. This includes all kinds of human mobility, but also is not determined by the legal status of the mobile party.

Academics often perceive the existence of different approaches to the study of migration as symptomatic of immature and underdeveloped research on migration.

**As formulated by Douglas Massey and his colleagues:**

Social scientists do not approach the study of immigration from a shared paradigm, but from a variety of competing theoretical viewpoints fragmented across disciplines, regions, and ideologies. As a result, research on the subject tends to be narrow, inefficient, and characterized by duplication, miscommunication, reinvention, and bickering about fundamentals. Only when researchers accept common theories, concepts, tools, and standards will knowledge begin to accumulate.\[^{18}\]

In public discourse when understanding and explaining migration in the country, there is a paradoxical situation in the region. On the one hand, the volume of migration studies in the region is very high: a Google search [in Cyrillic script] on “issledovaniya migratsii Kyrgyzstana [the study of migration in Kyrgyzstan]” gives 379,000 links and one on “migratsiya iz Tsentral’noy Azii v Rossiyu [migration from Central Asia to Russia]” gives 666,000 references. The vast majority of these sources are dated in the last three to five years. On


\[^{16}\] Law On Internal Migration of 30 July 2002


the other hand, the most important aspects of migration behaviour, and the nature and degree of the impact of migration on the dynamics of the different migration actors (from the migrants themselves and their families to local communities and entire sending and receiving countries) still contains more questions than revealed facts. Much of the data is still not real but rather “agreed” statistics. In several cases, the statistics that are available cannot be explained clearly.

Insufficient reporting on and understanding of migration flows on the global and regional scales is often used by actors – including States – as a political and ideological instrument in interstate relations. In recent years, the IOM and other international organizations and development agencies have been working actively to support the development of statistics and research into migration trends and practice and promote the development of effective migration governance strategies, in order to strengthen protection of the rights of migrant workers and ensure decent employment and living conditions for all citizens of all countries.

This Extended Migration Profile of the Kyrgyz Republic is the second information product, and is intended to facilitate a “common understanding of the migration situation, real migration flows, priorities, problems and interests in partner States.”

20 In 2011, Kyrgyzstan became one of the 14 countries in the world that prepared and received endorsement of an Extended Migration Profile. This migration profile is a basic document, which because of its systematic and standardized structure will facilitate comparison of the situation in countries and trends in migration management practices. For more, see EU, “Migration Profile Light: Production Guidelines”, 2013. Available from https://www.pragueprocess.eu/fileadmin/PPP/Migration_Profile_Light_Manual_2013.pdf
Collective historical memory in Kyrgyzstan sees the past in terms of nomadism, visualising constant migratory movements as the basis of the cultural and consciousness of the Kyrgyz people. Meanwhile, in academic literature the history of migratory movements of the Kyrgyz population in the pre-Soviet period and in the subsequent Soviet decades is usually presented as a coming together of two opposing models: the ‘relatively low-mobility, limited primarily to seasonal migration” life of the Kyrgyz population and the active migratory movement of the Russian (Slavic) population from central metropolitan regions to frontier areas in connection with the “settlement by the Russian Empire of the Turkestan territory”, which led to a significant growth in the population of Kyrgyzstan and changed its ethnic structure. Subsequent modernization, primarily in the field of economics, but also in social, welfare, cultural, spiritual and political affairs, and in general the radical changes that took place after 1917 under the Soviet authorities, led to consolidation of the model of intensive population movements from the central regions to national territories and “sedentarisation” of the Kyrgyz population.

- Young men recruited into the army and groups went to other administrative areas of the country for their military service (some conscripts served in the special contingent of troops in East Germany, and in the 1980s many men called up from Central Asia had to serve in the war in Afghanistan).

- People working in some professions, such as the military or mid-ranking party and Soviet officials, were “rotated” from one region to another every four or five years. And while mid-ranking party nomenklatura usually migrated within Kyrgyzstan, military officers and senior party and Soviet leaders could be sent anywhere in the Soviet Union.

- In addition, large numbers of primarily young people were sent to major construction projects and emergency settings to assist (for example, to restore the city of Tashkent after the 1966 earthquake or in the clean-up operation after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster) in their official capacity or voluntarily. Experts speak of increased population outflow, primarily among immigrants who arrived in 1940-1960, by the end of the 1960s to major construction projects in Siberia and the Far East.

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22 By 1914, under the influence of Russian colonization, 22 per cent of the local population had moved over to a settled way of life, but mass sedentarization took place during water and land reforms in 1921-22, and the last Kyrgyz nomadic group ended its traditional seasonal migration by 1933 [Available from http://kghistory. akipress.org/unews/un_post:1966]. It is important to note that during the Soviet period, particularly during World War 2, there was a massive inflow of war refugees to Kirgizia and other Soviet Central Asian republics from the central part of Russia, which had fallen under Nazi occupation or blockade, as well as of deported members of several ethnic groups, including Chechens, Dagestanis and Volga Germans among others. For more on models of migration of various classes and ethnic groups, see Sh. Batyrbayeva, “Sotsial’naya mobil’nost’ naseleniya SSR v gody pervykh pyatiletok: plany i rezul’taty (na primere Kyrgyzstana) [Social mobility of the population of the USSR during the first five years: plans and results (with the example of Kyrgyzstan)]. Available from http://www.university.kg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1408:2011-01-05-0720-36&catid=124:2010-04-21-10-36-57&Itemid=281
23 The last conscription to the Soviet Army took place in 1991, but the army was not broken up in practice, and continued to exist for two years as the United Armed Forces of the CIS.
Intersectionality was important in all the types and forms of Soviet migration: gender, age, ethnicity and social class played important roles. Migration activity among ethnic Kyrgyz residents was at initial stages in 1990.

Ethnicity became a dominating issue at the end of the 1980s, when the process of “returning to historic homelands” by ethnic Germans and Jews proved itself a harbinger of the collapse of the Soviet empire. The governments of the recipient countries (Germany and Israel) proposed special resettlement programmes, which provided state support and guaranteed free language courses, travel and resettlement expenses, special benefits for a certain period, and the status and rights of the citizen. Between 1989 and 1995, according to Kyrgyzstan’s National Statistical Committee, the number of Germans in the country fell from 101,300 to 26,100.

According to the sources presented and analyzed by the researcher S. Peyrouz (including the 1979 census), migration of Russians (Slavs) also began well before the collapse of the Soviet empire, as early as the 1960s and 1970s. He considers the reasons for this, which include the portents of “decolonization” of border areas: the loss of priority of development for the region (development of virgin lands gave way to a new goal: the development of Siberia and construction of the Baikal-Amur railway), relaxations to the rules that bound villagers to their places of residence and agriculture and the permitting of certain groups to move to the cities, and increased representation of the local population in administrative and management positions in the party and thus a decreased flow of professionals from the Union’s centre. According to official statistics, in ten years Soviet Kyrgyzstan “lost” almost 100,000 ethnic Russians (in percentage terms, ethnic Russians fell from 30.2 per cent of the population in 1970 to 29.2 per cent in 1979).

Immediately after Kyrgyzstan’s independence, a mass wave of ethnic migration took place of Slavic and other ethnic groups (primarily those ethnic groups deported to Central Asia in the 1940s, including Crimean Tatars, Chechens and others). In just one year (1993) the country lost 100,000 Slavs, which was interpreted in public discourse as “return to their historical homeland”. The reasons for migration of these groups included the changing political regime, industrial collapse, growth in unemployment, and general falls in living standards. Against the backdrop of economic shock therapy, privatization and introduction of private property, manifestations of economic crisis, such as hyperinflation, monetary reform and introduction of national currency, collapse in production and a significant shift from man-

25 Ryazantsev S. and N. Khoriye, “Modelirovaniye potokov trudovoy migratsii iz Tsentral’noy Azii v Rossiyu [Modelling of Flows of labour migration from Central Asia to Russia]”, (Moscow-Toyama, 2010), p. 38
28 However, given birth rates, it could be assumed that the “decline” in relative terms could also be due to the increased population of ethnic Kyrgyz and other local people.
ufacturing final products to raw material extraction, as well as a critical reduction in GDP, were all push factors for citizens. Another important factor was that at the beginning of the 1990s signs of a political crisis were also emerging: in 1990 interethnic violence took place in Osh, and a wave of border interethnic conflicts flared up in 1989-1991 in Batken. Sovereignty gave an impetus for active development of national identity, but also fuelled nationalist sentiments among some groups of citizens.

The changes also led to a change in the role of the Russian ethnos in the country’s development, which Kyrgyzstan’s Russian intelligentsia were painfully aware of. In 1992, in the journal “Literary Kyrgyzstan”, which had become the mouthpiece of Russian ethnic identity, one of the leaders of the “Compatriots” in Kyrgyzstan, the journal’s editor A. Ivanov, placed on record a dispute about national history with the Kyrgyz literary journal “Ala-Too”: “Adverse weather for borderland Russians”.

Meanwhile, administrative ethnicization reduced the chances for career and life success, especially among the Russian population, which had been very well represented in power structures in the Soviet period. However, experts believe that until 2006, when Russia’s Government announced a repatriation programme and simplified the procedure to receive Russian citizenship for “compatriots”, significant groups of the Russian / Slavic population of Kyrgyzstan continued to live in the country. Despite the fact that in literature on Russian migration and language policy in Kyrgyzstan debates concerning the status of Russian language and the struggle to propagate and develop the use of Kyrgyz is often viewed as an important factor pushing ethnic Russian citizens from Kyrgyzstan, it appears that use of the Russian language as an instrument of manipulation and discrimination rather reflects struggles within Kyrgyzstan’s political elite. Ethnically-tinged external migration outside the CIS began to dry up by the end of the 1990s and such mass emigration had almost ended by the mid-2000s because the potential for ethnic emigration had in practice been

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31 Overall, since 1989, the tone of the publications has not been in doubt: “Russkiye v Kyrgyzstane. Segodnya vtorrrye, a zavtra? [Russians in Kyrgyzstan. Today second, but tomorrow?]” (Vechernyi Bishkek, 1989); “Ya – ne «natsmen’shinstvo». Ya – russkiy! [I am not a “national minority”. I am Russian!]” (Vechernyi Bishkek, 1994); “Povroz’ druzheynye? [More friendly apart?]” (Literaturnyy Kyrgyzstan, 1992) and others.

32 Peyrouse S., “The Russian minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics and Language”, Occasional paper 297, Kennan Institute, p.10. The author recalls the study of migration attitudes among the Slavic population in the mid-1990s, when more than a third of ethnic representatives expressed a desire to leave, but the real flow was much smaller. Their staying in the region is explained by the author in terms of the difficulty of integration in Russia for Russians: limited opportunities for predominantly urban residents, as the Russians were in Kyrgyzstan, to move to cities in Russia; settlement in economically deprived and unpopulated areas of Siberia and the Far East; the negative attitude of the local Russian population to immigrants; and others.


35 Peyrouse S., “The Russian minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics and Language”, Occasional paper 297, Kennan Institute, p.21
Short history and main determinant factors

exhausted. Between 1999 and 2009 (between Population Censuses in Kyrgyzstan) a total of 19,520 people left Kyrgyzstan for countries outside the former Soviet Union, including 76 per cent to Germany, 10 per cent to the USA, 6 per cent to Israel, and 7 per cent to other countries. The largest contingents emigrating outside the former USSR were ethnic Russians (42.7 per cent) and Germans (38.5 per cent); 3.6 per cent were ethnic Kyrgyz and 3.5 per cent Jewish, while the total for other ethnic groups was 11.7 per cent.36

Table 1: Proportion of population of ethnic groups by region, 2009 census

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Bishkek</th>
<th>Batken oblast</th>
<th>Jalalabad oblast</th>
<th>Issyk Kul oblast</th>
<th>Naryn oblast</th>
<th>Osh oblast</th>
<th>Talas oblast</th>
<th>Chuy oblast</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>49.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajiks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.5%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungans</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>62.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a result of international emigration Kyrgyzstan, which two decades ago was a multi-ethnic country (particularly in urban areas), rapidly became more monoethnic, especially in several regions.

The proportion of ethnic Kyrgyz in the population has significantly grown in all regions, almost reaching the maximum in some (particularly Naryn oblast), thereby creating monoethnic everyday life for Kyrgyz people (see Table 1: Proportions of population of ethnic groups by region, 2009 census).

Ethnic emigration has affected all ethnic groups in Kyrgyzstan, has led to high levels of migratory loss and reduced the proportions in the population of almost every ethnic group except Kyrgyz. The composition of migratory loss between 1990 and 1998, and between the 1999 and 2009 censuses, differs by motivation for migration and because of inclusion of ethnic Kyrgyz in the external migration flow.

According to expert S. Abashin, there is a significant link between the first wave of ethnic emigration in the 1990s and the second in the 2000s:

“Mass migration from one region of the post-Soviet space to another led to the creation of support infrastructure: border crossing practices, dissemination of information and exchange of experience, and support networks in the new environment. The first migrants from the “titular” ethnic group utilised bonds of friendship and even kinship with emigrants from “non-titular” ethnic groups who had left and settled earlier. In many cases, emigrants in the first wave and subsequent migrants, as former compatriots, even started joint “businesses” in Russia, helped each other to find work and accommodation, acted as guarantors and character witnesses in contacts with the police, and so on. That is, the first migratory wave in the 1990s “facilitated” the second wave in the 2000s.”

At the same time, the expert listed a number of characteristics that distinguished the migration in the 1990s from that in the next decade:

1) Unlike the political and ideological reasons for ethnic migration in the 1990s, the main reason for leaving was economic factors and motives: people left to earn a living.

2) The forced economic character of migration led to key social characteristics emerging among the migrants themselves: most are unskilled workers from rural districts and small towns, people who have found it particularly difficult to find work that pays enough to meet even the basic needs of their families. Usually they are men of working age, and a large proportion are young men. As soon as earnings abroad and remittances back home became an everyday and important element of social status and social ties, participants in migration flows also diversified: the number of middle class migrants who started businesses increased. In addition, more women began leaving as migrants, and many now travel independently rather than following their husband or partner.

3) Migrant workers to the Russian Federation, as a rule, do not intend to settle there and acquire permanent residence. They return home often, though the regularity varies, and then again leave as migrants. As a rule, their families remain at home and the migrants send them money for their everyday lives, for strategic needs (renovation or construction of housing, purchasing prestige goods such as expensive cars, or conducting various traditional celebrations: weddings, sunut toy, important birthdays of parents and so on). Even those who live for a long time as migrants in Russia consider their presence there “temporary” and maintain close links with their families, relatives and friends so they can return to their homeland quickly.

4) In as much as integration and assimilation are not the strategic aims of the migrants, many reproduce their “home” practice when building their social networks in migration – familial, territorial and ethnic – and adapt this to the conditions in migration and “tem-
porary residence”. Social networks of migrants create their own infrastructure of trust and mutual support, providing services and leisure opportunities.

The proportion of emigrating Kyrgyz in the migration flow in the last five years remains one of the highest: Kyrgyz made up 39 per cent of migratory flow in 2010 and 2011, and 31 and 33 per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively.\(^{40}\) Between 2000 and 2014, a total of 401,300 people migrated from the country (between 2010 and 2014 the figure was 112,000).\(^{41}\) Today Kyrgyzstan has a negative migratory balance with all CIS countries with the exceptions of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.\(^{42}\)

When studying the forces behind international migration it is assumed that decisions about migration are made by individuals under the influence of various stimuli in the country of residence and/or the potential destination country. These factors – which may be demographic, political, economic or socio-cultural – can push people into migration or hold them back.\(^{43}\)

**Figure 1: Average salary (USD)**

![Figure 1: Average salary (USD)](image)

*Source: CIS Interstate Statistical Committee*

Many studies highlight the income gap between Kyrgyzstan and the receiving countries (Russia and Kazakhstan) as an important economic incentive pushing Kyrgyzstani citizens towards migration (see Figure 1).

The gap in salaries between Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Kazakhstan has been stable for a significant period of time. However, the economic crisis and the fall in the value of the rouble has significantly reduced the gap between average salaries in these countries. At the same

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\(^{40}\) National Statistical Committee, “Sbornik po sotsial’nym tendentsiyam Bishkek [Collection on Social Trends Bishkek]”, 2014, p.30


time, in practice this has not led to a significant change in the outflow of migrants from Kyrgyzstan.\textsuperscript{44} As a rule, decisions to migrate or to return are presented primarily as a rational evaluation of costs and benefits. Therefore, it is not the salary gap between countries itself, but an assessment of the expected benefits from the salary gap which is most important. According to International Labour Organization (ILO) figures, for persons with equivalent qualifications, average salaries in low-income countries are only 20 per cent of those in high-income countries, and 27 per cent of those in lower-middle income countries. Often the different is 10-fold, and sometimes it reaches 30-fold.\textsuperscript{45}

Because of Russia and Kazakhstan’s economic development, their labour markets are much wider than that of Kyrgyzstan, and citizens of those countries do not work in certain areas of the economy. Therefore, migrant workers in search of work are confident in their chances of finding work, even if it is unprotected (unlawful) work.

It should be noted that since the beginning of the 2000s, a very large contingent, born in a period of high birth rates between 1985 and 1994, has entered the workforce. This has put significant pressure on local labour markets. Given resource limitations (land cannot be worked on a farm by several sons from one family), migration from remote parts of the country to urban areas or abroad is the only alternative to earn money and consolidate one’s social status. Therefore, the demographic characteristics of processes in Russia and in Kyrgyzstan create a fusion of pull and push factors. Economic development in host countries, technological progress and development of means of communications are additional important determinant factors for migration. Thanks to the accessibility\textsuperscript{46} of Russia and Kazakhstan, the existence of logistical infrastructure (roads, various forms of transport and routes of travel) as well as the accessibility of means of communication (internet and mobile communications), migration can be engaged in not just by mature men and women from Kyrgyzstan, but also young men and women, who by tradition are under intense social control in their communities. The inability to engage in income-generating activities at home has led to development of “distorted” markets in land, capital and labour, which are said by Kyrgyzstani experts Khasanov and Koychumanov to be important factors stimulating external migration.\textsuperscript{47} Political factors are also significant, in both the source and destination countries.

\textsuperscript{44} Abashin S., “Massovogo ottoka migrantov iz Rossii ne ozhidayetsya [A Massive Outflow of Migrants from Russia is not Expected]” (2015).


\textsuperscript{46} This concerns the proximity of these countries, and financial attainability, because over the last decade air tickets have become much cheaper, and also it has become possible to travel to Russia by bus.

Short history and main determinant factors

Visualization of the migration balance statistics (the difference between the numbers arriving and leaving) between 1990 and 2015 (see Figure 2) demonstrates that there have been periods of reduced mobility, as well as certain peaks in migration. At the beginning of the 2000s, there was a noted tendency of reduction in the migration flow from the country in 2003-4, which was linked primarily to the electoral cycle in Russia (parliamentary elections in 2003 and presidential elections in 2004). This intensified populist rhetoric in political discourse, and led to a growth in repressive mechanisms in migration legislation. As Russian experts have noted: “…the mechanisms adopted to regulate migration flow significantly hampered the inflow of CIS citizens to Russia and did not match the administrative capacity of the State to combat illegal immigration.” However, soon after the adoption of this law, the President proposed a series of amendments to it, the adoption of which was virtually guaranteed but postponed to the post-election period.”

The year 2005 saw increased mobility, which can fully be explained both by political instability and because of economic collapse in Kyrgyzstan, as well as an economic upturn in Russia and “stabilisation” of the political regime following the parliamentary and presidential elections.

The next slump in migratory flow from Kyrgyzstan took place in 2008-9, when the economic crisis accompanied by “disloyal” measures of migration policy (a halving of the quota and the introduction of regulatory changes that made it more difficult to find lawful work), and inflation also proved themselves an insurmountable burden for many migrant workers, who were forced to return to their homeland. The 2010 events again stirred up a spirit of migration, especially among ethnic Uzbeks, primarily young men and boys. In the period

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49 For some regions, for residents of forested areas of Jalalabad oblast for example, years with poor nut harvests are also significant, as migrants try not to return home and do everything they can to help their family members at home survive without their main income source. According to experts, the years 2005-7 were harvestless.

since 2012, migration flows have again fallen, against the background of a serious economic crisis, the introduction of “black lists” and mass deportations of some migrant workers from the Russian Federation: “illegals” have been forced to return home and await new opportunities to leave again.

In recent years, experts have often highlighted household strategies as social push factors for migration. That is, it is not just the migrant who makes the decision to travel to work, but it forms part of a family strategy to diversify sources of income, minimise risks to the household and widen access to financial resources.\(^{51}\) Therefore, such decisions may be influenced by poor harvests or problems selling produce at viable prices, or a need for certain family or household activities that incur significant expenses. Social networks that attract migrants to foreign countries are very significant, as when there are limited economic opportunities at home, social networks help to mitigate adaptation to migration and provide role models for achieving economic and social success through migration.

Migration for education attracts the most active and ambitious students, who take the decision to leave their region or country to bridge the gap in quality and prestige of education, acquire skills and knowledge, and access the social networks that will allow them to meet their career goals.

A combination of push and pull factors lead to the mobility of hundreds of thousands of Kyrgyzstani, who travel abroad as migrants or move within the country in search of a better quality of life and economic opportunities. Choice of destination by migrant workers or other migrants is largely down to cultural factors (a common history, understanding the culture, knowing the language). It is not by chance that the main destination countries for migrants from Kyrgyzstan are Russia and Kazakhstan.

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Part A.1. General cross-border mobility

A glossary recently published by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) in its “Baseline Study on Cross-border Mobility in the OSCE Region” gives a laconic and “simple” definition for the term “cross-border mobility”: ‘Movement of persons across international borders’.\(^{52}\) Despite the simplicity of the wording, there are a number of serious challenges in practice when operationalizing the term and taking into account cross-border mobility in Kyrgyzstan. This is primarily because of the specifics of the UN estimates, based on the number of persons born outside the country. Thus, according to the Census, a quarter of Kyrgyzstan’s population (at the time 1,340,858 persons) had not lived in their places of residence from birth, including 230,167 people who had come from outside Kyrgyzstan.

The World Bank “Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011” includes statistics on Kyrgyzstan: the migration flow into Kyrgyzstan was 222,700 people, making up 4 per cent of the country’s population. The main countries of origin, according to the Factbook, were Uzbekistan, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkey and Germany.\(^{53}\) Russian migration expert V. Mukomel’, in an article entitled Rossiyskiye diskursy o migratsii: «nulevyye» gody [Russian discourses on migration: the “zero” years],\(^{54}\) when commenting on analogous figures about Russia,\(^{55}\) stated that: “Such estimates are unacceptable when applied to newly-independent states which have emerged in the territory of broken-up states: the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and others”. That is, due to the specifics of historical development and the mobility of Soviet citizens it is not possible to perceive those citizens living in one or another of the post-Soviet republics as immigrants by virtue of being born outside their place of residence, as earlier they were all part of one country, and migration of citizens from republic to republic, therefore, was internal.

The methodology applied by the UN to calculate the scale of immigration flows could lead in the case of the post-Soviet states to an absurd situation: some people classified as immigrant residents of Kyrgyzstan could be practically immobile, and could never have crossed international boundaries. This includes, for example, dozens of residents of Sary Mogol village in Alay district, whose land was transferred from Tajikistan to Kyrgyzstan in 2004 after having been rented for dozens of years.\(^{56}\)

The liberalization in 2012 of visa requirements for citizens of 44 non-CIS countries, to increase the flow of tourists from abroad, is a challenge to collecting data on cross-border mobility in the Kyrgyz Republic. Since 2013, Kyrgyzstan only requires visa requirements for citizens of a few countries in the Europe and Central Asia region, including Albania, Andorra, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Montenegro, San Marino, Serbia and Turkmenistan.\(^{57}\)

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\(^{54}\) Demoskop Weekly 479-480 26 September – 9 October 2011

\(^{55}\) In this collection, Russia was identified as the country with the second highest number of immigrants in world (after the USA): 12,270,000 people, including citizens now living in the country who were born in other republics of the Soviet Union when it was united.

\(^{56}\) Some residents of the village have not yet been documented, do not have valid passports, are not officially citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, and are classified as stateless persons.

There are different categories of people who engage in cross-border mobility: Kyrgyzstani citizens migrating to another country or returning from it; migrants from Kyrgyzstan intending to obtain citizenship of another country; transitory migrants; repatriates; refugees and stateless persons; migrant workers from other countries who are seeking work in Kyrgyzstan; and foreign nationals who come on tourism or business purposes. Often, people in these categories can overlap, leading to problems due to lack of regulatory principles in legislation.

According to statistics from the Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic, the number of crossings of Kyrgyzstan’s state border in the past decade is as follows:

Table 2: Crossings of the Kyrgyz Republic’s state borders, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of registered border crossings (entries/exits)</th>
<th>Of whom from CIS countries (entries/exits)</th>
<th>Of whom from countries outside the CIS (entries/exits)</th>
<th>Cross-border mobility of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6282307 (2972859 / 3309448)</td>
<td>1444350 / 1588330</td>
<td>96971 / 97813</td>
<td>1431538 / 1623305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12731948 (6232325 / 6499623)</td>
<td>3539579 / 3594521</td>
<td>131063 / 130915</td>
<td>2561683 / 2774187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>14291245 (6999983 / 7291262)</td>
<td>3651831 / 3704027</td>
<td>157943 / 152683</td>
<td>3190209 / 3434552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>15852630 (7977858 / 874772)</td>
<td>4361930 / 4217229</td>
<td>154637 / 155483</td>
<td>3461291 / 3502060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>15346226 (7656769 / 7689457)</td>
<td>3938252 / 3921265</td>
<td>185213 / 187200</td>
<td>3533304 / 3580992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Border Service of the Kyrgyz Republic

In addition to statistics from the Border Service, there are also figures from the Department for Registration of Population and Civil Acts at the State Registration Service (DRPCA SRS) under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (about the number of visas issued to foreign nationals: these reveal that in the last four years the number of foreign nationals arriving from visa countries has risen by more than 40 per cent).

Statistics on cross-border mobility do not give a full picture about movement to and from the country. The authors of an analytical report mapping irregular migration in Central Asia presented official data from 2010 where the illicit entry of foreign nationals comes to no more than 11 per cent of all legal entry into the country. According to the experts, “very small flows of migrants at borders may indicate that a significant proportion of entries and exits, particularly short-term or localised, are not displayed and thus not represented in the statistics.” In particular, it is considered unlikely that the cross-border mobility of casual-day labourers and other regular migrants from the border areas, who are informally hired (on a daily or seasonal basis) by households and farms, is accounted for.

In his work on migration from China to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, researcher N. Steiner argues that weak border controls, corruption and lack of oversight over officials when issuing visas contribute to a situation in which at just one point on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in a district

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58 Bir Duino NGO report, “Analiz zakonodatel’stv KR, RT, RF i RK v sfere trudovoy migratsii i rekomendatsii po ikh usovershenstvovaniyu [Analysis of the legislation of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan. Russia and Kazakhstan in the field of labour migration, and recommendations for its improvement], (Bishkek, 2013) pp.24-25

near Osh city, almost 40,000 unofficial, unregistered border crossings take place (as a rule by residents of Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). \(^{60}\)

The Border Service changed its statistical form for registering foreign nationals in 2007, adding a cluster of “border workers”. In 2007, a total of 13,183 Kyrgyzstani citizens and 36,036 foreign nationals were recorded in this category (accounting for 1.5% and 2% respectively of total entries). This category was made up of persons constantly travelling across borders because of work in a border area of a neighbouring state. Unfortunately, the Border Service returned in subsequent years to its old statistical form, which does not record the proportion of cross-border workers, or the motives of visits of foreign nationals who are not “visiting friends and relatives”, which amounted in 2007 to 64.6 per cent of the total crossings, or those engaging in “shopping tourism” or “treatment” (1.1% and 0.8% respectively).

Of the foreign nationals entering Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and 2014, the largest number came from the following countries (countries with more than 1,000 people entering the country):

### Table 3: Foreign citizens entering Kyrgyzstan in 2010 and 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIS countries</td>
<td>Non-CIS countries</td>
<td>CIS countries</td>
<td>Non-CIS countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>68.9%</td>
<td>China 2.3%</td>
<td>Kazakhstan 87.8%</td>
<td>China 1.04%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>Turkey 1%</td>
<td>Russia 14.3%</td>
<td>Turkey 1.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>USA 0.8%</td>
<td>Uzbekistan 8.9%</td>
<td>Germany 0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>Germany 0.5%</td>
<td>Tajikistan 4.9%</td>
<td>USA 0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>South Korea 0.3%</td>
<td>Turkmenistan 0.4%</td>
<td>South Korea 0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>United Kingdom 0.2%</td>
<td>United Kingdom 0.2%</td>
<td>India 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 0.2%</td>
<td>France 0.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran 0.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Canada 0.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India 0.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Australia 0.09%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Italy 0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 0.09%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland 0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Switzerland 0.08%</td>
<td></td>
<td>North Korea 0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland 0.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Israel 0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mongolia 0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands 0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan 0.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic 0.06%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** State Border Service

Trends can be seen in accessible statistics from the Border Service in declared motives and purposes of entry to Kyrgyzstan by foreign nationals (see Table 4).

### Table 4: Motives and reasons for entry to Kyrgyzstan by foreign nationals (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Tourism</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Transit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Non-CIS</td>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Non-CIS</td>
<td>CIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5861</td>
<td>12107</td>
<td>4857</td>
<td>19886</td>
<td>674858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>21681</td>
<td>9173</td>
<td>241533</td>
<td>20985</td>
<td>1723852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10721</td>
<td>6465</td>
<td>123929</td>
<td>5992</td>
<td>1009641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12455</td>
<td>5875</td>
<td>403177</td>
<td>9823</td>
<td>2497981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>102687</td>
<td>41653</td>
<td>239662</td>
<td>16531</td>
<td>2918753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5970</td>
<td>4088</td>
<td>192404</td>
<td>10937</td>
<td>3799961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>7104</td>
<td>8590</td>
<td>163805</td>
<td>172228</td>
<td>1924783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Border Service

The reasons foreign nationals enter Kyrgyzstan vary significantly from year to year: some years tourism is one of the most popular and numerous (in 2009 or 2011 for example), while in others it falls sharply; the number of service visits can also rise or fall by multiples year to year; and even the number arriving for permanent residency can change very significantly. It is not possible to describe how and which factors influence the volume of these different flows of foreign nationals into Kyrgyzstan as no research has been conducted in this area.

Of the foreign nationals who came to Kyrgyzstan with visas, a significant proportion extended the term of their visa for various reasons. Information from the DRPCA SRS about which types of visas were extended, and which aims the foreign nationals who had entered stated for extending them provide an opportunity to independently evaluate the character of immigration to Kyrgyzstan.

So, in 2011 31,539 foreign nationals who had entered Kyrgyzstan with visas had their visas extended, including:

- By number of entries: single entry – 26,060; double entry – 575; multiple entry – 4,924;
- By type of visa: business – 9,530; working – 8,007; private – 6,464; study – 6,684; religious – 78; tourist – 776.

Half of these visas were issued to citizens of China (16,516), then Turkey (3,295), Pakistan (2,560), Uzbekistan (2,176), South Korea (1,037) and Tajikistan (749).

In 2014 33,922 foreign nationals’ visas were extended, including:

- By number of entries: single entry – 26,232; double entry – 444; multiple entry – 7,246.

The declared intentions of foreign nationals for their visits may not be fully accurate, as can be seen, for example, by a visually significant number of religious missionaries who visit village mosques throughout the country with the intention of recruiting new adepts, though

61     According to media sources, most missionaries come from Russia (Tatarstan) and Kazakhstan.
Part A.1. General cross-border mobility

according to the statistics this flow has almost ended.\textsuperscript{62} Usually in villages when foreign missionaries (daavatchys\textsuperscript{63}) appear, the heads of officials from local self-government track them, gathering information about the foreigners (and their documents) in official memos. Exchange of information between the local self-government and the Border Service, the State Registration Service and other state bodies, as well as synchronization of records, could be a valuable resource for effective governance of immigration flows into Kyrgyzstan. It is likely that introducing such a practice would be linked with the introduction of a Unified Registration System for external migration, which the State Committee for National Security (SCNS) has been mandated to coordinate.

There are a significant number of foreign nationals who have decided to stay in the country for a longer period of time than they planned at the time of arrival and arranging visas (see Figure 3).

It is important to consider what the contingent of foreign nationals entering is, and why they change the goals and deadlines of their stay when they change the declared aim of short tourist visits to long-term stays (this is often linked with registration and obtaining residence permits and / or immigration status).

**Figure 3: Difference between the number of foreign nationals entering and exiting the country on tourist visas**

![Figure 3: Difference between the number of foreign nationals entering and exiting the country on tourist visas](image)

(Source: State Registration Service)

The cross-border mobility of Kyrgyzstani citizens varies from year to year. Over the past twenty years, cross-border mobility by Kyrgyzstani citizens has shown a pattern of amplification: increasing in bad years associated with significant downturns in the economy or extraordinary events, and reducing on stabilization\textsuperscript{64} (see the Figure below.).

\textsuperscript{62} It is quite possible that most foreigners who come to Kyrgyzstan with religious purposes are not from the countries mentioned above.

\textsuperscript{63} Dawat preachers (from dawat: Islamic call) explain the principles of Islam and invite (without coercion) listeners to accept Islam.

\textsuperscript{64} Due to the limited information provided by Kyrgyzstan’s Border Service, it is not possible to compare the flows crossing the border by land and air, or the main trends and directions of travel of migrating Kyrgyz citizens.
Figure 4: Trends in cross-border mobility of Kyrgyzstani citizens (thousands of persons)

Source: State Registration Service
Part A.2. Immigration

As noted in the Extended Migration Profile for Kyrgyzstan in 2012: “Kyrgyzstan practically does not have a formulated policy in the area of immigration of population. With an annual growth rate of immigrants the governmental approach towards illegal economic migrants is confined to ensuring control and accounting of immigrants within established by the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic’s labour quota.”

Experts also note the lack of significant research or analysis in the field of immigration and immigration policy in Kyrgyzstan. The authors of a report on mapping irregular migration in Central Asia stated: “Kyrgyzstan is unusual in its use of materials from surveys and censuses. As of yet its administrative system is not used very actively, although there has been progress in recent years. In 2007, Kyrgyzstan approved the State Programme for the regulation of migration processes for 2007-2010, in which it noted in particular that ‘a lack of reliable and comprehensive data on the number of migrants and the structure of migration flows makes it difficult to develop optimal solutions to streamline migration flows. Therefore it is necessary to strengthen inter-agency cooperation through the use of the most advanced methods of reporting and registration of migrants, and appropriate technical equipment belonging to the agencies concerned.’”

In analysing the practice of granting immigrant status over several years, the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth of the Kyrgyz Republic (MLMY) (formerly the mandated body for migration policy) identified four main groups of foreign nationals and stateless persons seeking immigrant status:

1. Persons who were formerly citizens of Kyrgyzstan and then took citizenship of another State but continued to reside uninterruptedly in the country’s territory.
2. Compatriots, who previously left for Russia with the aim of working and receiving Russian citizenship and returned to their homeland in Kyrgyzstan for permanent residence.
3. Citizens of other States with close relatives who are citizens or permanent residents of Kyrgyzstan.
4. Persons with the intention and opportunities to make a significant contribution to the economic, social and spiritual development of the Kyrgyz Republic.

The proportions of persons in each of these groups out of the total number of registered foreign nationals are not clear.

In the first 11 months of 2014, the country’s passport and visa departments registered 101,884 foreign nationals (see Figure 5): this is significantly more than in 2011.

Figures on foreign nationals and stateless persons entering and remaining in Kyrgyzstan are not tracked or disaggregated by sex, age and other socio-demographic characteristics, and therefore it is difficult to provide an average demographic profile. It can only reliably be said that every year the number of applications for Kyrgyzstani citizenship, residence permits (temporary or permanent), work permits for Kyrgyzstan or recognition as stateless persons is increasing.

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65 IOM, Extended Migration Profile, Bishkek, 2012, p.15
67 There is no data on the emphasized clusters in this Extended Migration Profile
Figure 5: Number of foreign nationals registered by DRPCA SRS

Source: DRPCA SRS figures

Figure 6. Number of applications for Kyrgyzstani residence permits (temporary or permanent)

Source: DRPCA SRS figures

Figure 7: Number of foreign nationals granted permanent residence in Kyrgyzstan from CIS countries

Source: DRPCA SRS figures
In 2013 and 2014 the growth in the number of foreign nationals granted permanent residence for the first time was mainly due to Chinese citizens, who began to receive almost six times more permanent residence permits than four years earlier. There was a reduction (in absolute and relative terms) in the number of Russian citizens receiving permanent residence, while the proportion of citizens of Kazakhstan remained stable (with an absolute increase in the number of people of more than 1.5 times). The proportion of Uzbek and Turkish nationals fell, with a stable number in absolute terms.
Figure 10: Number of residence permits issued and prolonged and persons recognized as stateless persons

Source: MLMY

The figures available on authorising and extending resident permits for foreign nationals and stateless persons do not provide evidence of what immigrants are doing and how they finance their stay. Lack of clarity about the socio-demographic profile of immigrants leads to a lack of understanding of their needs and interests, and makes it impossible to gauge if their rights need protecting. Remarkably, there is still no human rights organisation in the country that specialises in protecting the rights of foreign nationals and stateless persons, and not one state or civil society organisation has articulated protection of the rights of foreign nationals living in Kyrgyzstan as part of its mandate. This situation is not unique in the post-Soviet space, or in the world as a whole (with rare exceptions) and it reflects an important contradiction in the struggle to observe human rights: human rights are seen by most citizens as citizens’ rights, valid within the confines of a nation state, and not as a cross-border category.68

There has been a tendency of decline in flow of asylum seekers and refugees entering Kyrgyzstan over the last eight years. This may be because of the low proportion of asylum seekers receiving refugee status. The proportion of failed asylum claims is as follows:

- 2015 (first nine months) – 80.6%
- 2014 – 65.5%
- 2013 – 53.2%
- 2011 – 49.4%
- 2009 – 64.2%
- 2008 – 70.4%

(in 2010 and 2012 the proportion of failed asylum claims was low: 9 and 18.4 per cent respectively, but in these two years no-one received asylum seeker status).

---

68 Ibraeva, Moldosheva, Ablezova, Niyazova, Danshina, “Gender i migratsiya [Gender and Migration]”, 2013
According to the MLMY’s annual report for 2013, there were 143 refugees in Kyrgyzstan as of 1 December 2013. Of these, 88 per cent were from Afghanistan, a reduction by five from the same point in 2012, by 40 from 2011 and by 70 from 2010. There were 289 asylum seekers registered on 1 December 2014, including five new-born babies. The annual report stated that six refugees no longer had

Of the foreign nationals who settled in Kyrgyzstan from other countries, kayrylmans have a particular status. The issue of repatriation was on the political agenda already at the dawn of Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty. In 1993-4, the Government issued several decisions to simplify the procedure for return home of ethnic Kyrgyz. However, without committed funds and concrete measures the scheme remained rhetorical for a long period. In 1997 a State Kayrylman Programme was adopted for ethnic Kyrgyz. Conditions of return, including a social package, psychological support and reintegration measures, were widely discussed in society. However, practical steps were not taken.

Between 2007 and 2015, state policy on immigration of ethnic Kyrgyz was regulated by the Constitution, as well as the Law “On State Guarantees for Ethnic Kyrgyz Returning to their Historical Homeland”. The Law set out the legal, economic and social foundations for immigration processes, and also put in place the conditions needed for Kayrylms in their new home. Nevertheless, over the seven years the Law has been in force, thousands of Kayrylms have found themselves in a difficult situation: they waited for years for decisions on citizenship and faced practical problems in realising their rights and gaining access to basic social services.


According to official statistics, between 1995 and 2013 more than 40,000 people received citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic and the status of Kayrylmans, of whom 18,000 received it since 2007. People arriving from different countries and in different historical periods of Kayrylman repatriation faced different opportunities for receiving Kayrylman status and then citizenship.\textsuperscript{71} Repatriates from different countries faced and still face inequities: since Tajikistan’s civil war, Kayrylmans from Tajikistan have received support from international organizations,\textsuperscript{72} while arriving ethnic Kyrgyz from Uzbekistan do not receive such support. Meanwhile, Kayrylmans from Uzbekistan have been the most numerous in recent years.

The legislation describing and regulating the resettlement of Kayrylmans changed very recently,\textsuperscript{73} with very significant changes to the very concept of repatriation as a whole: while earlier the law focussed on ethnic Kyrgyz and saw their resettlement in terms of a return to their historical homeland, guaranteeing a package of state support, now mobility does not include historical rights of repatriates (under the amended legislation Kayrylmans have lost their right to choose land in Kyrgyzstan, and also the right to receive benefits and compensation, including loans). Now Kayrylmans do not differ in any way from other immigrants seeking to acquire citizenship. Equalization of Kayrylmans with other immigrants seeking Kyrgyzstani citizenship has also led to abolition of quotas as a limiting mechanism for all those wanting to be Kayrylmans. Figures 12 and 13 show the number of persons receiving Kayrylman status by region and sex, and by their citizenship before returning to Kyrgyzstan.

**Figure 12: Persons receiving Kayrylman status in 2014, by region**

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure12.png}
\caption{Persons receiving Kayrylman status in 2014, by region}
\end{figure}

Source: MLMY


\textsuperscript{72} More about this can be found in the third chapter of this profile.

Part A.2. Immigration

Figure 13: Persons receiving Kayrylmans status in 2014, by country of origin

![Pie chart showing the distribution of Kayrylmans status by country of origin.](chart)

Source: MLMY

As can be seen from Figure 13, the overwhelming majority of Kayrylmans acquiring the status in 2014 came from Uzbekistan, with a smaller number from Tajikistan. Evidently this fact has led to the localization of Kayrylmans predominantly in the southern oblasts, bordering Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Also, in several places, gender asymmetry can be seen, with a predominance of women. The age composition reveals that it is mainly young and working-age people who come to the “historical homeland”: the proportion of children and elderly people is very low. The lack of conditions for integration of working-age Kayrylmans in local communities and labour markets has increased the adverse living environment for them, and increased the risk of clashes or on-going conflict with the local population, which often happens in practice.\(^{74}\) Of the Kayrylmans from Tajikistan who have settled in Chuy oblast, a large proportion are women and men who do not have documents, and are living without hope of finding legal work or receiving social benefits or pensions. Often in such families, children who were born in Kyrgyzstan are also not documented. Because of patriarchal stereotypes, poverty, and the lack of documents among many, women give birth at home without medical assistance.

Figure 14: Persons receiving Kayrylmans status by age group

![Pie chart showing the distribution of Kayrylmans status by age group.](chart)

Source: MLMY

---

The situation of families of repatriates who are waiting for citizenship, like the process of integration of those who have already received citizenship, is very poorly researched.

In recent years, there has been much discussion about the problems of borderland immigration. In particular the process known as “creeping migration”, which takes place at Kyrgyzstan’s southern border with Tajikistan, has had wide resonance. In modern understanding, the term “creeping migration” is used to define illegal purchases or renting of property and plots of land from citizens of Kyrgyzstan by citizens of neighbouring Tajikistan, and the illegal claiming of disputed territory, which may have a negative impact on interethnic relations in cross-border communities. Experts believe that as a result of mass outflow of the population from many settlements in the south, particularly in Batken oblast, a change can be seen in the ethnic, social and age structure of the population, and that this could lead to problems with interethnic relations. At the same time, migrants from neighbouring countries, particularly Tajikistan, choose this area for resettlement. According to the NGO “Foundation for Tolerance International”, more than 200 families of citizens of Tajikistan live illegally in Batken oblast, and have illegally acquired 38 hectares of land and subsequently built housing for permanent residence.

A.2.1. Immigration for the purpose of employment

The decision “On the procedure for working in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic by foreign nationals and stateless persons”, approved by Government Decision 639 of 8 September 2006 envisages two types of permit:

- Permit to recruit a foreign workforce: a standardized document giving the right to legal and physical persons to recruit and use foreign workers in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic.

- Work permit: a standardized document confirming the right of a foreign national or a stateless person to carry out work or entrepreneurial activities in the Kyrgyz Republic; issued to persons at least 18 years of age.

In addition to these types of permits, national legislation also contains a comprehensive list of foreign nationals and stateless persons who are not required to acquire permits (persons...
A.2.1. Immigration for the purpose of employment

offically recognised as refugees; persons with permanent residence in the Kyrgyz Republic; persons who have been granted political asylum in the Kyrgyz Republic; persons who have been sent on a mission for installation (supervision of installation) of technical equipment by a foreign legal person; students undergoing practical training in a Kyrgyz educational institution and working in the holidays, and others).  

The mandated body to issue permits to recruit foreign workforces for legal and physical persons (within the framework of annual quotas set by the Government) was until recently the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth. A collegiate inter-agency licensing commission, chaired by the MLMY’s State Secretary, allocates quotas. The list of documents needed to receive permission to recruit a foreign workforce and permission to work is set by MLMY Order.

The MLMY has the following statistics for employment of foreign nationals:

![Figure 15: Number of employed foreign nationals in Kyrgyzstan, by type of permit](source)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Permit for labour activity in Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Permit for foreign worker status under quota</td>
<td>11358</td>
<td>10145</td>
<td>12031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MLMY

Table 5: Citizenship of working foreign nationals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China - 8455</td>
<td>China - 7280</td>
<td>China - 8721 (72,5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey - 1086</td>
<td>Russia - 2328</td>
<td>Turkey - 1780 (9,8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan - 271</td>
<td>Turkey - 1075</td>
<td>Russia - 370 (3,1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia - 250</td>
<td>Pakistan - 264</td>
<td>Pakistan - 323 (2,7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea - 231</td>
<td>South Korea - 238</td>
<td>South Korea - 255 (2,1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA - 144</td>
<td>USA - 147</td>
<td>USA - 188 (1,6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan - 140</td>
<td>Kazakhstan - 130</td>
<td>Uzbekistan - 132 (1,1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan - 109</td>
<td>Uzbekistan - 76</td>
<td>Kazakhstan - 130 (1,1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In their current form, quotas only cover a small proportion of the real number of labour immigrants and, consequently, in fact do not reduce the scale of recruitment that violates legislation.

Ibid.

Since December 2015 the power has been mandated to the State Migration Service under the Government.

It is not clear if it is possible to estimate how many foreigners actually started working in the reporting period (i.e., the volume of “flow”) or how to evaluate the size of the foreign workforce in the country on a certain date (i.e. the number of migrants at the beginning or end of the reporting period).

With regard to the immigration flow from China – it is complex, including ethnic Chinese (Han) working for large construction, extractive and processing enterprises in projects with Chinese financing, as well as individual entrepreneurs trading Chinese goods in markets. As a rule, these are ethnic Uighurs and Dungans from Xinjiang, who in the early 1990s, because of familial ties with the diaspora in Kyrgyzstan, began shuttle trading and creating bazaars in Kyrgyzstan, which are the largest in Central Asia for the re-export of Chinese goods. According to the American researchers Laruelle and Peyrouse, about 46,000 ethnic Uzbeks and 70,000 Dungans are involved in shuttle trading from China.\textsuperscript{82}

According Steiner’s statistics, about 100,000 Han Chinese are permanently resident in Kyrgyzstan.\textsuperscript{83} It is clear that all these flows are not supported by legal documentation. In 2015, the issue of Chinese immigrants was raised several times in Kyrgyzstan’s press, which referred to “dozens of citizens of the People’s Republic of China, who have provided fake work permits to carry out business activities”.\textsuperscript{84}

This information had great resonance in immigration circles. During a specially organised press conference at Vecherniy Bishkek newspaper, a member of the Kyrgyz-Russian association “New Economic Initiatives” expressed the opinion that foreigners find it impossible to acquire the documents needed within the allotted time frame. Most companies, including Russian ones, are refused permission without explanation to hire highly-trained professionals, while a large number of Chinese immigrants work in bazaars.\textsuperscript{85}

According to the MLMY, the main areas of labour of foreign citizens are the following:

**Figure 16: Migrant workers by economic sector in Kyrgyzstan (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade, services</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare, education and culture</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking, insurance sector</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: MLMY*

The trends in recent years for presence of foreign workers in various economic sectors are presented in Figure 17.

\textsuperscript{82} Steiner N. J., “Chinese Migration to Central Asia: Contrasting Experiences between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan”, p. 35
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
A.2.1. Immigration for the purpose of employment

Despite the insignificant volume of annual newly issued immigration quotas, in aggregate over the period 2009 to 2014, quotas have accounted for a significant proportion of the local labour market in terms of proportion of workplaces.

Table 6: Quotas for recruiting workforce in Central Asian countries, 2009-2014 (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>59630</td>
<td>45737</td>
<td>48092</td>
<td>48903</td>
<td>37480</td>
<td>63290</td>
<td>303132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>11395</td>
<td>10286</td>
<td>10650</td>
<td>12864</td>
<td>12990</td>
<td>12990</td>
<td>64175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>7000</td>
<td>5050</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>4350</td>
<td>4800</td>
<td>32000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>77025</td>
<td>63023</td>
<td>63792</td>
<td>66567</td>
<td>54820</td>
<td>81080</td>
<td>399307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In public discourse in Kyrgyzstan, questions are periodically raised about the very existence of immigration quotas: which professional competencies are demanded in quota requests? Which local labour markets require a foreign workforce? What is the actual composition of the immigrant workforce? What should the advantage of a foreign workforce be, to be preferred to local workers? Such questions are not frivolous: the creation of 65,000 jobs over a five-year period could significantly change the issue of unemployment among citizens of Kyrgyzstan.
Official MLMY figures show that provision of immigration quotas and work permits bring a not-insignificant sum to the state budget. In 2013, a total of KGS 46.3 million som of revenue to the national budget accrued from issuing work permits; of which 4.3 million was for permits to hire foreign workers, 12.5 million for work permits, and 29.4 million from the trade sector. In addition, hired foreign workers bring various benefits to local communities. According to the MLYS report, foreign and joint enterprises financed by foreign capital in 2013 hired more than 40,000 citizens of Kyrgyzstan, and foreign employers created new workplaces for 1,500 local citizens.

A.2.2. Immigration for educational purposes

According to the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO), in 1999 there were 1.68 million internationally mobile students (henceforward “foreign students” or “international students”) globally, while by 2009 the number had reached 3.37 million. The main exporters of higher education in the world continue to be the same several countries: primarily the USA, the United Kingdom and so on.

Educational immigration is one of the most interesting and potentially promising components of Kyrgyzstan’s migration policy. In analysing the prospects of this type of immigration, researcher Nurbek Jengish noted: “Exporting educational services generates billions of dollars from spending on tuition and also various charges, living expenses and discretionary expenses. Exporting educational services creates new workplaces and increases state income.”

According to experts, Kyrgyzstan gained at a certain time the status of informal regional leader in attracting foreign students, and currently the education sector has serious chances of being one of the most lucrative sectors of the country’s economy. In 2015 there were a total of 31 state and 19 private higher educational institutions in the country, and branches of six (Russian) institutions, which taught foreign students. Figure 18 shows a steady decline in the number of students from CIS countries and an increasing number of students from countries outside the CIS, though students from CIS countries continue to make up the larger proportion (66.5%, while in the 2005/06 academic year the figure was 75%). In total, the number of foreign students in 2014/15 was just 46.5 per cent of the total who were studying in 2005/06.

86 Jengish N., “Eksport uslug vysshego obrazovaniya v KR [The export of higher education services in Kyrgyzstan]”, p.5

87 Research into exports of educational services was carried out back in 2010, and the situation in this area has been changing rapidly. Since 2010, a more assertive campaign to attract foreign students has been conducted by Kazakhstan’s best universities (KIMEP, Nazarbayev University and others), and also for groups of students whose education in Kyrgyzstan is traditionally supported by grants from the Aga Khan Foundation, the Soros Foundation (Open Society). They also began to face fierce competition from universities in other regions (for example, a direct competitor of AUCA in this sense is the American University in Bulgaria), which could distract students from Turkmenistan from AUCA. In addition, the closure of the popular Kyrgyz-Uzbek University in the south of the country also reduced the recruitment of Uzbek citizens. Therefore the issue of the country’s potential for export of educational services requires systematic study (and monitoring) in order to create a support system for providing educational services for international students in Kyrgyzstan.

A.2.2. Immigration for educational purposes

Figure 18: Number of foreign students in higher education in Kyrgyzstan (persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>From CIS</th>
<th>From outside CIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014/2015</td>
<td>4257</td>
<td>8466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013/2014</td>
<td>3467</td>
<td>8195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012/2013</td>
<td>3286</td>
<td>7977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011/2012</td>
<td>3099</td>
<td>7068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2011</td>
<td>3366</td>
<td>9814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>3431</td>
<td>12994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/2009</td>
<td>3113</td>
<td>17123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008</td>
<td>2713</td>
<td>22293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006/2007</td>
<td>2342</td>
<td>24863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005/2006</td>
<td>2045</td>
<td>25280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From 2014/15, foreign students made up 5.9 per cent of the total number of students in Kyrgyzstan.


Figure 19: Proportions of domestic and foreign students in Kyrgyzstan (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proportion of Kyrgyzstan nationals in higher education</th>
<th>Proportion of foreign students in higher education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>88,2</td>
<td>11,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>88,5</td>
<td>11,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>91,7</td>
<td>8,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>94,3</td>
<td>5,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>95,7</td>
<td>4,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>95,1</td>
<td>4,95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>94,8</td>
<td>5,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>94,1</td>
<td>5,9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSC

The data on foreign students shows an increase in the number of students from Kazakhstan, from 3,000 in 2009/10 to 4,800 in 2014/15, while in the same period the number from Uzbekistan fell dramatically, from 6,000 to 600. The “leader” country from outside the CIS for students in Kyrgyzstan is India, from where the number increased by a factor of five in the last four years (from 500 to 2,500).
According to experts, in 2008 - 2009 Kyrgyzstan had advantages in attracting foreign students, on the basis of joint inter-state universities (two Kyrgyz-Turkish universities, the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University, the American University in Central Asia, the OSCE Academy and others) and a particular advantage in the humanities. Since 2010, with the closure of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek University and a reduction due to political instability in the flow of students from not only Uzbekistan, but also from the CIS and other countries, the number of foreign students has declined.

In 2011/12 the number of medical students began to increase: these are usually Indian and Pakistani students. However, according to surveys of “wellbeing and satisfaction” in service provision, the situation is far from the most positive. There are very few foreign students recruited for vocational education, particularly from countries outside the CIS, as this type of education cannot be provided to foreigners in English or other languages. In addition, training in most further education institutions is considered by Kyrgyzstani citizens themselves to be poor quality and not prestigious.

**Figure 20: Number of foreign students in further education in Kyrgyzstan by year (persons)**

![Bar chart showing the number of foreign students in Kyrgyzstan by year.](chart)

*Source: NSC*

In 2014, the issue of attracting foreign students became prominent in public discourse, and was discussed in terms of economic benefits. The discussion in practice was initiated by the then Prime Minister Otorbaev, who introduced huge statistics about budgetary revenue from recruiting foreign students (more than USD 80 million per year in expenditure on living expenses, and USD 5 million on tuition fees).

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89 In this case this concerns immigrants from countries outside the CIS, because educational immigration flow in most cases from CIS countries meets high education requirements. For them the proximity of the educational institutions to their homeland and place of residence, as well as having relatives in Kyrgyzstan, is more important.
According to expert N. Jengish,\(^90\) the economic benefit received from foreign students has been quite moderate in absolute terms: USD 15 million. However, this amount is more than Kyrgyzstan’s budgetary allocation for the entire higher education sector in 2010 (about USD 12 million). In addition, in relative terms, the expenditure of foreign students in Kyrgyzstan is comparable to that in the leading exporting countries of higher education (such as Canada, the USA, and the United Kingdom).

The Ministry of Education and Science (MES) has developed an Action Plan for Implementation of the Concept for Exporting Educational Services of the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2016-20 which sets the target of increasing the proportion of foreign students in the total number of students by 10 per cent.

Research from 2011 reveals the factors attracting foreign students when choosing a country in which to study: relatively low tuition and living costs, the possibility to study in Russian, the shortest possible length of study (particularly for medical specialists), the opportunity to enter higher education with poor grades from school, low requirements from students during the education process\(^91\) and others.

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\(^90\) Jengish N., “Eksport uslug vysshego obrazovaniya v KR [The export of higher education services in Kyrgyzstan]”

\(^91\) Ibid.
Part A.3. Emigration

Though mass migration from Kyrgyzstan has been an integral form of sustenance for the state and society for at least a quarter of a century, there are still no effective tools and approaches to precisely measure changes in the scale of migration as a whole, including the volume of emigration.92 Regular household surveys conducted by the National Statistical Committee with limited sampling cannot reliably ascertain the real extent of emigration,93 but only show trends and proportions.

National statistics based on population censuses and regular sample-based surveys reveal that between 1990 and 2014 the country’s population fell by 779,004, of which between 2010 and 2014 it fell by 136,527.94

Data from the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth show that between 2010 and 2014 every year about 5 to 10 per cent of the economically active population left the country. In 2014 between 650,000 and 700,000 Kyrgyzstani citizens left the country at various times of the year for work or business. The largest number of migrant workers – about 585,000 Kyrgyzstani – are in the Russian Federation, while about 80-85,000 Kyrgyzstani are working in Kazakhstan.95

In total, the trends for leaving the country are as follows:

**Figure 22: Trends in external migration by destination country** (persons)

![Diagram showing trends in external migration by destination country](image)


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92 The main data sources include national experts: Population and Housing Census (March 2009); Labour Force Survey (since 2002); One-off employment survey (July 2006); Labour Migration Survey (October 2010); and administrative records of ministries and departments, For more see World Bank, Statistika trudovoy migratsii v stranakh seti MIRPAL [Statistics on labour migration in the countries of the MIRPAL network], (World Bank, 2011), p.58


94 Ibid.

As noted by the authors of the report “On the path to fact-based migration policy”: “in recent years the volume of emigration from Kyrgyzstan (about 40-50,000 persons per year is about the same as emigration from Russia, which has a much higher population. Labour migration is many times higher than emigration for permanent residence, and usually is temporary with intention to return.”  

The three destination countries that receive the most migrants from Kyrgyzstan (Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan) are all in the CIS (see Figure 23)

**Figure 23: External migration from Kyrgyzstan to CIS: top three destinations (persons)**

Source: National Statistical Committee

External migration to countries outside the CIS began to be systematically recorded in 1996, and the trend in emigration of Kyrgyzstani citizens is as follows:

**Figure 24: External migration from Kyrgyzstan to countries outside the CIS (persons)**

Source: National Statistical Committee

Kyrgyzstani nationals work in a wide variety of countries as migrants. The countries with the most actively developed labour markets include Turkey, China, the United Arab Emirates, 

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96 Chudinovskikh O., Manke M., “Na puti k migratsionnoy politike, osnovannoy na faktakh [On the path to evidence-based migration policy]”, Recommendations on improving access to, quality of and comparability of migration data in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, OSCE-IOM, 2014
Part A.3. Emigration

Kuwait, Qatar, South Korea and many others. The European labour market is also actively explored: migrants from Kyrgyzstan work in Germany and Italy. The most popular destination is the United Kingdom and particularly the capital London, where experts believe about 5,000 to 8,000 Kyrgyzstani are working.97

In total, according to figures from MLMY specialists, as of January 2015 there were 30,000 Kyrgyzstani nationals working outside the CIS.98

The difference between the volume of emigration from Kyrgyzstan to countries outside the CIS compared to CIS countries is linked to the following factors: the “language barrier”; poor information about recruitment; lack of experienced recruitment agencies for foreign countries and lack of experience of recruitment and life in labour-importing countries; tough competition in the labour markets of western countries; and the weakness of ethnic migration networks in the recipient countries.

In general it is noticeable that the emigration flow is falling from year to year. If the years since 1990 are divided into five-year periods, it turns out that 2006-10 saw a “surge” in emigration flow, but this was almost 2.5 times less than the flow between 1990 and 1994. The volume of emigration in 2010-14 is about the same as that in 2000-04.

Figure 25: External migration from Kyrgyzstan over time (persons)

Source: National Statistical Committee

According to Federal Migration Service figures, a total of 516,500 persons have acquired Russian citizenship, of whom 367,200 acquired it between 2003 and 2014.99

In an editorial comment on the statistics on Kyrgyzstani citizens acquiring Russian citizenship, the Kyrgyzstani online newspaper “Belyi Parus”: “No-one has counted how many Kyrgyzstanis received Russian citizenship without leaving the country permanently. But this is a phenomenon we are facing constantly and everywhere: people of different ethnicities and different social strata – from neighbourhood Russian grannies to ethnic Kyrgyz senior bureaucrats – acquired Russian citizenship, although they are still living and working in...

98 Ibid.
Kyrgyzstan. This is also a significant fact, suggesting that the population finds staying here very comfortable, but on the condition that it is politically stable.”

Erica Marat, a researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center cites IOM statistics that show that in 2007 300,000 Kyrgyzstani citizens worked in Russia, of whom 160,000 had Russian passports. Then in 2008, the number who had acquired Russian citizenship increased by another 43,000. The number of persons who received Russian citizenship makes up a quarter of the whole adult population of the country, and is equivalent to more than 80 per cent of ethnic Kyrgyz aged under 35.

It is not possible to calculate the number of persons acquiring Russian citizenship who preserved de facto Kyrgyzstani citizenship.

Often such a situation is not a rational decision by citizens, but a result of misunderstanding and poor awareness. Thus, some emigrants from Kyrgyzstan believe that it is mandatory when acquiring Russian citizenship just to write a statement renouncing Kyrgyzstani citizenship, and they are not removed from Kyrgyzstani records. Some migrants did not register with consular services in the destination countries for various reasons. This is evidenced by the appeals from migrants from Kyrgyzstan in the Russian Federation during the last parliamentary elections, when a significant number of those who came to vote were unable to do so because they were not on the consular register in Kyrgyzstan.

Legislation and the authorities in Kyrgyzstan tolerate dual citizenship among immigrants, as reflected in the Constitution and the Law “On Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic”, of which Article 6. Other citizenship states:

1. A citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic with another nationality is considered by the Kyrgyz Republic just to be a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, with the exception of cases envisaged under this Law and entered into via international agreements to which the Kyrgyz Republic is party.

2. The acquisition by a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic of another nationality does not bring about termination of citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic.

That is, with regard to dual citizenship a quasi-legal situation has developed. On the one hand, it is permitted by national legislation, but due to a lack of agreements with key destination countries of labour migration its unilateral recognition is not sufficient for full dual citizenship.
Meanwhile, as a result of changes in Russian migration legislation in 2014 (the Law of the Russian Federation “On Citizenship”) Kyrgyzstani citizens who preserved their Kyrgyzstani citizenship may face criminal accountability.\textsuperscript{104} In practice, those acquiring Russian citizenship while maintaining Kyrgyzstani can lose the acquired Russian citizenship, if they are found on Kyrgyzstan’s civil register.

According to figures from the Directorate of Russia’s Federal Migration Service: “…migrants from Kyrgyzstan make up 4.9 per cent of migrants in the Russian Federation and 6.9 per cent of unlawful migrants, while a total of 5.9 per cent of Kyrgyzstani citizens living in the Russian Federation have dual nationality.”\textsuperscript{105}

There is no information accessible about the number of Kyrgyzstani citizens who have acquired Kazakhstani citizenship.

Though emigration outside the CIS countries is usually not considered large in volume, official immigration statistics from the USA reveal that the flow there is relatively large: more than 6,000 people legally migrated from Kyrgyzstan to the USA between 2005 and 2013.\textsuperscript{106} Unconfirmed data suggest that the volume of illegal migration to the USA has increased in recent years, and is several times larger than legal migration. The authors of the report “Mapping on Irregular Migration in Central Asia 2014” estimate that the volume of legal emigration to countries outside the CIS could be in total not less than 100,000.\textsuperscript{107}

A.3.1. Kyrgyzstani citizens living abroad and emigration

An expert at the Kazakhstani Institute for Strategic Research under the President of Kazakhstan has stated: “The Department of Migration Police at the Ministry of Internal Affairs provides statistics on the number of foreigners living in the country. For example, in 2012 there were 140,000 foreigners in Kazakhstan; in 2013 128,000 and in 2014, 150,000. But it is impossible to say precisely how many of them are working, on holiday or receiving medical treatment. In essence, we have no illegal immigration, as all foreigners who come to Kazakhstan pass through passport control, where their entry is registered. Most of them state when completing the migration card that they have come on a private visit. But then, if they get a job without special permission, without concluding a contract with an employer (an oral agreement), they are working illegally and become migrants with irregular migratory status.”\textsuperscript{108}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{104}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{105}] Iontsev V., Ivakhnyuk I., “Rol’ Mezhdunarodnoy Trudovoy Migratsii dlya Ekonomicheskogo Razvitiya Rossii [The Role of International Labour Migration in the Economic Development of Russia]”, KARIM-Vostok RR 28.
\item[\textsuperscript{107}] IOM, “Mapping on Irregular Migration in Central Asia 2014”, 2015
\item[\textsuperscript{108}] Chernykh I., “My yedem, yedem, yedem…Migratsiya v zerkale sotsiologii [We go, go, go… Migration through the window of sociology]”, Kazakh Institute for Strategic Research under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Available from http://www.kisi.kz/ru/categories/aktual-nye-komentarii/posts/my-edem-edem-edem%E2%80%90%E2%80%90%E2%80%90migraciya-v-zerkale-sotsiologii
\end{itemize}
A.3.1. Kyrgyzstani citizens living abroad and emigration

Research conducted on immigration flows into Kazakhstan gives the following perspective:\textsuperscript{109}

The traditional, orderly understanding of labour migration, in which migrants come to earn money and go back after a certain period, is obsolete. Migration is a living, constantly evolving process, which clearly responds to global crises, local changes to labour markets and legislation. For Kyrgyz migrant workers, Kazakhstan is often the country of habitual residence.

Migrant workers try to naturalize, to transfer the remaining members of their families, to reach the consumption levels of the local population. This is facilitated not only by developed migration networks and diasporas, but also by the personal qualities of migrants, their relationship with the local population, local conditions, and more. Therefore, one cannot ignore the links between labour migration processes and survival, development, adaptation and integration of migrants.

As indirect evidence of this situation, experts have researched the immigration flow from Kyrgyzstan in terms of its adaptive capacity:

Forty-three per cent of migrants live with their families in Kazakhstan. Every third migrant (35.6\%) lives with his or her children. A total of 7.7 per cent of respondents have children who were born in Kazakhstan, and another 2 per cent of respondents are expecting a child. In total, after their mother tongue, Kyrgyz migrants are most likely to be fluent in Kazakh (level 3.61). This level is between satisfactory and good knowledge of the spoken language, but without mastery of some aspects of grammar. These migrants can write, albeit with grammatical and spelling mistakes. Half of Kyrgyz migrants chose the state language for their children’s education, which is a rather effective indicator of their adaptation to Kazakhstan’s socio-cultural conditions.\textsuperscript{110}

Kyrgyzstani National Statistical Committee figures reveal a reduction in emigration flow by citizens of Kyrgyzstan (see Figure 26). If the flows from 2010 and 2014 are compared, it can be seen that the number of Kyrgyzstani citizens leaving was just 47.5 per cent, and even compared to 2013 it had fallen by 3.2 per cent.

According to figures from Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS), as of 4 December 2015 there were 1,880,547 citizens of Uzbekistan in the Russian Federation (including 1,520,539 men and 360,008 women; 670,120 citizens of Kazakhstan (398,483 men and 271,637 women); 542,928 Kyrgyzstani citizens (327,982 men and 214,946 women); 896,159 citizens of Tajikistan (735,672 men and 160,487 women); and 24,724 citizens of Turkmenistan (15,679 men and 9,045 women).


\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
Comparing FMS data from the beginning of December 2015 to those from a month earlier indicates a continuing decline in the number of citizens of Uzbekistan but growth in the number of Kyrgyzstani citizens. Sergei Abashin, Professor at the European University in St. Petersburg, comments on the dynamics of labour migration from Central Asia as follows: “Despite the economic crisis and the tightening of immigration rules that have forced some migrants to leave, the relaxation of rules following entry to the EAEU has in fact returned almost all migrants from Kyrgyzstan to Russia.”

A.3.2. Emigration for work purposes

Kyrgyzstan’s Government is making significant efforts to increase the proportion of the exported workforce that will have legal jobs on arrival in their destination countries. A Centre for Recruitment of Citizens was opened under the MLMY that is intended to provide services to citizens in three areas: information, recruitment in the internal labour market, and recruitment abroad. Measures taken to strengthen state migration policy include inter-state agreements and contracts agreed with recruitment centres in destination countries for Kyrgyzstani migrants, and giving private employment agencies the right to recruit staff for foreign employers. According to data on the website of the former mandated body for migration, on 17 November 2015 there were 27 private employment agencies with the right to assist with the recruitment of Kyrgyzstani citizens abroad. Key destinations for Kyrgyzstani citizens recruited by private employment agencies include Turkey (which 15 agencies recruit for), the UAE (six agencies, with another two working for other Arab countries: Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia). Recruitment to South Korea takes places without intermediaries through organisers in the Ministry of Employment and Labour on the Korean side and the mandated body for migration

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113 Ibid.
in Kyrgyzstan (the MLMY until the end of 2015), based on a Memorandum between the Ministry of Employment and Labour of the Republic of Korea and the Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth of the Kyrgyz Republic (employment permit system). A cooperation agreement was signed in the area of organised recruitment of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic at a trilateral meeting in Astana between the Centre for Recruitment of Citizens, the Mission of the International Organization for Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic and the “Basis A” group of companies, employers from Astana city (2014).

It should be noted that according to Nurdin Tynaev, the former head of the Centre for Recruitment of Citizens, in 2010 fewer private employment agencies were working legally than more recently, and a large proportion of the agencies then were focused on Russia (50%), the UAE and Persian Gulf states (28%), the US armed forces bases in Afghanistan (12%), Turkey (2.5%), the Czech Republic (2.5%), Finland (2.5%), and the USA and Canada (2.5%). Nine private employment agencies with official permits to work, found workplaces for 602 people in 2010. According to data from the report on the mandated body for migration, in 2013 nine private companies had permits to recruit Kyrgyzstani citizens to work abroad, including in Russia, Belarus, the UAE, Qatar, the USA, Germany and Thailand. In total, the nine agencies found work for 340 people abroad.

Figure 27: Number of Kyrgyzstani citizens leaving the country as migrant workers through legal channels, by year

Source: MLMY (this presents data on private employment agencies and the MLMY Centre for Recruitment of Citizens, including the recruitment of organised labour for South Korea by intergovernmental agreement)

Research in Ekaterinburg on “Gender and Migration” reveals that even Kyrgyzstanis who leave the country through organised recruitment prefer to leave the safest and legal workplaces, breaking their contracts, for unprotected but better paid work (as organised re-

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117 Ibraeva, Moldoseva, Ablezova, Niyazova, Danshina, “Gender i migratsiya [Gender and Migration]”, 2013
A.3.2. Emigration for work purposes

 Recruitment is not, in this sense, the “optimal” option for Kyrgyzstanis leaving the country to make money).

 Problems regulating the status of Kyrgyzstani migrants in Russia, and their observance of migration legislation, led to many of them being expelled and/or barred from the country.

 Table 7: Number of Kyrgyzstani citizens prohibited from entering the Russian Federation in 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Proportion prohibited from entering the Russian Federation</th>
<th>Proportion prohibited from entering the Russian Federation</th>
<th>Rise in absolute number prohibited 2013-14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>48702</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>76687</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MLMY

It is difficult to compile statistical records of migrant workers in Kyrgyzstan, both within the country and in the destination countries, but it is especially problematic in Kazakhstan. According to statistics, 20 per cent of foreign workers from Central Asia in Kazakhstan are from Kyrgyzstan. As of 1 November 2014, 31,600 foreign citizens had applied for permission to work to local government bodies in Kazakhstan. Therefore, at least 6,500 Kyrgyzstani citizens should be legally employed in Kazakhstan. However, Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Labour and Social Protection reported in 2010 that there were about 4,000 migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in the country. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there were 20-28,000 Kyrgyz migrant workers working in markets, construction sites, the service sector and agriculture in Kazakhstan without official registration. According to Kyrgyzstan’s Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth, there are about 80-85,000 Kyrgyz citizens in Kazakhstan, but unofficially there are about 100,000.118 At the official opening ceremony of the border between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in August 2015, Kyrgyzstan’s President Atambaev stated: “According to official data, about 70,000 Kyrgyz citizens live and work in Kazakhstan.”119 Expert estimates range from 120,000 to 150,000 people.

Research has revealed that migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Kazakhstan mainly work in construction, services, trade and agriculture, and almost never are involved in more strategic areas of the economy with better prospects, such as mining and oil and gas extraction (though almost half the workers in this sector are foreign). On 1 August 2014, the largest numbers of foreign workers were found in Atyrau oblast (7,906), Astana city (7,720), Pavlodar oblast (4,030), Almaty city (3,585), Mangystau oblast (2,782), Aktobe oblast (1,444) and South Kazakhstan oblast (1,215).120 Social research conducted in Kazakhstan in 2011121 revealed

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120 Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “Aktual’nyye voprosy migratsionnoy politiki: otsenka teksushchego sostoyaniya, prognoz potrebnosti v trudyashchiksya migrantakh s uchetom ikh kvalifikatsii, nelegal’naya trudovaya migratsiya, opyt zarubezhnykh stran [Topical issues in migration policy: evaluation of the current situation, prognosis of needs for migrant workers taking into account their qualifications, illegal labour migration, and experience of foreign countries]”, (Astana, 2014).
121 DFID and IOM, “Dostup trudyashchiksya migrantov iz Kyrghyzskoy Respubliki i Respubliki Tadzhikistan k sotsial’nym uslugam v Kazakhstane [Access of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to social services in Kazakhstan]”, (Results of sociological research), (Almaty, 2011).
that of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan with specialised skills, the largest numbers were teachers, builders and economists. Other common specialisations were car mechanics, tractor drivers, electricians and tailors. More than half of migrant workers work in Kazakhstan all year round. Twenty five per cent just work in the construction and agriculture seasons. A tenth are engaged in shuttle (commuting) migration. Migrants working in Astana and Almaty are more likely to be year-round migrants; in Aktobe seasonal; and in Shymkent shuttle traders. Migrants working year-round tend to be in the service sector – trading and catering. The average length of stay for Kyrgyzstani in Kazakhstan is 4.8 years though, according to the research, quite a high proportion had already stayed in Kazakhstan for 10 years or more. As a rule, this category of migrants had already acquired Kazakhstan citizenship (many took advantage of an amnesty and legalised their status, in most cases acquiring citizenship).\[122\]

In the opinion of the department managing regulation of labour migration at the Migration Committee of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection, in Kazakhstan the foreign workforce is insignificant (not more than 1% of the total hired workforce in Kazakhstan). About 30,000 workplaces in Kazakhstan are always vacant, with neither Kazakhstani nor migrant workers taking them. According to the department, the real demand for workers in 2015 was 500,000 and every year the demand will increase on average by 60,000, which in practice could mean there is significant migration potential for the Kyrgyzstani workforce.

Statistics on labour migration from Kyrgyzstan to Russia are more coherent, and often the Kyrgyz authorities largely refer to Russian FMS data. According to the FMS, on 4 December 2015, there were 542,928 Kyrgyzstani citizens in the Russian Federation.

Migrant workers from different countries have developed specializations in different sectors of the Russian economy. According to researchers from the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, in 2010 migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan mainly worked in housing and utilities, services, transport, and trade.\[124\] According to 2010 figures, the numbers of workers from certain countries working in various economic sectors in Russia were as follows:\[125\]

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122 Ibid.  
123 Chernykh I., “My yedem, yedem, yedem...Migratsiya v zerkale sotsiologii [We go, go, go... Migration through the window of sociology]”, Kazakh Institute for Strategic Research  
Table 8: Specialization of migrant workers from certain countries in certain economic sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Kazakhstan</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Tajikistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>467 (12.7%)</td>
<td>5689 (12%)</td>
<td>15764 (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>25 (0,7%)</td>
<td>485 (1%)</td>
<td>1283 (0,9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>30 (0,8%)</td>
<td>184 (0,4%)</td>
<td>247 (0,2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral extraction</td>
<td>627 (17%)</td>
<td>1650 (3,5%)</td>
<td>4671 (3,4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industry</td>
<td>870 (23,6%)</td>
<td>16140 (34,1%)</td>
<td>42347 (30,5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>581 (5,8%)</td>
<td>5924 (12,5%)</td>
<td>14605 (10,5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>1085 (29,4%)</td>
<td>17199 (36,5%)</td>
<td>59762 (43,1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Centre for Migration Policy at the European University Institute

During the period under review, according to the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey and the Labour Force Survey, in Kyrgyzstan there has been a shift in the employment of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, with an apparent increase in the number of unskilled workers and a reduction in skilled workers.

Figure 28: Change in the proportion of skilled and unskilled workers among migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan abroad (persons)

Source: KIHS and LFS in Kyrgyzstan

The socio-demographic characteristics of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in Russia have been presented in many local and regional studies. Most migrant workers are of working age, though a high proportion leave the country almost immediately after turning 18, or even before (see graphs below). Of migrants in Russia, more than 65 per cent are residents of southern oblasts of Kyrgyzstan: from certain regions in Batken oblast, for example, almost 35 per cent of the working-age population has left or has worked in Russia.

127 Ibraeva et al, “Gender i migratsiya [Gender and Migration]”, 2013
A research team led by E. Varshaver and A. Rochev conducted cluster analysis of modes of travel / stay in Russia of Kyrgyz migrants (giving the example of Moscow). They found that a quarter to a third of the migrants from settled and regular migrant groups have Russian citizenship (of recent migrants in the sample, less than 1% had Russian citizenship). Having Russian citizenship, according to this study, is the most important instrument for migrant workers, as with it they can improve their socioeconomic status (go to the best private or public educational institutions, receive medical services, etc.).
public employment agencies, credit and financial institutions, gain access to kindergartens and schools, and so on).

**Figure 32: Migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow by sex (%)**

![Bar chart showing migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in Moscow by sex, categorized by recent, seasonal, and regular migration, with gender distribution for each category.]

*Source: National Statistical Committee, 2014*

The average length of stay in Russia of migrants, according to sound sociological research conducted in 2004 was almost 25 months, a little over two years. About 20 per cent of the migrants in the sample population had been living in Russia at the time of the study for almost five years. Over 40 per cent of respondents would like to acquire Russian citizenship and stay in the country permanently. Another 20 per cent of migrants intended to stay a long time in the country and then return. And only about 30 per cent of migrants wanted to earn money quickly and return home.\(^{128}\) FMS data does not disaggregate length of stay of migrants by citizenship, and there is no information on the average length of stay of migrants. However, the data suggest that there are gender differences in the length of stay.

**Figure 33: Length of stay of migrants in Russia**

![Pie chart showing the distribution of migrants by length of stay, categorized by gender.]

*Source: National Statistical Committee, 2014*

**A.3.3. Emigration for the purpose of education**

According to the statistical handbook “Exporting of Russian Educational Services”, in 2011 more than 4,000 Kyrgyzstani citizens studied abroad, and every year about 300 people travelled abroad to study (the main destination countries were Turkey, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus). According to Moscow’s Education Department, at the end of May 2015, a total of 25,357 foreigners were studying in secondary and specialized secondary educational institutions in the city, of whom 3,128 were Kyrgyzstani citizens. In 2015, Russia’s Embassy to Kyrgyzstan announced that the country’s Ministry of Education and Science had allo-

\(^{128}\) Varshaver Ye. A. et al, “Kirgizskiy migrancy v Moskve: rezultaty kolichestvennogo issledovaniya integratsionnyh trajektoriy [Kyrgyz migrants in Moscow: results of qualitative research on integration trajectories], (Moscow, 2014), p. 92
A.3.3. Emigration for the purpose of education

cated Kyrgyzstan a quota of 445 places. The statistical handbook on the export of Russian educational services notes that the proportion of foreign citizens from CIS countries has oscillated around 3 to 4 per cent,\footnote{Aref’ev, A. L. and F. E. Sheregi, “Obuchenie inostrannykh grazhdan v vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniyakh Rossiy skoy Federatsii [The Study of Foreign Nationals in Higher Education Institutions in the Russian Federation]”, Statistical Compilation, Edition 9, Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation} and that because of xenophobia and high levels of enmity towards foreign students in Russia, young people from Kyrgyzstan are, increasingly, less likely to want to go to Russia to study.

According to the Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan there are already 3,000 students, both through Confucius Centres and on specialized preparatory programmes for bachelors and masters courses, but there is also a large number of students who are studying in China on a fee-paying basis. Every year the Chinese Government’s quota for students from Kyrgyzstan is 120, and there are some students who have been studying for 10 years, from undergraduate study to doctoral research.

Young people from Kyrgyzstan also study actively in other countries, including Malaysia, Germany, the United Kingdom, the USA, Japan, South Korea, Kazakhstan and the Czech Republic. In 2009-10, 274 Kyrgyzstanis studied in the USA, and in 2010-11 the figure was 279. Every year Kyrgyzstan is allocated about 800-900 places for bachelors, masters and doctorate programmes in Turkey.

At the beginning of 2016, a UNESCO database provided the following information on Kyrgyzstanis studying abroad:\footnote{UNESCO Institute for Statistics, “Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students”} the total number of registered students from Kyrgyzstan was 5,885, of whom 3,215 were in Russia, 963 in Kazakhstan, 494 in Germany, 391 in Saudi Arabia and 250 in the USA. On the UNESCO website it was noted that destination countries for educational migration are usually chosen because of geographical proximity to the student’s home. However, the existence of specialized funded programmes is also very important.

In the case of Kyrgyzstani students abroad, such programmes can explain why the top five destination countries include the distant Germany, Saudi Arabia and USA. In an analytical article the newspaper “Kutbilim” noted that, despite the efforts of the Ministry of Education to provide comprehensive statistics on the import and export of educational services, these statistics are inevitably limited, as they only reflect travels to study with support of the State, or via inter-state agreements. Students who travel privately do not appear in official reports.\footnote{Kutbilim Information Agency, “Ucheba za rubezhom: priemnaya kampaniya v razgare [Study abroad: reception campaign in full swing]”, (Bishkek, 2015). Available from http://kutbilim.journalist. kg/2015/03/10/ucheba-za-rubezhom-priemnaya-kampaniya-v-razgare/} There is also no official information on the sites of diplomatic services or embassies of the countries which admit students and provide stipends or grants for students from Kyrgyzstan to study. Even the UNESCO and OECD databases provide information that is either outdated or incomplete.

The number of migrants studying in Russia has shown a trend of increase in the last decade, because of schoolchildren travelling with parents who are migrant workers. Children accompanying migrant workers are a big challenge: their access to pre-school and school education depends on the financial opportunities of the families, and on the “twists and turns” of the host country’s migration policy. To solve the problem of caring for children at
preschool age, migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan have “invented” a new career niche, usually for adolescent girls, who are taken as nannies. Such girls are called “bakchi”: often they are illegal, they are forced to work and sometimes suffer sexual exploitation. The migration of children and young people has a great impact on the community left behind: the exodus of schoolchildren from Kyrgyzstan, most of whom go for indefinite periods without being removed from the register, in fact “empties” once-large rural schools in some regions, creating opportunities for corruption, recording of “dead souls” and misuse of education resources.

A.3.4. Involuntary migration

Growing migration and insufficient oversight of law enforcement agencies have led to a significant increase in irregular migration, in turn creating the preconditions for human trafficking. Migration already involves socio-economic groups such as rural residents, women and young people, who are often particularly vulnerable to violations of their rights in migration processes.

Experts have made a rough estimate that currently about 600,000 migrant workers in Russia – about 20 per cent of the total – are living in conditions of slavery. E. Arkhipova, chair of the Russian lawyers’ association “For Human Rights” estimates that the cost of one Central Asian migrant in criminal markets is between USD 300 and 500, and that slaves can be “ordered: through criminal structures, as well as through migrant worker foremen. Quantification of unlawful migration is the most complicated task in analysing this phenomenon. Ascertaining its scale is extremely difficult because it is extremely well hidden, both by the criminals and by the victims. There are no official figures on human trafficking in Kyrgyzstan, but only expert estimates. The IOM has estimated that 5-15,000 Kyrgyzstani citizens have been victims of trafficking in persons in other countries. Between 2008 and 2013, with IOM funding, government bodies and NGOs provided assistance to more than 900 victims of trafficking in persons. In 2002-2013, the Ministry of Internal Affairs registered 220 cases of trafficking in persons, and launched a criminal investigation into every one. Nevertheless, comparison of the statistics regarding criminal cases with data from research conducted by international and non-governmental organizations confirms the complexity of ending the scourge of trafficking in persons.

Between 2008 and 2013, the National Security Committee’s investigative division identified and terminated more than 10 trafficking channels, and initiated criminal cases based on them.

Research entitled “The Scale of Human Trafficking in Central Asia” in 2010 found that the main destination countries for victims of trafficking from Central Asia were Russia and Kazakhstan. Most of the victims subjected to forced labour are men (about 70 per cent), and the most common form of exploitation of men and women from Central Asian

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132 RosBalt Information Agency, “Advokat: V Rossii do 600 tys. nelegal’nykh migrantov – raby [Lawyer: In Russia up to 600,000 illegal migrants are slaves]”, (Moscow, 2012). Available from http://m.rosbalt.ru/moscow/2012/03/02/952611.html

A.3.4. Involuntary migration

countries was labour exploitation, which amounted to 91.3 per cent of cases in the study period (for comparison: 8.7% were cases of sexual exploitation).\textsuperscript{134}

IOM data presented in the report “Identification of the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of male victims of human trafficking”, suggest that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan are regional leaders in trafficking in human beings.

**Figure 34: Trafficking in human beings by country for 2003-2014, aggregated** (persons)

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Trafficking in human beings by country for 2003-2014, aggregated (persons)}
\end{figure}

Source: IOM Identification of the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of male victims of human trafficking

Trends in growth of trafficking in Central Asia are country- and gender-specific. For example, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in total between 2003 and 2014 the proportion of female victims of trafficking was higher than that for men. It is important to note that in recent years Uzbekistan’s statistics have seen an increase in the proportion of male victims and a significant reduction in the number of female victims of trafficking. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the downward trend in the proportion of female victims is not as straightforward and unambiguous.

**Table 9: Trafficking in persons, by year**

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>1794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>301</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM

According to the US State Department’s 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, Kyrgyzstan is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to labour exploitation and slavery, and for women, children and men subjected to sex trafficking. It states that the destination countries for labour exploitation and slavery of Kyrgyz men, women and children are mainly Russia and Kazakhstan, and more rarely Turkey or European states, as well as Kyrgyzstan itself (this is particularly common in the agriculture sector, forestry, construction and the textile industry, as well as in the care sector and domestic service). Children from Kyrgyzstan are often forced to work in cotton and tobacco fields, to sell and distribute drugs within the country, and to haul cargo both within Kyrgyzstan and in neighbouring countries. Women and girls are often subjected to sex trafficking abroad, most frequently in Turkey, the UAE, India, Russia, Kazakhstan, as well as within the country. Women and girls from Uzbekistan are at most risk in the south of Kyrgyzstan. In 2015, the mass media repeatedly carried reports of forced, involuntary trafficking of Kyrgyzstani citizens to Syria as fighters. As a rule, most of those sent to Syria were deceived by recruiters promising jobs in Turkey or by marriage proposals.

Globally, recruiters, suppliers, and other criminal organizers of trafficking are compatriots of victims of trafficking, and the trade itself is usually carried out within the same sub-region or even within their own country. A study conducted by SIAR Research and Consulting for IOM found that only a third of the male respondent victims in Central Asia were recruited by strangers. Recruiters can be close friends, or even relatives.

Figure 35: Degree of familiarity of victims of trafficking and their recruiters (n=202), %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Familiarity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stranger</td>
<td>33,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pimp</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family member</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friend</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business contact</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>6,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour</td>
<td>38,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IOM research

At a conference on migration in Bishkek in June 2015, the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that: “between 2001 and 2014 police identified 239 cases of trafficking in persons and initiated the same number of criminal proceedings. In 2015, four cases have been identified in Kyrgyzstan (two sales of new-borns, and two cases of sexual slavery)”.

The Trafficking in Persons report states that Kyrgyzstan’s Government reported identifying 21 labour trafficking victims in Russia, and 23 sex trafficking victims in Turkey and the

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136 SIAR Research and Consulting, “Vyavleniye reabilitatsionnykh i reintegratsionnykh nuzhd muzhchin, zhertv torgovli lyud’mi [Identification of the rehabilitation and reintegration needs of male victims of trafficking]”. (Bishkek, 2015).

A.3.4. Involuntary migration

UAE. Fifteen offenders were convicted in 2014 under Article 124 of the Criminal Code, compared to zero in 2013. International organizations and NGOs reported assisting 194 victims in 2014, 182 of whom were subjected to forced labour, nine to sex trafficking, and three to both labour and sex trafficking; three of the victims were younger than 18 years and 137 were male.138

The 2014 Global Report on Trafficking in Persons notes that most victims of trafficking are foreigners in the countries where they are identified as victims.139 In other words, more than six in 10 of all victims have been trafficked across at least one national border. That said, many trafficking cases involve limited geographic movement as they tend to take place within a sub region (often between neighbouring countries). Domestic trafficking is also widely detected, and for one in three trafficking cases, the exploitation takes place in the victim’s country of citizenship. A majority of the convicted traffickers, who may have been convicted of either domestic or transnational trafficking, are citizens of the country of conviction. If countries are divided into those that are more typical origin countries and those that are more typical destinations, this reveals that origin countries almost only convict their own citizens. Destination countries, on the other hand, convict both their own citizens and foreigners.140

Figure 36: Ratio of local and foreign criminals in source and destination countries for cross-border trafficking in persons (2010-2012), %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Source countries</th>
<th>Destination countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local criminals</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign criminals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Russian Federal Migration Service as of 1 January 2016

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140 Ibid.
Part A.4. Irregular migration

In a report on unregulated migration and trafficking in persons in modern Russia, a research group under E. Tyurkanova noted that the predominant models for international migration are ineffective, as can be seen from the great levels of illegal migration.\textsuperscript{141} Typical features of modern migration regimes in most countries are forced labour and labour exploitation, and lack of guarantees of decent work and respect for basic human rights. In public discourse in Kyrgyzstan it is common to talk about structural dependence on the illegal status of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in the main destination countries (Russia and Kazakhstan), and the difficult working and living conditions in other countries receiving migrant workers. At the same time the topics of labour immigration, the illegal presence of foreign nationals and migrant workers, or the threat to national security from illegal immigrants (who at the same time are often said to be criminals), are either not brought up or viewed primarily in terms of corruption in migration licensing and governing bodies. There is no reliable data about the working conditions and lives of immigrant workers in the Kyrgyz Republic.

According to data provided by the mandated body on migration (which until December 2015 was the MLMY), the number of foreign citizens refused entry into Kyrgyzstan has increased every year, and by 2014 was almost three times more than in 2010.

\textbf{Figure 37: Number of foreign nationals refused entry to Kyrgyzstan (persons)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure37.png}
\caption{Number of foreign nationals refused entry to Kyrgyzstan (persons)}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: MLMY}

According to official figures, the number of foreign citizens who violated migration legislation in Kyrgyzstan has been continually increasing every year. While the growth was 34 per cent in 2011, 12 per cent in 2012, and 31.7 per cent in 2014, in 2014 it was more than 60 per cent. Of the total immigration inflow, those who violate the law make up an insignificant proportion: in 2011 they were 3.5 per cent and in 2014 they were 6.1 per cent.

Of the foreign nationals who violate Kyrgyzstan’s migration legislation, the highest proportion were registered on the borders with China and Uzbekistan. For all countries, there has been an increase in registered violations, with the exception of citizens of Tajikistan.

Persons violating migration legislation are either expelled from the country or brought to administrative responsibility by payment of a fine. As can be seen from Figures 39 and 40, the number of foreign nationals and stateless persons expelled from the country are roughly stable, while the number brought to administrative responsibility and the total of fines has increased significantly.
Part A.4. Irregular migration

Figure 40: Number of foreign nationals brought to responsibility for violating Kyrgyzstan’s migration legislation (persons)

![Bar chart showing the number of foreign nationals brought to responsibility for violating Kyrgyzstan’s migration legislation from 2010 to 2014.](chart)

**Source:** MIA

Figure 41: Total fines paid under Article 390(1) of the Code on Administrative Responsibility (som)

![Bar chart showing total fines paid under Article 390(1) of the Code on Administrative Responsibility from 2010 to 2014.](chart)

**Source:** MIA

In addition to violations of migration legislation, mandated state bodies in Kyrgyzstan monitor data on illegal border crossings and illegal immigration, as well as other forms of criminal offences. The volume of criminal offences committed by foreign nationals / stateless persons in recent years is roughly stable, accounting for about 0.3 per cent of the registered immigration flow every year.
Key components of illegal migration include illegal entry of foreign nationals into the country / illegal border crossing and organizing illegal migration (under Article 2014(1) of the Criminal Code: providing means of transport or forged documents, or dwelling or other premises, or providing other services for the unlawful entry, exit, or movement to the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic to civilians). Statistics for these crimes are indicators of other types of crimes, and are important characteristics of the immigration situation.

As can be seen from Figure 43, there is a trend of increase in the number of criminal cases launched concerning illegal border crossing, while at the same time no such trend is seen in crimes connected to organizing illegal migration. This may be connected both to difficulty proving guilt in criminal cases, and also to normative gaps.
Foreign nationals and stateless persons also commit other criminal acts. Figures from the period 2010 to 2014 show an increase in certain types of crimes (murder, production and sale of arms, and sexual crimes including rape, sexual assault, indecent assault and child abuse) and a decrease in other types (contraband, fraud, theft, robbery and so on). Altogether, foreign nationals and stateless persons commit less than 1.5 per cent of all registered crimes.

Not one of these types of offences and crimes has its data disaggregated by sex or other demographic characteristics related to the offender at the time of the offence. Most of them do not include citizenship, which significantly reduces opportunities to analyse and understand the reasons and factors behind the committing of crimes.
Part A.5. Internal migration

Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan uses approaches to register internal migration inherited from the Soviet regime (registration of individuals by place of residence, use of propiska (residence permits), and linking of basic public services to residence permits: documentation, all kinds of social assistance for needy citizens, access to education and healthcare services, and the ability to vote), mobility within the country is still poorly tracked.

As the authors of the draft Strategy for Migration Policy noted: “An extremely difficult situation is exacerbated by internal migration, which accounts for about 60 per cent of all movements between areas. It is dominated by mass unregulated and two-way migration flows.”

Internal migration occurs because of the extreme unevenness of regional development and causes:

- Flow from high mountain areas to valleys and plateaus;
- From the south to the north;
- From rural to urban areas (depopulation of several rural regions, and ethnic depopulation of border areas);
- From areas with limited resources and labour markets to richer regions.

Figure 46: Scale of different types of internal migration (thousands of persons)


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A World Bank report\textsuperscript{143} using data from the KIHS, compares internal and external labour migration with employment of the population in Kyrgyzstan as a whole, and highlights a steady tendency of falling internal migration. The reasons for this have not yet been studied.

Graphs showing the scale of internal migration by region and intra-regional migration in Kyrgyzstan reveal several “centres of gravity” for internal migrants: Bishkek city and Chuy oblast. Despite the fact that migrants also move to Osh city and Issyk Kul, they do not have net inflow of migrants. The least attractive regions from the perspective of internal migration appear to be Naryn, Batken and Talas oblasts.

Time, space and gender perspectives on internal migration reveal different trends in different periods: The U-shaped dynamics of mobility among rural men and women (which are less pronounced among women) in the selected periods in general seem to be declining in absolute terms among internal migrants, while migration of town-dwellers is growing.
Figure 51: Scale of internal migration in Kyrgyzstan by age and territory (persons)

Source: NSC (Migration of the population of Kyrgyzstan. Population and Housing Census 2009)

The authors of a special issue of the demographic weekly “Demoscope” give a possible explanation for the different trends:

A significant proportion of internal migrants are inhabitants of formerly monofunctional, medium-sized or small towns and urban-type settlements, which were created around mining or electrical manufacturing, and have fallen into disrepair. At the same time, the excessively large volume of internal migrants is causing increased stress on overcrowded urban centres – the capital and its metropolitan area, and worsens prospects for development of rural areas and the resource-rich periphery. This type of irregular migration has already led to hyper-urbanization (overpopulation) of the Bishkek metropolitan area and de-urbanization (a decrease in the share of urban population among the whole population) in the country as a whole.\(^{144}\)

Inter-regional migration has been and remains the main mechanism for assessing the socio-economic differentiation of regions. The migration process is primarily movement of labour, and the major socio-economic consequences of inter-regional migration mobility are imbalances that may arise in the economy.

Research conducted by R. Rakhimov, came to the following conclusion: \(^{145}\)

One of the factors contributing to internal migration is ineffective land policy. Land reforms have failed to lead to more efficient use of land plots, protection of land, or the development of the regional economy, including agriculture. Land policy did not take into account the situation in the country’s regions and the prevailing economic and industrial relations. The possibility of cooperation in agricultural production and processing was not considered, and a thorough legal, economic and environmental analysis of reforms to land distribution has not been carried out.


\(^{145}\) Rakhimov R., “Vnutrennnyaia migratsiya v kontekste zemel’nykh otnosheniy [Internal migration in the context of land relations]”. Available from www.src.auca.kg
The author believes that as a result of failure of economic policies and reforms to decentralize power, the country’s internal migration is aggravating the conditions for uneven development of the regions.

The thesis of uneven regional development (in addition to an objective difference between the economic options of regions) agrees with research on unemployment trends by region. The following charts on regional unemployed trends reflect not only the different scales of the phenomena, but also the lack of similar changes in trends (apart from the fact that in all regions the statistics may imply ineffectiveness of state employment policy and the fight against unemployment). In this context, it is important to note that aggregated data on unemployment trends at national level not only do not reflect the real situation on the ground (even taking into account the fact that those officially registered as unemployed are only some of those who require livelihoods and employment), but can mislead policymakers and strategies that seek to combat unemployment and incentivize employment.

**Figure 52: Trends in unemployment by region of Kyrgyzstan** (persons)
Because of increasing unemployment in the working-age population, the main reason for internal migration is looking for work (57% of all international movements). This is also the result of reduced intra-oblast migration, and the creation of gravitational pulls from Bishkek, Chuy oblast and Osh city. Education, which traditionally in Soviet times led hundreds of school graduates to head to three cities where they could receive higher professional education (Bishkek, Osh and Karakol), has to some extent lost its significance (particularly for poor families and school leavers with poor qualifications) because of the fact that higher education institutions have now opened in all oblast centres, and even in small towns.

Figure 53: Reasons for internal migration by region (2009)

A World Bank document\(^\text{146}\) gives the following as the main reasons for internal labour migration:

A) a higher proportion of skilled workers in manufacturing, more employment in services among internal migrants, and the higher proportion of unskilled workers, compared with those working at the place of residence in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Part A.5. Internal migration

Figure 54: Citizens of Kyrgyzstan by field of work and place of work, 2013 (%)

Source: NSC

B) reduced proportion of persons who leave school after primary or early secondary, and a higher number who have completed secondary or higher professional education.

Figure 55: Internal migrants by educational attainment (%)

Source: World Bank
Part B. The influence of migration

Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

There are three elements to assessing the demographic situation: (1) static evaluation of the current age-sex structure of the population and its reproduction parameters; (2) trend analysis of demographic processes shaping the size and composition of the population; and (3) forecasting trends and assessing their demographic impact. Assessing the demographic situation is not limited to quantitative description and qualitative assessment of demographic processes. Changing the situation in the desired direction, or population policy, requires an understanding of the factors that gave rise to various problems and how they are handled. In this context, it makes sense to conditionally divide the factors into two groups. The first, so-called endogenous factors, shows the characteristics of the population: its sex-age structure and reproduction parameters. The second group, so-called exogenous factors, covers the external, mainly socio-economic, impact.\(^{147}\)

The key aim of this section of the Extended Migration Profile is to consider how demographic processes and migration in Kyrgyzstan influence each other.

The key trends in demographic processes in Kyrgyzstan today are generally considered to be as follows:\(^{148}\)

A. Significant natural population growth,\(^{149}\) caused by:

1. Increased reproduction. Since the beginning of the 2000s there has been a growth in fertility in Kyrgyzstan. In 2014 the country’s total fertility rate was 3.2 children per woman aged 15-49.

2. Increased fertility. The increase in fertility is manifested in growth in the number of new-borns and birth of third or subsequent children to mothers, at the same time as a significant reduction in the number of first-borns and an unchanging proportion (28-29%) of second-born children. At the same time there has been an increase in the proportion of women aged 25-29, and a sudden fall in the proportion aged 20-25. The average age of mothers at the birth of their first child is 23-24 years.

3. Fall in infant and child mortality. In order to achieve international comparability, in 2004 Kyrgyzstan adopted the criteria for live births and, therefore, for infant and child mortality recommended by WHO. In recent years, there has been a significant reduction in these indicators, and therefore Kyrgyzstan has achieved the fourth Millennium Development Goal.

4. Increased life expectancy at birth. In 2014 this was 70.4 overall; 66.5 years for men and 74.5 years for women.

B. Changing demographic composition due to migration.


\(^{149}\) Demoskop Weekly has reported that: “In Kyrgyzstan the rate of natural increase rose from 12.8 per cent in 2000 to 20.6 per cent in 2011 and 21.1 per cent in 2012-2013. As a result, by intensity of natural increase Kyrgyzstan is now clearly in second place after Tajikistan, pushing Uzbekistan back into third.” Available from: http://demoscope.ru/weekly/2014/0617/barom02.php
In public discourse, discussion of external and internal migration in relation to demographic indicators and processes is usually based on various stereotypical myths and baseless assumptions. The most commonly expressed myths are as follows:

1) Migration of women leads to a whole range of negative consequences, including:
   A reduced birth rate (as a result of postponing pregnancy and childbirth and then being unable to give birth to children because of ill-health caused by labour migration), an increased proportion of women who are never married (as the years of labour migration reduce their chances in the “marriage market”), an increased number of divorces (as the experience of labour migration has a negative influence on the relationship between spouses and on family values and increases conflict and violence in the family).150

2) Labour migration worsens the health of the migrants, increases mortality and therefore leads to a fall in the life expectancy of men and women.

3) Internal migration leads to depopulation of regions and a reduction in the proportion of ethnic Kyrgyz.

4) High levels of external migration among the working-age population, especially young people, create risks to national security, particularly in terms of “brain drain”.

5) The higher the volume of working-age population in the country, the more the scale of external migration increases, because of the surplus of labour in the local labour market.

6) External migration is caused and conditioned by poverty, and migration has a positive influence on mitigating and overcoming poverty.

7) Remittances from migrant workers to their families – a significant investment, equivalent in certain periods to a third of national GDP – facilitate the development of households, and economic development of regions and the country as a whole.

This section of the migration profile attempts, based on a study of available demographic data, to justify arguments for and against some of the myths and assumptions listed above.

The myth about the proportional growth in the scale of migration and the volume of working-age population is particularly interesting because the prognosis for the period until 2025 is for population growth in Kyrgyzstan to remain high and for the proportion of working-age people to increase.

Discussions about changing proportions and volumes of working-age people as a whole are rather controversial. On the one hand, some experts give the following perspective: “Labour migration is destroying the country. It is not caused by labour surplus. The reason for migration in Kyrgyzstan is poor governance and degradation of the national economy. There is a chronic lack of vision in this regard. This is the cause of many myths about migration which completely contradict the real situation.”151

On the other hand, mainstream experts in the field of labour and migration policy in Kyrgyzstan define the local labour market in terms of over-supply of labour and say, conse-

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150 In 2013 such assumptions led to initiatives by parliamentary deputy Yrgai Kadyralieva to introduce age limits on young women leaving the country.

151 Kudryavtseva T., “Vse, chtoby uyeektat’ [Everything to leave]”, 24.kg Information Agency (Bishkek, 2014). Unfortunately there is almost no evidence-based reasoning behind this position.
Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

Quently, that it is not possible, objectively, to say that demand pushes the primarily working age population to external migration. In this connection, young people are particularly vulnerable, as by this logic they are “naturally” doomed to leave as external migrant workers.

Doubts about the firmness of the logic above may arise for several reasons. For example, on the basis of this logic, that there is no alternative to labour migration for labour supply unused in local markets, we can assume that women would be more likely to migrate as their employment rates are lower than those of men (82% of men and 59% of women are employed). However, in fact women make up a smaller proportion of external migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan than men.

Table 10: Proportions of women and men in various types of migration (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>International</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to Russian Federal State Statistics Service data (see Table 11), the proportion of working-age migrants among the immigrant population was significantly lower in certain periods than in others, though it has always made up the majority of the overall migratory flow. Meanwhile the proportion younger than working age has varied significantly, from a quarter of the inflow to less than a tenth. The data in the table show changes in the proportions of men and women of various ages in the migration flow, which is likely caused by demand and labour market opportunities in the host countries.

Table 11: Age and sex composition of migrants to Russia, % of all migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Permanent population of Russia, 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than working age</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working age</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>60.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than working age</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male total</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ЖЕНЩИНЫ ВСЕГО</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Younger than working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older than working age</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Russian Federal State Statistical Service

152 The 2010 road map for development of the labour market in the Kyrgyz Republic, developed by a team of experts, takes the labour surplus of a third of the working-age population as axiomatic, and develops employment strategy from this.
Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

A conclusion of the authors of the 2013 World Development Report can serve as another counterargument. The Report revealed that the problem of youth is not always unemployment. According to the figures, the proportion of economically inactive young women and men who are not seeking work, not studying and not working has reached critical levels in some countries. Research conducted by INTRAC in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan also recorded groups of economically inactive young people.

Because of the low quality of thousands of job vacancies that arise every year in the country and are not filled (primarily due to low pay) the proposition is that the labour market cannot become a realistic alternative to emigration, particularly among young men and women. Though external labour migration for many Kyrgyzstani citizens does not automatically lead to work – for reasons such as lack of professional qualifications or particular skills, poor knowledge of Russian language and others – (no reliable data on the number in this category are available), chances to find work and be paid several times more than for analogous work in Kyrgyzstan are much higher in Russia and Kazakhstan. For example, a trolleybus driver in Kyrgyzstan is paid 5,000-8,000 som per month, while in Novosibirsk they receive 23,000-29,000 roubles and in Moscow 53,000-63,000 roubles. In addition, Russian transport companies also provide additional benefits and a social package. Vacancies are advertised both in Kyrgyzstan (more than 150 vacancies in the Bishkek trolleybus department alone) and in Russian cities.

Comparing statistical data on trends in migration flows and changes in the volume of the working-age population at the level of descriptive statistics demonstrates a lack of correlation between the two. Figure 56 clearly shows that rises and falls in the waves of migration flow do not correlate to growth in the working-age population. Additional correlation analysis (using Pearson’s correlation coefficient) also gives a statistically insignificant relationship.

For visual comparability Figure 56 was calculated using the proportion of the working population and the percentage migration outflow of the population.

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153 According to the 2013 World Development Report there are 621 million young people in this category.
157 Though the proportion of the working-age population between 2011 and 2014 fell from 61 to 60 per cent, in absolute numbers growth continued.
158 Based on the formula: absolute size of the working population, divided by the total population.
159 Based on the usual formula for calculating percentages.
The myth of the threat of fertility decline in Kyrgyzstan and the deferred fertility of migrant workers

Kyrgyzstan is one of the few post-Soviet states where the population is continuously growing.

The increase in the population of Kyrgyzstan is the result of more births than deaths in the context of a negative balance of external migration.
Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

**Figure 58: Components of population growth in Kyrgyzstan** (thousands of persons)

![Components of population growth in Kyrgyzstan](image)

**Source:** NSC

International practice for measuring the level of fertility of countries uses the so-called fertility rate of women. Since the early 2000s in Kyrgyzstan this figure has tended to increase, reaching in 2014 an average of 3.2 children per woman (for simple reproduction of the population, this indicator should not be lower than 2.1).\(^{160}\)

**Figure 59: Total fertility rate of Kyrgyzstan (1990-2014)**

![Total fertility rate of Kyrgyzstan (1990-2014)](image)

**Source:** NSC

As shown in the Statistical Compendium on Social Changes 2009-2013, in Kyrgyzstan “there is a trend of increase in the proportion of second children (from 28% in 2009 to 29% in 2013), and also third children (from 18% in 2009 to 19% in 2013). The proportion of fourth and subsequent children in families is on average 15 or 16 per cent.”

\(^{160}\) Unfortunately, the statistics do not provide full information about the reproductive behaviour of women. For example, they state the age of the woman giving birth, her marital status, the place of birth and other things, but there is no publicly available data on the fertility rates of different ethnic groups.
The study of fertility and comparison with migration outflow data also demonstrates the “detachment” of the total fertility rate (TFR) from changes in migratory outflow. This is particularly evident in recent years, in which TFR and migratory outflow have increasingly diverged: migration outflow is on the decline, while the birth rate is higher. That said, an inverse relationship is not observed for other periods of the two processes.

**Figure 60: Migratory outflow and total fertility rate**

![Graph showing migratory outflow and total fertility rate](image)

**Source:** NSC

The authors of a report on the interdependence of demographic and socio-economic processes in Kyrgyzstan, when analysing reproductive trends against migratory outflow in comparison with the CIS countries (Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Russia), noted that “…the data do not lend themselves to the logic of individual demographic models. ‘Increased births result from adaptation of the population to an adverse socio-economic environment ‘in spite of’ its negative attributes, processes and consequences. In this case, all of these illogical trajectories of all demographic processes are mainly because, during a chronic long stagnant period punctuated by even worse episodic crises, the cause-and-effect relationship between the economy and population growth has been completely or largely lost. Therefore, ongoing demographic anomalies defy conventional explanation and do not fit into the traditional framework.”

**The myth of the negative influence of labour migration on the mortality rate and on life expectancy of men and women.**

There is no reliable data on deaths of migrant workers abroad; but there are fragmented and “rough” figures reported by mass media and internet publications in Kyrgyzstan.

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The figures show that mortality of Kyrgyzstani nationals in Russia makes up about 85 per cent of all registered deaths reported in the media, and mortality of migrants from Kyrgyzstan in Russia has risen by more than 200 per cent over three years. However, there is insufficient data available to conduct further analysis of causes of death or to reveal gender specifics. Though in 2015 the Kyrgyz Republic’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation reported an increase in mortality among women, there are no data in practice to substantiate this statement, except individual media reports about violent deaths of women from Kyrgyzstan.

In 2014, there were 1.9 deaths of Kyrgyzstani nationals per 1,000 persons (in Russia), while the national death rate that year was 6.1. Because of a lack of data it is not possible to compare figures for men and women. Statistics reveal a significant difference in the mortality of men of working age compared to women in the same age group.

It possible that the data provided by the media do not include all reported deaths of Kyrgyzstani nationals abroad. But it is obvious that the calculated mortality rate of migrants in Russia (per 1,000 people) is quite low and could not have a negative impact on national life expectancy. Demographic data in this respect demonstrate a steady increase in life expectancy for both sexes.
Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

Figure 63: Life expectancy at birth by sex (years)

Source: NSC

It is likely that the figures are lower than the national mortality rates because they mainly include the working-age population, while mortality rates are higher among infants and those aged over 60 years.

Myth about the influence of migration on falling ethnic Kyrgyz populations in regions and changes to the ethnic composition of the population

The researchers Sergey Gradirovsky and Nely Esipov have represented the Kyrgyz Government’s migration policy (primarily with regard to external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan and emigration) as a policy of “adaptation to strong human currents” including “a constant and steady process of monoethnicization...”.

Today ethnic composition is a continuum, in which the proportion of the titular ethnic group - the Kyrgyz – is gradually increasing from year to year. And more than a hundred other ethnic groups are still found. Most are not present in statistically significant numbers. Only a few ethnic groups have statistically significant communities, and each group is developing in its own way: some are getting bigger and others smaller.

Figure 64: Trends in ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan (%)

Source: NSC

Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

Migration statistics reveal that the increasing proportion of ethnic Kyrgyz is not just a result of national population growth, but also a result of migratory outflow of other ethnic groups, particularly ethnic Slavic groups.\footnote{The statistics show a fall in migratory outflow of Kyrgyzstani nationals of several ethnic groups, including Dungans and Uighurs, after 2012: for some groups this was due to an exhaustion of ethnic resources.}

**Figure 65: Migratory outflow of Kyrgyzstani nationals in 2013 by ethnicity (persons)**

![Diagram showing migratory outflow of Kyrgyzstani nationals in 2013 by ethnicity](chart.png)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyz</td>
<td>1649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbeks</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhs</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koreans</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dungans</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>3745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatars</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uighurs</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSC

Interpreting trends in ethnic composition of Kyrgyzstan, the authors of the article “The Migration Policy of the Kyrgyz Government: confrontation or adaptation to strong human currents?” believe that the trend of monoethnicization is a result of state governance, and that “there is a selective migration policy structured on ethnic lines, even if it is not declared openly” (for example, by means of language policy, repatriation policy and instruments of immigration policy that deter the permanent settlement of nationals of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Declaring that “…the Kyrgyz state is ideologically in favour of monoethnicization of the country, seeing this as a way to strengthen national sovereignty, and considering migration policy as a means to achieve this goal”,\footnote{Gradirovskiy S., Yesipova N., “Migratsionnaya politika kirgizskogo pravitel’stva: protivostoyaniye ili prispособleniye k sil’nym chelovecheskim techeniyam? [The Migration Policy of the Kyrgyz Government: confrontation or adaptation to strong human currents?]”} the authors express their doubt that this approach will be effective in the medium and long term in the face of demographic drifts in internal migration from (southern) regions to the north, including the capital, and the immigration upsurge of foreign nationals from Afghanistan and China, as well as replacement immigration from border districts of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The reality of such replacement migration can be demonstrated using the examples of early stages of internal migration in
Part B.1. Migration and the demographic situation

Kyrgyzstan (in 1989-1999) when the predominantly ethnic Kyrgyz population of mountainous districts replaced emigrants (mainly Slavs and Germans) in the metropolitan area.\textsuperscript{165}

**The myth of gender risks caused by migration (changing traditional models of marriage and divorce, fertility and others)**

Women and men are distributed unevenly in the country, particularly when it comes to different age groups. In Naryn and Talas oblasts there is a lower proportion of working-age women, and therefore more men in this category (the difference in absolute numbers is 10,000 and 6,000 respectively. The greatest gender asymmetry is of women and men older than working age in Bishkek (in absolute terms the difference is almost 35,500 people). This stark disbalance between sexes in any area can be seen from the age of 35, and there are almost twice as many women as men aged over 80. This difference is largely the result in differences in mortality between the sexes – mortality among women is 1.5-1.6 times less than for men – as well as the five-year difference in pension age between men and women. There is also a significant divide between the number of women and men of working age in Bishkek and Osh cities (31,884 and 6,021 respectively), which may reflect partial and internal migration, which are mainly undertaken by working-age women.

**Figure 66: Permanent population by age group and territory, 2014 (%)**

![Permanent Population by Age Group and Territory, 2014 (%)](image)

*Source: NSC*

Migration has had a real impact on the gender regime and the relationship between the sexes. The proportion of men and women in immigration and emigration flows has never been the same, or unchanging, for different societies and specific periods of time. Changes in the proportions of female and male external and internal migrants and their age composition can be the result of changes to the labour market, the “marriage market”, the values held by men and women, and also the socio-economic and political-cultural context in both the destination and the source communities. In recent years, there has been much talk about depopulation, ageing and the feminization of border areas of Kyrgyzstan, because all the young and working-age population are leaving, and because of the difference in life expectancy in favour of women (eight years). According to UN classifications, a country’s

\textsuperscript{165} National Statistical Committee, Mountain Atlas of Kyrgyzstan, (Bishkek, 2004)
population is considered elderly if more than 7 per cent of the population is older than 65. Statistics show that at the beginning of 2015, 4.3 per cent of Kyrgyzstanis were in this age group, which means that demographic ageing has not yet affected Kyrgyzstan. However, the situation in some areas, particularly remote settlements, may significantly differ from the overall national figures. Qualitative research on migration indirectly suggests that in rural areas it is not rare for there to be almost no young people left in villages, and for the population to be mainly children and the older generation, who care for and raise the children using funds sent by migrants from the “middle” generation. The issue of demographic ageing and depopulation requires detailed study.

It is also not possible to track the influence of immigration into Kyrgyzstan on the “marriage market” or on the birth rate. Various media publications display xenophobic sentiments and give numbers of children born to immigrants (often referred to as “Chinese citizens” or “migrant workers”) and local girls. However, reliable information, such as sex-disaggregated data about the number of immigrants entering into marriage, or the birth rate in marriages between Kyrgyzstani and foreign nationals, is either not tracked or not publicly available.

The researchers Agadjanian and Gorina conducted regression analysis of KIHS data and defined predicted gender risks of internal migration during the calendar year. For example, it was found that male and female migration almost mirror each other: that is, when more men leave as migrants, the flow of women migrants falls, and vice versa. Moreover, female migration peaks during economic crises / recessions, while male migration increases in the after or between such events. Discovering this “mirroring” model of gender-based migration strategies allowed the authors to talk about the mutual compensatory internal migration of men and women.

This asynchronous migration is a kind of stress on women, because it requires either mobilization of women, who in the absence of their husbands are the only heads or parents

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168 Agadjanian V., Gorina E., “Economic swings, political instability and internal migration in Kyrgyzstan”, NCEEER Working Paper, Arizona State University
in the household, or else it forces on women the adoption of the non-traditional role of breadwinner, to live and work far away from their families and children, even in the most unfavourable economic periods. The asymmetry of migratory patterns for both internal migration and external migration\textsuperscript{169} could be a factor in the expansion of “marriage markets”, not only (as traditionally) for men but also for women.

Demographic indicators, such as the marriage rate, the number of marriages and the marital arrangements of Kyrgyzstani nationals are rarely researched, particularly in the context of the population’s migratory behaviour. The authors of the article “Marriages, births and migration in Kyrgyzstan”\textsuperscript{170} examined the relationship between migration and marital arrangements, and used multivariate analysis to find that “willingness to migrate increases the likelihood that the respondent will state that they may marry in the next two years”. This may be seen as paradoxical as it is “more expected that having a solid migration plan would lead to postponement of marriage. But for the Kyrgyz population marriage, which is not always followed by birth of children, can be seen as a consequence of, or even as a precondition for, migration. The authors established that marriage and other variables – higher education, material wellbeing, and living in Bishkek – increased the likelihood that the respondents wished to marry soon.

The statistics reveal an increase in registered marriages between 2005 and 2013 of 50 per cent (in absolute terms)\textsuperscript{169} However, the issue of whether it is possible to extend the model from internal migration to external remains open and requires study. There are often objective reasons for growth in the number of marriages – an increased number of young men and women entering the “marriage market” and marrying for the first time. The proportion of marriages between Kyrgyzstani nationals and foreign nationals, including immigrants to Kyrgyzstan, as well as statistics about interethnic marriages, are not publicly available, despite the many rumours about the integration strategies of Chinese (and other foreign) immigrants via marriage with Kyrgyz girls, as well as the special attempts made by state bodies to promote interethnic marriages, particularly in the south of the country, between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz.

\textbf{Figure 68: Number of marriages and divorces in Kyrgyzstan}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure68.png}
\caption{Number of marriages and divorces in Kyrgyzstan}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Source: NSC}

\textsuperscript{169} However, the issue of whether it is possible to extend the model from internal migration to external remains open and requires study.


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These figures about marriages entered do not include unregistered marriages which, according to the 2009 Census figures, vary significantly between ethnic groups. Because of high levels of labour migration by men in particular, the issues of unregistered marriage and cohabitation remain little studied, and it is not possible to adequately understand the daily lives of migrant workers, both internal and external.

**Myth about the moral decline of women, caused by less social control as a result of external migration**

Research into the daily lives of external migrant workers in Russia\textsuperscript{171} and Kazakhstan\textsuperscript{172} reveals the significant role of social networks in making decisions about external labour migration or adapting to migration. Because of “imposed ethnic identity”\textsuperscript{173} in a foreign cultural environment, particularly in Russia where migrants are distinguishable by their appearance, social control on the behaviour of female migrants from Kyrgyzstan appears very strong. The observation is supported by the appearance of groups of Kyrgyzstani national criminals who, calling themselves “(ethnic) patriots”, commit violent acts against ethnic Kyrgyz girls and young women as a punishment for deviating from “tradition”.\textsuperscript{174} In addition, many studies of living and working conditions of migrant workers from Central Asia in Russia note crowded living conditions in a closed ethnic space.\textsuperscript{175} Moreover, it is specifically migrants from Kyrgyzstan, according to Russian researchers, who live in the most crowded conditions, even in comparison with migrant workers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Another control structure is “Kyrgyztown” infrastructure, in which the ethnic space of social relations is formed and reproduced. That is, in most cases, though they have moved to a different physical space, many young women and girls remain in a traditional ethnic social space, where by virtue of the “imposition of ethnicity”, behavioural requirements may be even more stringent.


\textsuperscript{172} Alimbekova G., Il’yasova A., Ni V., “Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskiy portret zhenskoy migrantsii v Kazakhstane [Socio-economic portrait of women’s migration in Kazakhstan]” (Almaty, 2009)

\textsuperscript{173} This term, proposed by D.Dragunskim in 1993, means pressure from outside to build ethnic boundaries and “define” one’s identity as ethnic in a way which should define everything: behaviour, thought and culture.

\textsuperscript{174} Ibraeva G., Moldosheva A., Ablezova M., “′We will kill you and we will be acquitted!’ critical discourse analysis of a media case of violence against female migrants from Kyrgyzstan”// T.Kruessman (ed) Gender in Modern Central Asia. LIT Verlag, 2015

Part B.2. Migration and the Economic Situation

Given that migration is traditionally seen primarily as an economic phenomenon, migration’s impact on the economic situation (particularly certain aspects, such as remittances from migrants) is mainstreamed in research and popular literature about Kyrgyzstan and the region. Nevertheless, as of today, a certain number of myths (which sometimes contradict each other) and baseless assumptions have appeared about the relationship, which often manifest themselves in development / implementation of state policies and strategies in the area of employment, labour and migration. These myths and assumptions include the following:

1) The economic crisis in the country inevitably leads to increased external migration of citizens.
2) Labour migration brings financial benefits to the source country, increases economic growth and reduces poverty by means of remittances.
3) Remittances from migrant workers also influence the level and quality of household consumption, household living standards as a whole, and regional development.
4) Migration helps to develop the business sector thanks to the savings of migrant workers, and the accrual of ideas, knowledge and experience. Thus the technology and knowledge received through migration experience is a basis for development of the labour market in Kyrgyzstan after the return of migrants.
5) Households in receipt of remittances from household members who are migrant workers can meet their strategic goals and needs (primarily through purchase of property: land, housing and so on), as their income increases thanks to the combination of earned income and transfers.
6) Money transfers do not stimulate development of household economies because they are overwhelmingly used for spending on celebrations and increased conspicuous consumption, particularly in households receiving remittances from migrants.
7) Remittances are on a par with FDI and ODA in facilitating state investment in economic development.

The following paragraphs give the main arguments for and against a number of theses on the impact of migration on the economy: they are summarized here based on the range of publications that have appeared online or in print in the last five years.

B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

During the analysed period (2010-2014) extremely varied political and economic events took place in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia, the CIS and the world. These included revolutions and coups, interethnic conflicts and wars, natural disasters, economic crises, a worsening migration policy in the main destination countries, and a rapid growth in terrorist acts, not just in the countries where they traditionally occurred, but around the world. In the opinion of experts, these and other events are reflected in Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development indicators, which are extremely dependent on external influences, particularly the high proportion of remittances from migrant workers abroad, dependence on the volatility of prices for the country’s main export product – gold, and also the high proportion of imported goods, which are detrimental to local manufacturers. Analysing the macroeconomic indicators for recent years, the authors of a study on the state of Kyrgyzstan’s economy
B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

made cautious forecasts, highlighting the significant risk of reduced economic growth, an end to poverty reduction, and even a reassessment of defaulting on national debt from “moderate” to “high”.176

Table 12: Trends in main macroeconomic indicators, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth in income and economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in current prices, in national currency, billion som)</td>
<td>220,4</td>
<td>286,0</td>
<td>310,5</td>
<td>355,3</td>
<td>397,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (in current prices, in USD, billion USD)</td>
<td>4,79</td>
<td>6,2</td>
<td>6,61</td>
<td>7,33</td>
<td>7,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (percentage change by year)</td>
<td>-0,5</td>
<td>6,0</td>
<td>-0,1</td>
<td>10,9</td>
<td>3,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (USD)</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1186</td>
<td>1282</td>
<td>1295178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total investment (% of GDP)</td>
<td>28,1</td>
<td>24,0</td>
<td>26,1</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>26,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State investment (% of GDP)</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>5,5</td>
<td>7,7</td>
<td>7,0</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investment (% of GDP)</td>
<td>21,1</td>
<td>18,5</td>
<td>18,5</td>
<td>19,0</td>
<td>18,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Money and prices</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index (% change by year, at end of year)</td>
<td>19,2</td>
<td>5,7</td>
<td>7,5</td>
<td>4,0</td>
<td>10,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer Price Index (% change by year, average for period)</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>16,6</td>
<td>2,8</td>
<td>6,6</td>
<td>7,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal exchange rate (at end of reporting period)</td>
<td>47,10</td>
<td>46,48</td>
<td>47,40</td>
<td>48,44</td>
<td>53,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Индекс реального обменного курса (2000 г.=100%)</td>
<td>111,3</td>
<td>112,5</td>
<td>112,6</td>
<td>113,3</td>
<td>128,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balance of external payments (% of GDP unless otherwise stated)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real growth in exports (% of analogous period of previous year)</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>23,7</td>
<td>-0,9</td>
<td>19,9</td>
<td>1,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real growth in imports (% of analogous period of previous year)</td>
<td>5,9</td>
<td>32,0</td>
<td>31,2</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>-5,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of goods</td>
<td>38,2</td>
<td>36,6</td>
<td>34,0</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td>31,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export of goods</td>
<td>62,4</td>
<td>63,5</td>
<td>73,2</td>
<td>76,6</td>
<td>71,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, net</td>
<td>-4,8</td>
<td>-1,7</td>
<td>-5,4</td>
<td>-0,7</td>
<td>-4,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances from migrant workers, net (million USD)</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2101</td>
<td>1993,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current balance of payments</td>
<td>-6,4</td>
<td>-6,5</td>
<td>-15,6</td>
<td>-15,0</td>
<td>-16,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct foreign investment, net inflow</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>11,2</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>8,7</td>
<td>2,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt, total</td>
<td>88,4</td>
<td>76,7</td>
<td>78,6</td>
<td>72,9</td>
<td>81,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Economic research about migration processes in the last three years has actively tested and analysed the interdependence between migratory flow and macroeconomic indicators. This could include, for example, the influence of migration on the productivity of labour or on trends in salaries. According to statistical data and economic research, changes in labour productivity in Kyrgyzstan are a subject of concern for experts. For example, the authors of the report “Transitioning to Better Jobs in the Kyrgyz Republic: a jobs diagnostic” commented on these changes as follows:

...productivity growth has been low relative to other CIS economies. The remittance-financed growth model yielded early productivity gains, with workers moving out of subsistence agriculture to work in services and industry (primarily construction). But while continuing growth in services has supported productivity growth (though concentrated in a few sub-sectors), most other sectors - including manufacturing, mining, and electricity have all experienced large declines in productivity over the decade. Overall, productivity growth fell from about 7 percent a year between 2005 and 2009 to about 0.7 percent a year since 2009, significantly below the productivity growth of Kyrgyz’s neighbors.

It is notable that in Kazakhstan labour productivity rose by 60 per cent between 2008 and 2013, which meant the country entered the world’s top 25 countries in both absolute and relative growth in labour productivity, that is growth in both the size and the quality of the economy. What is more, Kazakhstan overtook Russia on a whole range of key indicators from GDP per capita to labour productivity, despite the similar structure of the economy, based on raw materials (oil, gas and minerals).

The authors of a report entitled “Analysis of Key Trends in National Economic Development”, analysed the nature and factors slowing the rate of economic growth in Kyrgyzstan, highlighting the significance of the country’s economy, and the pace and scale of flow of labour resources by industry, to understand issues including migration processes. The analysts formulated a key conclusion on economic growth as follows: “The Kyrgyz Republic has failed to achieve sustained high rates of economic growth, which were interrupted by internal and external shocks at an appreciable frequency over three or four years. But while earlier steps were related to economic processes, in recent times they are linked with internal political and technological, and external financial shocks.” The largest contribution to national wealth in 2010, 2011 and 2013 came from an increase in the volume of production. Under the influence of external and more internal technical shocks, in 2012 and 2014 this sector underwent sharp decline, and even a significant increase in the size of the services sector (together with construction, transport and communications) could not compensate for the share of industry and achieve even modest growth in real GDP.

180 Ibid.
Table 13: Contribution of sectors to average annual growth in real GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>0,5</td>
<td>-0,6</td>
<td>0,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>0,1</td>
<td>0,7</td>
<td>0,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and hospitality</td>
<td>1,8</td>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>1,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td>0,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>0,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes on produce</td>
<td>0,4</td>
<td>0,6</td>
<td>0,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total GDP</td>
<td>4,8</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>4,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 69: Rate of growth in migratory outflow and growth in economic sectors and real GDP

Source: NBKR, NSC

Almost half of all the country’s industrial production comes from Kumtor, and more than a third of national exports are gold mined in Kumtor. That is, economic growth is mainly facilitated by growth in extraction and sale on global markets of mineral deposits and other natural resources (including electricity generated in the country’s hydroelectric power stations). Other subsectors of industrial production are primarily the textile industry, which is largely in the shadow economy, and its estimated contribution to national GDP varies between 5 and 15 per cent.

The figures shown in Table 14 show important changes in recent years: sectors that made important contributions to GDP in earlier years fell during the period 2010-2014. Significant reductions can be seen for agriculture, trade and the services sector. The only significant increase has been in production, but it does not show a steady trend and continues to be seriously dependent on production at Kumtor.
Table 14: Absolute changes in the economically-active population in certain sectors, thousands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>+130.1</td>
<td>-146.0</td>
<td>-100.6</td>
<td>+17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production</td>
<td>-11.3</td>
<td>+70.2</td>
<td>+22.0</td>
<td>-37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>-13.5</td>
<td>+110.1</td>
<td>+86.4</td>
<td>+4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and hospitality</td>
<td>+34.1</td>
<td>+141.7</td>
<td>+69.7</td>
<td>+19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communications</td>
<td>-14.8</td>
<td>+51.2</td>
<td>+31.8</td>
<td>+20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>+62.4</td>
<td>+57.2</td>
<td>-21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>+97.7</td>
<td>+289.6</td>
<td>+166.6</td>
<td>+3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSC

Table 14 also shows a difference in the nature of inter-sectoral flows of labour resources. Between 2010 and 2014, there were serious structural problems. For example, the increasing proportion of employment in agriculture in the context of falling proportion of GDP from agriculture suggests that the increase in workplaces took place at the same time of falling labour productivity in the sector. At the same time industry was not ready to absorb agricultural labourers for many reasons and, what is more, cut the number of workplaces.\(^{181}\)

According to expert opinion, “the distorted economy continues to reduce demand for highly qualified workers, and increases unfavourable factors in the labour market.”\(^{182}\) These factors include growth in the informal labour market, which has increased partly because of the income of workers from the regions, despite overall reduction in the mobility of the workforce. Between 2003 and 2013 the proportion of working internal migrants who were working in industrial enterprises (excluding the construction sector), grew by a factor of five, while the number of internal migrants working without official contracts rose from 28 to 47 per cent. In 2012, the proportion of internal migrants working in construction was 11 per cent, while the proportion of internal migrants working without contracts rose from 36 to 81 per cent.

Of the whole array of research on migration and the economy, the largest share looks at the impact of remittances on other economic categories and processes.

Publications\(^{183}\) on remittances from migrants to Kyrgyzstan and other CIS countries put forward and justify the following statements about the influence of the economic situation in the country sending migrants.\(^{184}\)

---

181 Ibid.
183 See the bibliography for a full list of studied relevant literature. The key documents in the list are: Kupets O., “Razvitiye i pobochnyye effekty denezhnykh perevodov migrantov v stranakh SNG: Ukraina [Development and Side Effects of Migrant Remittances in CIS Countries: Ukraine]”, CARIMEast RR 2012/06 and others; S.A. Ayvazyan et al. “‘Gollandskaya bolezn’ v ekonomikah Rossii i Armenii [‘Dutch disease’ in the Russian and Armenian economies]”, Prikladnaya ekonometrika, 2014, 36; “Tendentsiya ekonomicheskogo rosta i perspektivy v razvivayushcheyся Azii: Tsentral’naya Aziya (KR). [Trends of economic growth and prospect for developing Asia: Central Asia (Kyrgyzstan)]
184 With regard to the sending country, there are also papers that give diametrically opposite findings on remittances,
### Table 15: Statements on the influence of remittances on the economic situation in the country sending the migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive influence on the economy</th>
<th>Negative influence on the economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances are a safety cushion, a kind of social insurance for the poor</td>
<td>High dependence and vulnerability to external events / shocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances facilitate economic growth (an increase of 10% in remittances leads to a 0.3% increase in GDP)</td>
<td>Growth in remittances leads to inflated demand and income inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased access for the population to imported goods</td>
<td>Growth in demand for imports and reduced demand for domestic goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helps to reduce poverty levels / to escape poverty</td>
<td>Reduces labour supply and employment, reduces demand for workforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of foreign currency</td>
<td>Dollarization of the country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitates growth in domestic investment</td>
<td>Strengthens the som’s exchange rate, thereby reducing the competitiveness of domestic production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthens the banking system thanks to transfer services</td>
<td>Reduces the effectiveness of monetary and credit policy, increases banking risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stimulates growth in economic sectors, particularly construction</td>
<td>Increases prices for land and housing, increases speculation in these markets and reduces access for most of the population to housing and land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances finance education and healthcare for children</td>
<td>Increases gender inequality in household-level wealth redistribution (including investment in education and medicine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances increase school attendance and likelihood of receiving higher professional education</td>
<td>Increases conspicuous consumption and the “toї”187 economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aggravates social stratification, deepens income inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotes substitution of labour income transfers, makes many able-bodied citizens economically inactive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In many countries the volume of remittances is higher than that of direct foreign investment and official development assistance. The real contribution of remittances to house-
hold incomes facilitates increased consumption, which in turn leads to growth in real GDP. In this connection they have significant potential to reduce poverty rates and facilitate economic development. According to World Bank data, in recent years Kyrgyzstan has become one of the 10 countries with the highest proportion of GDP made up of remittances.\textsuperscript{185} Between 2005 and 2013, remittances in dollar terms increased by a factor of 10, and annual gross inflow of remittances was equivalent to, or even higher, than the volume of direct foreign investment and official development assistance. This is of great interest for the study of this issue in terms of investment in economic development.

Figure 70: Annual inflow of remittances (REM), foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) to the Kyrgyz Republic, 1993-2013 (%)

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure70}
\caption{Annual inflow of remittances (REM), foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) to the Kyrgyz Republic, 1993-2013 (%)}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.}

Figure 71: Remittances to Kyrgyzstan, millions of USD\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure71}
\caption{Remittances to Kyrgyzstan, millions of USD}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source: World Bank}

\textsuperscript{185} Migration and Remittances”, Factbook 2011.

B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

According to LiK research, 18 per cent of households in Kyrgyzstan receive or have received remittances from abroad as an income source, but the proportion of recipient households differs from region to region: the smallest proportions are found in Bishkek and Naryn oblast, and the largest in Batken, Osh and Jalalabad oblasts.

Figure 72: Households reporting remittances from persons living abroad as one of their income sources

Source: “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

LiK figures also reveal that average annual transfers to richer families are more than 1.5 times higher than those to poorer families.

Table 16: Total sum of money that migrants sent you in the last 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income quintile</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st income quintile</td>
<td>37 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>4 690 000</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd income quintile</td>
<td>37 500</td>
<td>1 500</td>
<td>2 450 000</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd income quintile</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>2 000</td>
<td>882 000</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th income quintile</td>
<td>50 000</td>
<td>10 000</td>
<td>4 020 000</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th income quintile</td>
<td>60 000</td>
<td>2 400</td>
<td>800 000</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

187 Database panel studies of households and individuals, conducted by DIW in 2010, 2011 and 2012, are available as an open resource of primary data on a variety of topics (demographics, employment, property, migration, remittances, social networks, market for agricultural products and services, and so on). The sample includes 3000 households, more than 8000 individuals, and 1500 business initiatives. The aggregate sample is representative both nationally and by region. Available on http://lifeinkyrgyzstan.org/
At the same time, richer families send remittances more often.

Table 17: Number of transfers in the last 12 months

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income quintile</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st income quintile</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd income quintile</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd income quintile</td>
<td>6.29</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th income quintile</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th income quintile</td>
<td>6.31</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

Thus, the data indicate that remittances contribute to further stratification of society.

Though remittances are being compared to investment in the country’s economy, it is obvious that the recipients of these transfers are specific citizens, not the state, and so they can only have an indirect effect on the national economy, such as by increasing consumer demand, stimulating development of supply of goods and services, and investment in private business.

Figure 73 shows that growth or reduction in the volume of remittances and migratory outflow do not have an effect on strengthening basic water supply and sanitation infrastructure, and do not increase access to it.

Figure 73: Migration, remittances and access to basic infrastructure

Source: NSC, World Bank
LiK data from 2010 revealed that there is a difference between families with members who have returned from external migration and families without “returnees” in consumption of various goods, including meat (particularly mutton), dairy products, cereals (particularly rice), fruit and others. Though it is not recommended to compare average consumption of households that receive remittances with average consumption of households that do not receive them – since these two groups can in their initial characteristics, and therefore behaviour – the differences can at least be recorded for further investigation.

Table 18: Food costs (in som per person per month) and having family members with experience of migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Food stuff</th>
<th>Families without members who have returned from migration</th>
<th>Families with at least one member who has returned from migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasta</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cereals and legumes</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatos</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrots</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabbage</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other vegetables</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apples and pears</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bananas</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other fruit and berries</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fresh milk</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kefir, airan and smetana</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beef</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutton</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sausage</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confectionary and biscuits</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tea and coffee</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-alcoholic drinks</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholic drinks</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

There are also no clear links between migration, transfers and development of information technology and communications links, though in daily life many cases are reported in which the older generation needs to master new technology – computers, iPads or mobile phones – and new communications services – Whatsapp, Skype, Viber and others, to maintain contact with migrating family members.\(^{188}\)

**Figure 75: Migration and innovation in Kyrgyzstan**

![Graph showing the rate of growth in migratory outflow and the rate of growth in number of personal computers in households.](image)

Source: NSC

\(^{188}\) Though there are no pertinent studies, common sense suggests that families whose members are leaving for CIS countries are increasingly using computers and Skype, while migrants from neighbouring countries use mobile phones more often. In Russia, services for migrants even include specially provided preferential tariffs for calls to Central Asia.
LiK research data on consumption of non-food items, including communications, television and the Internet, can be seen as an indirect indicator of having migrant family members.

Families with members who have returned from migration spend more money on communications, television and Internet, as well as furniture and household appliances.

**Figure 76: Average non-food expenditure over the past 12 months (in KGS) and if a family member has experience of migration**

This research project included econometric analysis of the influence of remittances on economic growth.\(^ {189}\) This used an expanded version of the neoclassical model of economic growth. A list of all the variables used is given in Table 19.

**Table 19: Variables used to create the model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lnGDP</td>
<td>Logarithm of GDP per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REM</td>
<td>Remittances received, % of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance, % of GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment, % of GDP (indicator of economic openness)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF</td>
<td>Gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators).*

The table below shows the model’s parameters:

\[
\ln G_{\text{DPP}} = \theta_0 + \theta_1 REM_t + \theta_2 AID + \theta_3 FDI + \theta_4 GCF
\]

Table 20: Model parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.605***</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REM</td>
<td>0.009***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AID</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>0.013***</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCF</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** - significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent respectively. In brackets: standard error.

Thus, the analysis shows that remittances have a positive and statistically significant effect on GDP per capita.

With regard to economic growth, it is important to consider distribution of national income between different categories of people, including tracing trends in the poverty rate. For quantitative measurement of the impact of remittances on poverty we use the model developed by Adams and Page (2010), which looks like this:

\[
\log P_t = \alpha + \beta_1 \log \mu_t + \beta_2 \log g_t + \beta_3 \log x_t + \epsilon_t
\]

In which \( P_t \) is an indicator of poverty, calculated as the proportion of the population living on less than USD 1.90 per day; \( \mu_t \) is GDP per capita; \( g_t \) is the Gini coefficient, which measures income inequality; and \( x_t \) is the volume of remittances received over the period. The data are taken from World Bank databases (World Development Indicators).

Table 21: Results of the regression analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>18.016***</td>
<td>(3.632)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \mu )</td>
<td>-5.793***</td>
<td>(1.478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>(0.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>-0.175*</td>
<td>(0.090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. R²</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *, **, *** - significance at 10, 5, and 1 per cent respectively. In brackets: standard error.

The results show that remittances have a positive and statistically significant effect on poverty reduction, and specifically a 10 per cent increase in the volume of remittances leads to a 1.7 per cent reduction in the proportion of persons living in poverty. Thus remittances are an effective instrument for reducing the scale of poverty.

---

B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

These are in agreement with the impact of remittances on poverty estimated by the authors of the report “Transitioning to Better Jobs in the Kyrgyz Republic: a jobs diagnostic”, who believe that “remittances from workers abroad have not only directly helped the families of migrants, but also financed strong growth in domestic consumption, which increased employment in the country, primarily in the service sector.”

At the same time there is a range of indicators, both macroeconomic and microeconomic, which are difficult to classify as showing positive influence of migrant transfers on poverty reduction. Looking at the Gini coefficient shows steady growth in the gap between income quintiles using various criteria.

Table 22: Distribution of all remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Monetary income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, %</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First (lowest-income) quintile</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth (highest income)</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R/P ratio</strong> (differentiation ratio), factor</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gini coefficient</strong> (index of income inequality)</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.371</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSC, Compendium 2009-2013

It is interesting to note that reduced incomes were seen for all quintiles except the fifth. In addition, even in the peak of migration from Kyrgyzstan to the Russian Federation in 2010, and as well as in subsequent years, there has been a steady increase in the Gini coefficient.

Explaining changes in poverty rates and migration outflows and transfers, the authors of the UNFPA/UNDP analytical report stated: “These elasticities show that in relative terms, GDP growth has the greatest impact on poverty reduction, followed by growth in social security and the least important of expenditure is growth in transfers. At the same time it should be emphasized that, in absolute terms, migrant transfers have a much greater impact on poverty reduction. This is because the growth of transfers in recent times is much higher than the growth rate of other indicators. The role of transfers in reducing poverty will lessen, given that 1 per cent growth in transfers only reduces the poverty rate by 0.09 per cent.”

---

191 Department on Poverty and Equality Issues in Europe and Central Asia, “Perekhod k uluchsheniyu zanyatosti v Kyrgyzskoy Republike: diagnosticheskiye issledovaniy situatsii v oblasti zanyatosti [Transition to better employment in the Kyrgyz Republic: diagnostic research into the situation in the field of employment]”, pp1645-1669
A number of studies on remittances give the key message that there is a lack of data on the proportion of money coming into the country from business transactions. Other studies describe significant regional differences in income structures. In particular, transfers make up the largest share of incomes for the population in the south of the country. This necessitates a differentiated account of the impact of migration on poverty and other economic indicators.

The validity of this last statement is confirmed by a number of statistical indicators. For example, the proportion of poor people varies considerably by region: the regions with the highest proportion of residents living in poverty are Jalalabat and Batken oblast (over 40%), almost a third of the population of Osh and Naryn oblasts is poor, while in Bishkek city and Talas oblast the proportion of poor people is much lower (less than 20%) (see Table 23).

Table 23: Poverty rates by region of Kyrgyzstan (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Batken oblast</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jalalabat oblast</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issyk Kul oblast</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naryn oblast</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh oblast</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talas oblast</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuy oblast</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bishkek</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osh city</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NSC

Changes in poverty rates by region are also uneven: between 2010 and 2014 there has been significant progress in poverty reduction in Talas, Naryn and Issyk Kul oblasts (by factors of 2.2, 1.7 and 1.5 respectively), in Osh oblast poverty has fallen by 10.2 percentage points, while in Batken and Jalalabat oblasts and Bishkek city there have been increases (by 7.1 percentage points, 1.7 percentage points and a factor of 2.2 respectively). It is important to note that most external migrant workers are from the southern oblasts of the country, which have seen negative trends in poverty rates in recent years, while the less-mobile population of Naryn and Issyk Kul oblast have been better able to reduce their poverty rates. This paradoxical fact requires additional research and explanation, as does the low mobility of residents of Naryn and Issyk Kul oblasts.

The economic situation is traditionally more closely tracked at the macro level through key macroeconomic indicators. However, practice shows that the macroeconomic situation does not always allow for an understanding of the situation at the level of households or individuals. Micro-level approaches and more detailed study of the relationships with other macroeconomic indicators are also needed.
The researcher Emil Nasritdinov believes it is critical that many macroeconomic studies do not consider a number of issues, including non-economic factors, when assessing the potential impact of transfers on trends in poverty rates.

“If we divide the whole amount by the number of migrants, if we proceed from expert opinions, suggesting that in total about half a million of our fellow citizens are currently outside the country, we come to an average level of transfers of about USD 100-120. This does not seem a large addition to the family budget, and we can assume that it would be quite easy to earn this much in Kyrgyzstan. The significance of remittances becomes even more questionable, if we break the average monthly amount transferred down by groups of migrants. A World Bank study cited in an IOM report shows a very strong contrast:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; $50</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$50-100</td>
<td>30,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100-150</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$150-200</td>
<td>16,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200-300</td>
<td>8,4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300-500</td>
<td>3,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; $500</td>
<td>14,2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Almost half the migrants send home less than USD 100 per month. Meanwhile, 18 per cent of migrants send more than USD 300, and therefore push the average size of remittances upwards.”

Here we should note that in connection with the lower rate of growth of remittances from Russia in 2014-2015 there is a very interesting tendency of accelerated growth of household consumption expenditure compared to growth rate of transfers. A number of experts say this is due to increased borrowing and obtaining loans.

**Figure 77: Rate of growth in remittances and household consumption expenditure**

In their report: “The Impact of Remittances on the Structure of Household Expenditure in the Kyrgyz Republic”, A. Muktarbek kyzy and N. Zhenish summarize the expenditure strategies of households with regard to migrant transfers:

Source: World Bank and NSC

193 Nasritdinov E., “Migratsiya v Kyrgyzstane: vzveshivaya vse za i protiv [Migration in Kyrgyzstan: weighing the pros and cons]"
“Analysis of academic literature reveals two main perspectives on how remittances are spent. Optimists believe that transfers stimulate greater investment, and pessimists argue that remittances have more impact on consumption. A large group of mostly early studies support the pessimistic point of view, and argue that remittances are mostly spent on consumption rather than investment. The results of some of these studies, however, may be biased as they do not take into account certain categories of expenditure, nor consider spending on education and health care as investment. In other works, unproductive use of remittances is partly due to the poor quality of education services and the lack of incentives to invest in education in Kyrgyzstan. Some researchers argue that the costs of home construction and renovation should also be considered investment rather than consumption, as they are important for mobility, health and living standards of households, as well as for development of the construction sector in regions with high proportions of migrants. Earlier researchers that did not take this into account, according to these authors, came to distorted conclusions.”

Conducting their own analysis based on “Life in Kyrgyzstan” data, the authors revealed that households spend the money received from remittances on weddings more often than on healthcare or education. What is more, remittances are almost never invested in private business.

Table 24: What survey respondents spent remittances on

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>№</th>
<th>Category of expenditure</th>
<th>Yes, %</th>
<th>No, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>22,6</td>
<td>77,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Healthcare</td>
<td>17,1</td>
<td>82,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Weddings</td>
<td>31,0</td>
<td>69,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Funerals</td>
<td>9,9</td>
<td>90,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Investment in business</td>
<td>0,3</td>
<td>99,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Purchasing durable goods</td>
<td>26,4</td>
<td>73,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Purchasing non-durable goods</td>
<td>72,5</td>
<td>27,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Helping other households</td>
<td>6,1</td>
<td>93,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>41,7</td>
<td>58,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11,6</td>
<td>88,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


More than half the respondents use remittances to cover current household expenditure. The proportion of remittance-funded expenditure spent on celebrations and memorial events is significant: more than a quarter in 2013 saved some money, while about the same proportion spent money on weddings and funerals. Remittances are almost never invested in private business.
B.2.1. Indicators of Kyrgyzstan’s macroeconomic development, remittances and economy

Figure 78: Expenditure items that remittances are spent on

Source: Results of the “Life in Kyrgyzstan” survey. Figures for 2011 were taken from National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic “The influence of remittances on household expenditure in the Kyrgyz Republic”

On average, a family which receives remittances holds about one or two events per year (mean: 1.53; median: 1), while families who do not receive remittances conduct two or three events per year (mean: 2.53; media: 2). However families who receive remittances, on average, spend more money on holding events.

Table 25: Total monetary and non-monetary spending on organizing and holding the largest-scale events in terms of guests and expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Families which do not receive remittances</th>
<th>Families which receive remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Median (in som)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage of a male household member</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage of a female household member</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>55 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child birth / cradle ceremony / circumcision celebration</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>19 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jubilee (birthday every ten years)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birthday</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>4 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buying property / car</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotating savings groups (who meet for meals)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13 950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>15 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

According to this survey, about 10 per cent of respondents answered that family celebrations were paid for by remittances.
Experts believe that the inflow of remittances from abroad has facilitated intensive growth in demand for property, particularly in Bishkek and Osh cities. A. Muktarbek kyzy and N. Jengish, the authors of the report: “The influence of remittances on household expenditure in Kyrgyzstan”, using two different methods of data analysis came to the conclusion that, based on SUR results, remittances increase the proportion of spending on durable goods, investment in human capital, construction, and celebrations.

**Figure 79: Resources used for major family celebrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions from relatives and friends</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selling property (for example livestock)</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances sent from abroad specially for this purpose</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borrowing from friends and relatives</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank credit</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NSC and NBKR*

At the same time, receiving remittances reduces the proportion of total expenditure spent on food and utilities. The influence of remittances on construction, celebrations and durable goods is statistically significant.

State Registration Service and NBKR figures\(^{194}\) indicate development of a mortgage market for construction and buying of property founded on growth in the volume of remittances.

Kupets, the author of “Development and Side Effects of Migrant Remittances in CIS Countries: Ukraine”,\(^{195}\) gives examples of research and analysis which links changes in average prices for property in capital cities in the CIS with the scale of remittances from migrants: “There is proof that in certain CIS countries remittances have led, at least partially, to inflationary pressure in sectors not linked with trade, and had a significant impact on prices for land and property, and also private sector salaries” Analysing determinants of property prices in former Soviet countries (with the exception of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in the period 1990-2009, Stepanyan et al (2010) revealed that remittances and inflow of foreign capital (defined by the authors as the investment liabilities of banks other than FDI) were significant drivers of price increases for property in the region. These assessments have been criticized. Authors try to link changes in average prices for property in capital cities (in eight of the 12 countries researched) to the volume of remittances.


\(^{195}\) Kupets O., “Razvitiye i pobochnyye effekty denezhnykh perevodov migrantov v stranakh SNG: Ukraina [Development and Side Effects of Migrant Remittances in CIS Countries: Ukraine]”, CARIMEast RR 2012/06 and others.
Figure 80: Growth in prices on the property market, remittances and mortgage lending in Kyrgyzstan

![Graph showing growth in prices, remittances, and mortgage lending from 2010 to 2014.](image)

Rate of growth of property prices
Rate of growth in remittances to Kyrgyzstan
Rate of growth in construction and mortgage credit

Source: NSC and NBKR

Increased property prices, particularly in cities and coastal areas, heighten expectation of relatively high future prices and potential growth in capital, which leads to increased speculation on the property market (EBRD, 2007). Skyrocketing prices, in turn, have made property ownership less accessible for many poor families who want to improve their living conditions and forces migrants from such families to remain abroad for longer to save more money than they initially planned. Kupets has expressed doubt about such findings and arguments, stating: “It is well known that remittances are most often used in rural and poorly-developed urban locations, rather than in capital cities and surrounding areas.” Without disputing the fact that recipients of transfer are usually residents of rural areas, it is impossible without further research to exclude the possibility that relatives of migrants can acquire property in their names in the capital using credit, and subsequently paying off the mortgage using funds from remittances. That is, the issue requires additional study. In any case property market experts in Bishkek link the crisis in housing construction on the primary and secondary property markets, specifically with the worsening economic situation for migrants in Russia and Kazakhstan.

B.2.2. Participation of foreigners in economic development

In 2013, a total of 3,022 enterprises with foreign investment were operating in Kyrgyzstan. More than half of these (53.8%) were fully financed by foreign capital. Compared to 2010, the number of enterprises with foreign investment had risen by 15.7 per cent.

A total of 1,115 enterprises were fully financed by countries outside the CIS (68.1% of the enterprises fully funded with international capital); while 452 (31.2%) were funded from CIS countries. Of these enterprises, 268 were fully financed from Turkey; 250 from China; 196 from Russia; 187 from Kazakhstan; 84 from South Korea; and 58 from Iran.
Figure 81: Proportion of enterprises in Kyrgyzstan with capital from abroad by type of economic activity

Source: NSC

Statistics show that the highest proportion of foreign capital is invested in manufacturing and mining industries.

Figure 82: Number of enterprises by main sector of activity

Source: NSC

The overwhelming majority of enterprises with foreign investors are located in Bishkek city and Chuy oblast. Foreign direct investment is also extremely unequally located, with centres in Bishkek and Issyk Kul oblast, which attracted about 55 per cent of Kyrgyzstan’s FDI in 2012.
It is not possible to discuss the proportion of foreign specialists and workers working in enterprises financed by foreign capital, as the statistics do not disaggregate workers by citizenship, like they do for other parameters (age and sex). This is undoubtedly because there is no legislation in Kyrgyzstan limiting the number of foreign workers recruited.

Under Law 66 “On Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic” of 27 March 2003 foreign investors have no requirements about the number of foreign nationals and Kyrgyzstani nationals that they hire. Article 16 “Recruiting workers who are not Kyrgyzstani nationals” states:

1. Investors have the right to freely hire employees who are not Kyrgyzstani nationals in accordance with Kyrgyzstani legislation. Employees who are not Kyrgyzstani nationals may be appointed to the managing bodies of the enterprise.

2. Any salary, compensation or other type of reimbursement paid by investors to employees, and also other income, may be freely transferred out of the Kyrgyz Republic in a manner that complies with Kyrgyzstani legislation.

3. The authorized government bodies shall render assistance to foreign citizens with their entrance, departure and stay for the term of their employment within the scope of the investment activity in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Kyrgyzstan’s Law On Concessions does not regulate recruitment of foreign workers. Thus, Article 16: “The rights and obligations of the concession holder” gives the right “by its discretion to determine the make-up of workers and employees from among nationals of the contracting parties and third countries”, while Article 21: “The conditions of employment of workers and employees” gives parties to the agreement the right to determine the ratio of local and foreign workers in each individual case: “Recruitment of workers and employees is done on a contractual basis. The proportion of Kyrgyzstani citizens among the administrative and technical personnel is agreed by the parties to the concession contract.”
Government Regulations set annual quotas for the foreign labour force and cannot be “exceeded” The right to engage a foreign workforce, including hiring foreign managers, is guaranteed by the Law above.

**Table 26: The main economic indicators of enterprises with foreign investors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Listed number of workers at enterprises, persons / as % of previous year</td>
<td>60584/97,5</td>
<td>56721/99,0</td>
<td>58580/100,6</td>
<td>59966/106,4</td>
<td>59800*98/109,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment utilization in fixed assets, million som / as % of previous year</td>
<td>23313,3/93,6</td>
<td>18934,1/93,6</td>
<td>38641,6/103,3</td>
<td>44696,6/102,4</td>
<td>59439,2/99,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, million USD</td>
<td>364,8</td>
<td>468,4</td>
<td>589,8</td>
<td>519,7</td>
<td>438,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, million USD</td>
<td>1520,0</td>
<td>1833,2</td>
<td>2297,2</td>
<td>2394,0</td>
<td>2209,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports, as % of total for the country</td>
<td>20,8</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td>35,3</td>
<td>29,6</td>
<td>23,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports, as % of total for the country</td>
<td>47,2</td>
<td>43,0</td>
<td>41,2</td>
<td>40,0</td>
<td>38,5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NSC*

As can be seen from Table 26, while making up a significant proportion of Kyrgyzstan’s economy, enterprises with foreign capital make up less than a quarter of exports, while they account for more than a third of imports.

**Figure 84: Total foreign investment (excluding outflow), million USD**

![Bar chart showing total foreign investment from 2010 to 2014]

*Source: NSC, “Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic 2010-2014”*

The unevenness of income from different types of foreign investment is shown in Figure 85. For example, grants and technical assistance have tended to decrease over the past four years, portfolio investment almost all arrived in one year, while FDI has been roughly equal from year to year.

197 If you look at the difference with employment data on the foreign workforce, which is about 65,000 people, it appears that more than 5,000 foreign nationals are employed legally as individual entrepreneurs. Most likely, these are traders in bazaars.
B.2.2. Participation of foreigners in economic development

Figure 85: Foreign investment, excluding outflow (%)

Foreign direct investment, in the main, focuses on trade, catering, industry, communications and the financial sector. This reflects the partial discrepancy between FDI sectoral priorities and state priority sectors for development of Kyrgyzstan’s economy, which include agribusiness, tourism, energy, mining, transport and communications. Many foreign companies do contract work for foreign co-operation organizations. Direct investment from the USA is concentrated on the hospitality and telecommunications sectors, with particular interest in construction and mining. Joint enterprises and foreign companies in Kyrgyzstan include Reemstma Kyrgyzstan Company (tobacco production), Plaskap Bishkek Company (packaging/bottling), Besser Brick Company, Central Asian Group (entertainment/clothes) and Hyatt Regency Bishkek, Turkish Coca-Cola Franchising Company for local bottling, and the Canadian gold mining firm Cameco, which formed the largest western joint enterprise in Kyrgyzstan: Kumtor. Traditionally, GDP reporting in Kyrgyzstan is carried out including Kumtor production and excluding it, which emphasizes the importance of the contribution of this enterprise with foreign capital.

Joint enterprises play a leading role in the mining, petrochemical, hospitality and food sectors. Between 1998 and 2007, the regional breakdown of foreign investment was as follows: Issyk Kul – USD 37.4 million (6.9%); Bishkek – USD 322 million (59.6%); Osh oblast – USD 95.8 million (17.7%); Jalalabad oblast – USD 43.7 million (8.1%); Chuy oblast (excluding Bishkek) – USD 32.3 million (6%); Naryn oblast – USD 5.2 million (1%); and Batken oblast – USD 3.8 million (0.7%).

There is little difference between the main countries providing FDI and donor countries. FDI is provided mainly by China (24% of FDI in 2012); Canada (22%); the United Kingdom (12%);

Source: NSC, “Investment in the Kyrgyz Republic 2010-2014”


Kazakhstan (6%); Germany (5%); and Russia (4%). These percentages have varied over time. Between 1995 and 2000 the main foreign investor was Canada, because of its acquisition of the Kumtor gold deposit, which made up 80 per cent of FDI received. By 2012, China’s share of FDI had increased sharply to 24 per cent.200 Russian capital in Kyrgyzstan’s economy is concentrated in specific areas of activity. In particular, it has a specific sectoral impact in the fields of hydroelectric power station construction, construction of oil and gas infrastructure, petrol stations, and mobile telephone communications.

Using econometric methods, the researcher S. Shamkeev201 concluded that direct foreign investment has facilitated growth, but not development, of Kyrgyzstan’s economy. In order to identify the nature of the relationship between FDI and several of Kyrgyzstan’s important macroeconomic indicators for 2000-2012, they calculated the correlation between FDI and GDP, and between FDI and unemployment in Kyrgyzstan.

Using Microsoft Excel, Shamkeev found a correlation between FDI and GDP of 0.89811, with a statistical significance of 0.806. That is, he established that the relationship between FDI and GDP is close and positive.

This character of the relationship is because the flow of FDI was accompanied by the modernization of the enterprises purchased by foreign companies and the construction of new modern plants. This increased the scale of manufacturing in Kyrgyzstan. The gross added value produced by enterprises financed with foreign investments in 2010 was USD 1.1 billion, or 24.1 per cent of national GDP, compared to USD 0.9 billion, or 19.8 per cent, in 2009.202

The statistical relationship between FDI and the number of persons registered unemployed (for the period 2000-2013) gives a correlation coefficient of 0.25823, with a statistical significance of 0.066. This indicates a positive statistical relationship.

The statistical relationship between FDI and the level of unemployment should be inversely proportional. That is, growth in FDI should lead to a fall in the number of unemployed. In Kyrgyzstan this is not happening: the growth in unemployment peaked during a period of steady growth in FDI. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the technical and technological capacity of enterprises with foreign investors does not require many workers. Secondly, large-scale FDI causes the ruin of small and medium-size enterprises in Kyrgyzstan, leading to an increase in unemployment. Thirdly there is a real layer of the informal economy, which in practice has no links to FDI.

Shamkeev revealed, based on analysis of macroeconomic features of Kyrgyzstan, that the current system of currency regulation and inflation targeting by a policy of “expensive” money creates chronic deficiency in indigenous investment resources. Foreign direct investment cannot be used as the main driver for development for Kyrgyzstan’s economy. The author argues that the level of liberalization of investment law in Kyrgyzstan does not

correspond to the national economy’s level of development, thereby creating additional risks for investors and the country’s economy.

Based on comprehensive analysis of FDI received by Kyrgyzstan between 1995 and 2012, Shamkeev identified a number of features of foreign business investment, of which the main one is that an absence of international investment and credit ratings and a high degree of political instability means there has been a trend of absolute increase in the volume of FDI (except between 2008 and 2010). This is largely due to the high rate of return on invested capital by foreign investors. Kyrgyzstan ranked third after Angola and Bahrain for rate of return on FDI invested in the economy. The investor receives a net profit of USD 41 on USD 100 of investment. The world’s average rate of return on FDI is about 7 per cent. Most countries with high rates of return of FDI are developing countries. This high degree of return on foreign investors’ capital is, in our view, an indirect indication of a high degree of exploitation of Kyrgyzstan’s labour and natural resources, as well as of chances to extract monopoly profits.

The author notes a trend of steady increase in the proportion of FDI in total foreign investment in Kyrgyzstan, while maintaining its dominance. This is changing the structure of FDI itself: from a predominance of the share of contributions to capital stock to an increased proportion of intra-corporate loans. According to figures provided by Shamkeev, in 1996 99 per cent of all FDI was invested in share capital, but in 2012 this was only 6.2 per cent. Intra-corporate loans, by contrast, showed an increase from 27 per cent in 1998 to 70 per cent in 2012. This indicates a blurring of the essential features of FDI as an economic category. Enterprises with foreign capital produce about 40 per cent of the country’s total industrial output. There are segments of Kyrgyzstan’ domestic market where the share of goods and services of individual enterprises (organizations) with foreign capital is more than 35 per cent, which can be defined as a dominant position. There are very few investigations by the State Agency for Antimonopoly Regulation concerning abuse of dominant positions despite such cases occurring. Effective compensation measures are not in place for material damage by monopolists. Foreign investor financed enterprises accounted for about 80 per cent of the domestic communications market (VimpelCom Ltd – Russia, Alfa Telecom – Russia, OOO Nur Telecom - Kazakhstan), and 75 per cent of wholesale and retail trade services. Most of major foreign investors are offshore.

B.2.3. Migration, employment and the labour market

According to global forecasts of Kyrgyzstan’s population for the foreseeable future, over the long-term the proportion of the working age population will decline slowly, while the proportion of children will fall, and the proportion of elderly people will grow.

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In 2010-2015, the composition of Kyrgyzstan's population changed in various ways: in 2010-2011 there was a growth in the working-age population and a fall in the older population. However, since 2012 trends have changed, and the male and female working-age population has started to fall (for women this reduction has been slightly more intensive: in five years there was a fall of 1.33%, while for men the fall was 0.89%).

Source: NSC
B.2.3. Migration, employment and the labour market

The relationship between the rate of growth of the working-age population and migratory outflow from Kyrgyzstan is not interconnected at the level of descriptive statistics: the trend in migratory outflow has taken place in the context of a more-or-less stable size of working-age population (see Figure 88). Similarly there is no clear relationship seen if analysis of the rate of growth of the working-age population and migratory flow also includes a third parameter: the rate of growth of poverty (see Figure 89).

**Figure 88: Proportion of population of working age and migratory outflow from Kyrgyzstan**

![Proportion of population of working age and migratory outflow from Kyrgyzstan](image)

*Source: NSC*

**Figure 89: Increase in migratory outflow, proportion of population working age and poverty rate in Kyrgyzstan**

![Increase in migratory outflow, proportion of population working age and poverty rate in Kyrgyzstan](image)

*Source: NSC*

The country’s employed population has high educational attainment, because of the current educational system: nearly one in five of the working population has had some higher education, and one in ten has completed secondary professional education. Women in the workforce are more likely to have higher qualifications: in 2013, 23 per cent of all employed women had completed higher professional education, compared to 15 per cent of men; for secondary vocational education the figures were 14 and 7 per cent respectively.
However, the Labour Force Survey indicates that this position is changing: the proportion of the employed population and economically active population with complete and incomplete higher education is tending to decrease, while the proportion whose education ended at secondary level, as well as the proportion who ended at primary level or who did not study, is increasing. The downward trend in the educational attainment of the country’s workforce probably reflects a reduction in the value of knowledge and expertise in the professional fields of work, reduction in the productivity and quality of work, and devaluation of vocational training, as mentioned earlier in this report. In any case, an indirect indicator of these processes is an increase in the proportion among of the unemployed with higher education (21,600 people in 2010 and 33,600 people in 2013).

**Figure 90: Educational attainment of workforce, thousands of persons**

It is also important to note that the accessible labour markets in the main destination countries for migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan in 2010-2014 also provide more opportunities to find unskilled work, while the proportion of migrants from Kyrgyzstan finding skilled work in Russia has significantly fallen. The authors of: “Opportunities and problems of social integration of migrant workers from Central Asian countries in Russia” noted (giving the example of Moscow and St Petersburg that: “The enclaving of migrants’ employment is rather high; and there is a trend of expanding and deepening niches of migrant employment, particularly in Moscow. On the one hand, this deepening of niches weakens the competition between migrants and local workers, but on the other hand it leads to segregation in the labour market, the abandonment of certain areas, and finally to ineffective development of the labour market, further marginalization and social exclusion of migrants.”

During research on the labour market conditions of migrant workers, Elena Vakulenko and Roman Leukhin, researchers from the National Research University Higher School of 

205 Ye.Tyuryukanovoy, “Vozmozhnosti i problemy sotsial’noy integratsii trudyashchikhsya migrantov iz stran TSA v Rossii (na primere Moskvy i Sankt-Peterburga) [Opportunities and problems for social integration of migrant workers from Central Asia countries in Russia (using the example of Moscow and St Petersburg)]”, Centre for Migration Studies (2010), p. 20
Economics, came to the conclusion that Russian employers are not interested in the experience and education of migrant workers. Employers (usually construction and industrial companies) prefer to hire low-skilled employees without higher education and less than a year’s experience, who are much cheaper than local workers.  

Therefore, neither internal nor the main external labour markets provide stimuli for development of professional skills among Kyrgyzstan’s workforce. The reduced education level among those active in the labour market gives worrying signals. US economists Robert Solow (a Nobel laureate), John Kendrick, and Edward Denison identified the key role of scientific and technical progress in facilitating economic growth. In particular, Denison developed 23 classification factors for economic growth, of which four related to labour, four to capital, one to land, and 14 to the contribution of scientific and technical progress, relevant to the educational capital of the population. Economic growth, in the opinion of Denison, is determined not as much by the amount spent on factors of production as by the increase in their quality, and primarily the quality of the workforce. Based on analysis of sources of growth in the USA between 1929 and 1982, Denison came to the conclusion that education is the determining factor for growth in output per worker.

Sixty per cent of the economically active population are male (1,471,600 individuals), and 40 per cent are female (997,000). 34 per cent of the economically active population live in urban areas (835,500) and 66 per cent (1,633,100) live in rural areas. The level of economic activity (the proportion of the population over 15 years old who are economically active) was 63 per cent. Men are more active on the labour market, as illustrated by the Labour Force Survey results: 76 per cent of men are economically active, compared to 49 per cent of women. In urban areas the level of economic activity is less than in rural areas. Economic activity in urban areas fell from 68.2 per cent in 2010 to 65.2 per cent in 2013, while in rural areas it fell from 72.7 per cent in 2010 to 71.4 per cent in 2013.

Figure 91 shows that the proportion of economically inactive men and women steadily increased, while the proportion of economically active women fell.

**Figure 91: Economically active and inactive men and women in Kyrgyzstan, thousands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Economically active men</th>
<th>Economically active women</th>
<th>Economically inactive men</th>
<th>Economically inactive women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1394</td>
<td>293,8</td>
<td>983,8</td>
<td>674,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1415,5</td>
<td>280,7</td>
<td>996</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1433,5</td>
<td>297,6</td>
<td>985,7</td>
<td>695,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1443,4</td>
<td>314,3</td>
<td>953,9</td>
<td>752,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NSC*

The level of economic activity of the population depends on the age composition: it is lowest in the youngest age group (15-19 years) and the oldest (65 and older). The maximum level of economic activity is found in those aged 35-39 (83%). However, if figures are divided

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by sex, it can be seen that men’s economic activity peaks at ages 30-39 and 40-49 at higher than 93 per cent, while for women the most economically active period is between the ages of 40-49, where the rate fluctuates between 70 and 79.5 per cent (see Figure 92). In addition, the level of economic activity of the working-age population depends on health status: if in total the level of economic activity is 69.2 per cent, among those with disabilities the figure is 27 per cent (16% for women and 34% for men). In 2013, most persons with disabilities (73%) were not economically active.

Figure 92: Level of activity of population of Kyrgyzstan aged 15 and over by age and sex, %


The employed population is unevenly distributed by areas of employment: women are less engaged in individual entrepreneurship, employed by individuals, or working on farms. Recent changes are interesting: until 2012, more women than men were employed by enterprises and organizations, but in 2013-2014, their share fell significantly, and men made up a majority in absolute terms.

Figure 93: Employment of Kyrgyzstan’s population aged 15 and older by main workplace and sex, thousands

Source: NSC
B.2.3. Migration, employment and the labour market

Figure 93 reveals that in the whole country, and particularly in certain regions young people, are in the worst position in the labour market. This contributes to them being pushed out of local labour markets, often as internal migrants, to regions with higher demand for labour, or as external migrants to countries where labour is in demand. The labour market needs in the host countries are obviously not conducive to highly skilled employment, and this to some extent is reflected in the statistics for the increase in migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan with general secondary education, and the fall in the number of migrant workers with higher education, as well as in the proportions employed in skilled and unskilled labour.

Figure 94: Economically inactive population by age, %

Source: NSC, “Employment and Unemployment”

Figure 95 shows the gap between the employment levels and economic activity of young women and men, which are often considerable.

Figure 95: Economically active and inactive young people by sex, %

Source: NSC, “Employment and Unemployment 2014”

By region, there is inequity in opportunities and practices of employment and unemployment among young people. In some regions (for example, Naryn oblast) employment and economic activity are the lowest in the country, at 37.1 and 31 per cent, while the unemployment rate is one of the highest in the country (after Chuy oblast) at 16.5 per cent. However, a much smaller proportion of Naryn oblast’s population leave as external migrants. This requires further study (see Figure 96).
Meanwhile, the proportion of economically active youth and employment is much higher in regions that have high outflows to external migration, primarily Osh and Jalalabad oblasts.

There are big gender differences in the number of hours worked per week in the main job (see Figure 94): on average, women work 4.3 hours a week less than men, and the number of women whose working week is 10 or less hours or 11 to 20 hours is much higher than for men (128,000 men and 166,100 women), while the number of men working more than 41 hours is more than twice as high as for women (332,900 men and 154,600 women). That is, a relatively high proportion of women work part-time. The gender gap in employment and unemployment among young people is even more dramatic.

A World Bank report based on figures from the “Life in Kyrgyzstan” survey revealed potentially interesting results concerning employment and unemployment. Firstly, households that moved out of the poorest 40 per cent of the population, as well as those who were outside it in 2011, showed relatively high levels of employment; while the number of unengaged (including unemployed and economically inactive) was relatively high in households who had continued to live in poverty or who had entered poverty. Thus, at first glance, it could be thought that employment can help to escape poverty. However, more specifics are needed, including research into the data for different sectors of the economy. Such research reveals that only work in certain sectors really helps to escape poverty. In particular, more
than 60 per cent of those who were not in the poorest 40 per cent of the population in 2011 stated that they worked in the services sector, while for the poorest households this figure was about 30 per cent. Most people who found themselves in poverty in both the years the research was conducted were employed in agriculture, as well as mining and construction. Results regarding manufacturing are not clear, as the employment level is relatively higher both for those who were in poverty and those who were not. \(^{207}\)

The types of employment of heads of households also provided curious results. The World Bank analytical report on poverty and economic mobility, also based on “Life in Kyrgyzstan” figures, established that the heads of a substantial majority of the households which were falling into poverty in 2011 were individual entrepreneurs, while those who came out of poverty or stayed out of it were employed.\(^{208}\)

**Figure 98: Profiles of economic mobility by transitional groups: the proportion of households by characteristics of the head of household**

Attempts to explain the reasons for economic inactivity of the working-age population, and particularly young people, are also very significant in determining the motivation for young people to stay in their homeland or leave as migrant workers and/or long-term emigrants, and also can help to evaluate the nature of the influence of migratory outflow and remittances on the families remaining behind and the level of economic activity of the population.

Thus, migration experts have posited that households that receive remittances from family members who are migrant workers tend to replace income from work with transfers.

The “Life in Kyrgyzstan” database helps to clarify this question. In order to determine the employment status of the respondents four questions were posed:

- In the last seven days have you worked for an organization, enterprise or public sector body, or on a farm where the employer is not a member of your household?

\(^{207}\) Life in Kyrgyzstan”, Report 99775-KG pp. 17-18

\(^{208}\) World Bank, “Poverty and Economic Mobility in the Kyrgyz Republic: some conclusions from the ‘Life in Kyrgyzstan 2010-2011’ survey”, 27 April 2015
• In the last seven days have you worked on a farm or for a business owned by or rented by you or other members of your household?

• In the last seven days have you worked in agriculture, fishing, hunting or gathering fruit, berries, nuts or other products?

• Do you have a permanent job, your own business, other income-generating activities or unpaid work in the household where you have not been working in the last seven days, but to which you will return?

The percentage that answered ‘No’ to all four of the above questions is higher among respondents in families who receive remittances.

Figure 99: Respondent having worked in the seven days and household receiving remittances

| Family did receive remittances | 69,8% |
| Family did not receive remittances | 55,3% |

Source: Results of “Life in Kyrgyzstan 2013” survey

Table 27: Proportion of respondents seeking work (of those who wanted work), by whether the household received remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Families which did not receive remittances</th>
<th>Families which received remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Would you like to have paid work?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>66,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the last seven days did you seek work or try to organize your own work (percentage of those who wanted work)?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>91,8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State the main reasons why you did not seek work (percentage of those who did not seek work)?</td>
<td>Waiting to start work</td>
<td>1,0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waiting for a reply / call from an employer</td>
<td>1,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waiting for the season</td>
<td>14,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student / schoolchild</td>
<td>8,4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B.2.3. Migration, employment and the labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Percentage Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Percentage Kazakhstan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Housewife / look after my child or grandchild</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior citizen / pensioner</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health reasons / disability</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No chances to find work</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gave up looking for work after a long search</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know how to start my business</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of funds to start my business</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opportunities to work</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political instability / violence</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will travel abroad or somewhere in Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In practice, most “returns” of migrant workers to Kyrgyzstan give rise to new waves of migration, or revert to a cycle of poverty and unemployment, as the country still lacks effective measures to develop employment and local labour markets that would facilitate return migration and adaptation of returned migrants to labour market conditions.209

The researcher S. Tieme believes that eventually migrant workers will return from Russia and Kazakhstan, not to their home villages but to larger cities, as part of a new cycle of internal migration. Because of labour migration, both the state and certain categories of migrant workers are raising the issue of the cost of deskilling: both at individual level, as a result of long-term employment abroad as unskilled migrant workers, and the deskilling of entire sectors. For example, today sectors such as teaching and medicine in the regions are at risk, as there is a shortage of qualified, competent staff and/or an aging workforce.210

Migration undoubtedly is changing both the configuration of the labour market and the level of innovation, and is also distorting certain professional niches.

Literature about labour migration, particularly at global level, emphasizes opportunities for cultural and technological interventions in local development thanks to experience gained as migrants. That is why labour migration is seen as an opportunity, a positive factor. However, the literature on the influence of external and internal labour migration on local labour markets and employment contains almost no data about positive effects, and no examples of use of technology and knowledge gained by Kyrgyzstani nationals as migrant workers. However, ad hoc observations do reveal some examples in the form of innovative business initiatives by citizens who returned from labour migration. It is clearly important to research this kind of experience, and assess its impact on local development and on the innovators themselves.

209 S. Thieme, “Policy Briefs: Where to return to? Rural urban interlinkages in times of internal and international labour migration”, University of Zurich, www.src.auca.kg. The study “Conditions and State of Social Rehabilitation of Migrant workers-Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic Following Their Return to Homeland,” also discusses the time needed to search for jobs at home and the impossibility of choosing a workplace. www.src.auca.kg

210 A. Chykynova, “V shkolakh Kyrgyzstana ne khvatayet 2340 uchiteley [In Kyrgyzstan’s schools there is a shortage of 2,340 teachers]”. Available from http://knews.kg/society/68273_elvira_sarieva_v_kyrgyzstane_ne_hvataetbolee_2_tys_uchiteley
Part C. Migration governance

Part C.1. Legislative base (at national, regional and international levels)

Since independence, Kyrgyzstan has acceded to a large number of international conventions, including 53 ILO conventions, most of which affect migrant workers.

Appendix 1, “International conventions and other documents on human rights and the rights of migrant workers ratified by Kyrgyzstan / multilateral and bilateral agreements on migration”, contains a list of the international conventions and other instruments relating to human rights to which the Kyrgyz Republic that are key for migration. This list is very extensive, but ratified documents often do not in practice widen protection of the rights and interests of various categories of migrants from Kyrgyzstan. As noted in a review of the regulation of external labour migration in Kyrgyzstan, expert A. Musabaeva stated that: “the major recipient countries of labour from Kyrgyzstan – Russia and Kazakhstan – have not ratified certain important international instruments. This is due to the difference in the interests of the countries sending and receiving migrants. Russia, as a major importer of foreign labour, for example, has not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, adopted by the United Nations on 18 December 1990, or ILO Conventions 97 and 43 on migrant workers.” Therefore, most of the mechanisms of international conventions are intended to affect the rights and status of foreign nationals in Kyrgyzstan, as on ratification of international conventions, the Kyrgyz Republic recognizes the primacy of international over national law.

The impressive list of multilateral and bilateral agreements between governments in the region, shown in the table, reflects a trend for agreements to be made to accede to conventions and agreements at high-level meetings at regional level. These agreements do not lead to innovative regulation of migration processes: in general they do not create real governance mechanisms and their implementation is ineffective. However, to a large degree they are symbolic political instruments of external political activity. As noted by the authors of the report “Labour migration regulation as an instrument for development and regional cooperation in Central Asia”, “the main differences between bilateral agreements between Central Asian states and the framework document of the Commonwealth of Independent States [as well as international conventions: author’s note] is the specification in the text of the bodies responsible for implementation from every country party to the agreement, including provisions on non-discrimination as well as several more developed and detailed provisions on sharing information.”

The tables in Appendix 2: “Migration legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic, regulating immigration, refugees and resettlement”; Appendix 3 “Legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic on internal migration” and Appendix 4 “Legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic on external labour migration from the Kyrgyz Republic and emigration” present the main national legislative acts regulating migration. Comparing the tables leads to the following preliminary conclusions:

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211 V.S. Malakhov et al, “Vstupleniye KR v YEAE: vliyaniye na protsessy migratsii [Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the EEU: influence on migration processes]”, p.27

212 Summary report on the legal framework regulating labour migration in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: sub-regional and national context.

213 This report does not go into details in the tables of laws and regulations, because such analysis, including description
1) The volume of migration legislation in the field of immigration and labour migration to Kyrgyzstan is much larger than for regulation of internal migration or external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan and emigration. This is in stark contrast to active public discourse in the media and among politicians, which focuses on external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan. Internal migration is not very popular, while migratory flow to Kyrgyzstan is an even less common topic, as there is a firmly-rooted idea in society that Kyrgyzstan is a country that almost exclusively sends migrants. In practice, Kyrgyzstan’s migration policy focuses on regulation of immigration flows. Emigration is virtually not regulated.  

It is important to note that the large number of regulations on immigration is not and should not be regarded as a positive fact. In studying the migration legislation of various countries, academics have come to the belief that it is important to reduce active law-making, “through which an insufficiently legally-skilled group of people ‘piles up’ laws on top of each other, multiplies their contradictions and conflicts, continues to complicate the legal system and makes it more difficult, and at times sets back the resolution of the most pressing issues.”

The disproportion indicated above in the volume of regulations of external labour migration to Kyrgyzstan and immigration, and the corresponding legislative base in the fields of internal migration and external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan, are worthy of debate. On the one hand the abundance of standards, primarily secondary legislation, is because the key regulatory acts in the field of migration contain many referencing norms, generic and declarative provisions, which against the backdrop of the extensive existing regulatory framework of international conventions and protocols is often simply redundant. Many regulations in the field of migration partly duplicate each other (for example, provisions regulating the work of foreign nationals and stateless persons in Kyrgyzstan). On the other hand, the lower number of regulations in the field of external migration is rational: national level regulations cannot help migrants from Kyrgyzstan in other countries. In those countries even global and regional agreements often do not work and in general migration management practices are established on the basis of bilateral agreements. According to experts, even the existing regulations in the field of external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan are not effective, and do not contain provisions to effectively protect the rights of Kyrgyzstani nationals working in other countries. At the same time, if the relatively small number of regulations covering external migration from the Kyrgyz Republic can be explained by the realism and correct understanding by legislators of their limited possibilities to influence the situation of our nationals abroad, this logic is does not explain the paucity of regulation of various aspects of internal migration, though there are quite a lot of issues in this field, and why state regulation is weak.
2) Development of the legislative base for migration in Kyrgyzstan throughout the years of sovereignty has been uneven, with various degrees of intensity at different periods of time, both concerning regulation of internal migration, external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan, emigration and immigration (see Figure 100). In addition, visualizing the legislative process on migration as a diagram helps one to see trends of development in national migration legislation: secondary legislation is predominant over primary legislation, particularly for regulation of immigration and external labour migration to Kyrgyzstan; there has also been growth in the number of amendments to earlier adopted laws and regulations in recent years.

**Figure 100: Development of migration legislation in Kyrgyzstan**

![Diagram showing development of migration legislation in Kyrgyzstan]

*Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the website of the Ministry of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic*

Growth in laws and regulations adopted for the first time or amended is natural because of the way migration in Kyrgyzstan has taken on a mass character, and thereby changed the socio-economic and political-cultural life of the country, causing upheaval to local labour markets and so on. That is, it is rational for lawmakers to react to changes to the situation and socio-economic position of recipients of migration policy by developing and amending laws and regulations designed as much as possible to observe the rights of migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan, and protect the country’s interests through legal support to migrant workers.

Analysis of legal changes conducted by expert A. Niyazova demonstrated the non-obviousness of “rational” suggestions. As it turns out, changes to the reality of migration processes and to national legislation are barely connected, as can be seen from the statistics below.

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215 Ibid.
### Part C.1. Legislative base (at national, regional and international levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Laws and regulations</th>
<th>Laws and regulations in the field of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010</td>
<td>12083</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• laws</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>6 (0.3 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• secondary legislation</td>
<td>11421</td>
<td>15 (0.13 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2013</td>
<td>12856</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• laws</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>6 (0.86 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• secondary legislation</td>
<td>12165</td>
<td>21 (0.17%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Niyazova A., *Normative legal base in the labour migration sector and problems of rural women in Kyrgyzstan*.

The expert’s conclusion is very critical: “The negligible volume of laws and regulations in the field of migration after the peak in 2007 and 2010 shows that migration policy has not been updated and is not the focus of legislators. At the same time, amendments introduced to laws and regulations in the field of migration will not help to resolve the problems – the difficulties and barriers – faced by both internal and external migrant workers.

Analysis of changes to legislation shows that changes and additions to laws and regulations in this areas since 2007 have been linked with:

- Transferring authority from the Parliament to the Government to determine the quotas for recruiting and using foreign labour, as well as quotas for labour migration (Law “On External Labour Migration”); and
- Changing the legal status of cross-border migrant workers (the procedure for recruiting them and limiting their numbers is determined by the Government).

According to the expert, “...changes since 2010 have mostly been connected to:

- Governance issues (the registration function of police departments transferred to the authorized state body in the field of registration of the population);
- Harmonization with the Constitution;
- Increasing the term for registration of Kyrgyzstani citizens at embassies or consular offices, traveling outside the Kyrgyz Republic (for periods of more than three months from three days to 15); and
- Determining the term for considering applications of foreign nationals or stateless persons to acquire visas to enter Kyrgyzstan (not more than five working days).”

At the end of 2012, at a special session of the commission to optimise the system of state governance of Kyrgyzstan, Joomart Otorbaev, then the First Vice Prime Minister, stated: “Migration policy in Kyrgyzstan is overseen by six agencies with no results. The six agencies have functions in the field of migration policy and therefore weak interaction.”

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mission to optimise the system of state governance stated that the following agencies have functions in the field of migration policy: Ministry of Defence; State Committee for National Service; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; State Registration Service; and Ministry of Youth, Labour and Employment. It was noted that a third of the services provided by the State are not reflected in the regulations of public bodies. In-depth analysis was conducted of the goals and objectives of 38 government agencies and 1266 functions were inventorized. It was found that of 386 services provided by the State recorded in the registry, 137 are not reflected in the regulations governing public bodies. Functions were clarified and redistributed between 20 government agencies, and duplication was eliminated in the functions of 10 government agencies. During the analysis hundreds of problems were identified including: improper execution of duties and lack of coordination with other bodies (83); insufficient funding and limited resources (55); and compartmentalization of related functions between different state bodies (9).

Table 29: Analysis Kyrgyzstan’s instruments of immigration policy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject*</th>
<th>Status requirements</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour immigrants to Kyrgyzstan from countries with visa-free regimes</td>
<td>Work permit / immigrant status</td>
<td>In 2014, 12,031 work permits were issued for activity in Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour immigrants to Kyrgyzstan from countries with visa regimes</td>
<td>Visa Work permit / immigrant status</td>
<td>Legislation regulates issues such as deportation of illegal migrant workers, and violations of rules of stay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporarily and permanently residing foreign nationals and stateless persons</td>
<td>Registration at place of residence Permanent residence Migration registration</td>
<td>Elements have been put in place to monitor entrance, stay and exit of migrants, and also for responsibility, initially administrative, for foreign workers if they violate the rules for stay in Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kayrylmans (ethnic Kyrgyz returnees **)</td>
<td>Stimulating the move</td>
<td>The repatriation programme does not clearly define which regions are to be settled in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Refugee status</td>
<td>There are no quotas for refugees and the number receiving refugee status can vary from year to year: from 165 in 2014 to five in 2015. Every year about 300 people apply for refugee status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*** Employer in Kyrgyzstan (legal or physical person)</td>
<td>Permit to recruit foreign workers</td>
<td>In 2014, the quota for recruiting foreign workers was 12,990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* By law all foreign nationals and stateless persons enjoy the same rights and freedoms and have the same duties as Kyrgyzstani nationals (with the exceptions of voting rights and the duty to perform military service).

to Several Legislative Acts of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 27 January 2015, in essence reflects ideological changes in the approach to resettlement: return is no longer defined in terms of return to the historic homeland and kayrylmans are not guaranteed socio-economic support to the same degree.

*** This category of foreign nationals or stateless persons only receive the right to work if they have received official refugee status.

In general, instruments of migration policy are mainly oriented towards regulating the legal status of foreign nationals, their possible access to the labour market and their choice of place of residence. An important component of migration policy concerns the obtaining and relinquishing of citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic. Acquiring citizenship is possible under the following conditions:

1) By birth;
2) As a result of admission to citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic;
3) As a result of restoration of citizenship;
4) On the grounds or in the manner prescribed by virtue of international treaties to which the Kyrgyz Republic is party. There are two modes of acquisition of citizenship - general and simplified. Issues of social integration of persons receiving citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic are not subject considered in migration policy.

In general, experts who have analysed Kyrgyzstan’s migration legislation have come to the conclusion that there are many “blind” areas in it, which are not regulated at normative level, but cause many problems to migrants in practice.217

For example, speedy resolution is required of problems with pensions and access to social security for migrant workers; there is an urgent need for regulation of recruitment of migrant workers, whose legal status is not regulated nor ratified by Kyrgyzstan by international treaties or legislation passed by the Kyrgyz Republic; there is no clear policy on external labour migration and a lack of tools that would allow the authorized body to fulfil its mandate to assist migrants with employment and protection of their rights.

The authors of the migration profile conclude there that the normative base for migration is “insufficient”:218 “Analysis of the current legislative and regulatory basis between source and destination states shows that:

- The current legislative and regulatory basis designed to regulate migration between states lags behind general trends in migration processes, passing through its formation stages (improvement);
- any change in the laws governing the migration processes in the countries of destination, are designed primarily to protect the national interests of these countries;
- migrant workers, in turn, facing the need to protect their own interests, use a variety of mechanisms, including acquiring citizenship of the country of destination, and creating parallel state structures, such as healthcare for Kyrgyzstanis at affordable prices, etc.

217 Bir Duino and Centre for International Protection, “Analiz zakonodatel’stv KR, RT, RF i RK v sfere trudovoy migratsii i rekomendatsii po ikh usovershenstvovaniyu [Analysis of the legislation of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and Kazakhstan in the area of labour migration and recommendations for its improvement]”
Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015 and changes to the migration regime for Kyrgyzstanis in Russia and Kazakhstan has begun, in practice, an entirely new step in the country’s migration policy. The “project launch” of the Eurasian Economic Union meant the start of integration policy and the need to ensure the functioning of the Unified Economic Space, ideally without exceptions or limitations. During preparations for the Union Agreement, representatives of member States and the Eurasian Economic Commission worked to reveal and analyse barriers to free movement of goods, services, capital and labour, starting from the need to determine in which areas and sectors of the economy certain freedoms are lacking and why. The Commission established that there was a lack of freedoms, as a rule, caused by a lack of elements,\textsuperscript{219} needed to ensure the free functioning of an internal market, or excessive economic regulation measures by some States that limited one or more of the four “freedoms”. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Union expressed the intention of member States to gradually reduce exceptions and limitations, for a rather long period the internal market of the Union will continue to operate with them.\textsuperscript{220}

\textsuperscript{219} The absence of a principle of mutual recognition in some sectors means it is not possible to speak of complete freedom of movement of goods, services, capital or labour. For example, the principle of mutual recognition of diplomas was a missing element from free movement of labour force up to 2015.

\textsuperscript{220} О ситуатсii po ustraneniyu prepyatstvuyushchikh funktsionirovaniyu vnutrennego rynka Yevraziyskogo ekonomiche-skogo soyuza bar’erov dlya vzaimnogo dostupa, a takzhe iz’yatiy i ograničeniy v otnoshenii dvizheniya tovarov, uslug, kapitala i rabochey sily [On elimination of obstacles to the functioning of the internal market of the Eurasian Economic Union, barriers to mutual access, as well as exceptions and limitations on the movement of goods, services, capital and labour], (Moscow, 2015).
Part C.2. Institutional and organizational framework

In 2000, when the Law on External Migration was adopted, legislation clearly stated that “in the Kyrgyz Republic the mandated state bodies in the field of external migration are the State Agency for Migration and Demography under the Government, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Ministry of National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the Ministry of Defence of the Kyrgyz Republic”. There is no such specificity about authorized state bodies in any of the relevant laws and regulations in the field of internal migration, or about migration management in general.

Frequent changes of government, and changes to the structure of government, particularly given the multi-party parliamentary system in Kyrgyzstan, make it possible to state the duties of specific state bodies mandated to implement migration policy in Kyrgyzstan. Otherwise, laws and regulations would rapidly become “obsolescent” and would require continuous amendments to reflect the new configuration of Government, becoming a real problem for migration legislation and practice. To avoid such problems, in 2012 a new edition of the Constitutional Law “On the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic” was adopted. Article 11(2) states: “The Government, on the basis of the functions specified in this constitutional Law, distributes functions for implementation between ministries, state committees, administrative agencies and local state administrations.” Nevertheless, resolving problems of changing legislation does not resolve the issue of how to institutionalize mechanisms to govern migration, including changes to the structures and functions of the authorized body for development and implementation of state migration policy. Migration expert A. Musabaeva has tracked the changes to the statuses of the authorized body for development and implementation of state migration policy (since its time of creation) as part of the overall institutional mechanism for governing migration processes in Kyrgyzstan.

Table 30: Development of the institutional mechanism for governance of migration processes in the Kyrgyz Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Name of institutional mechanism</th>
<th>Government agency affiliated to</th>
<th>Regulatory document</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999-2001</td>
<td>State Agency for Migration and Demographics</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government Regulation 450 of 17 August 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2005</td>
<td>Migration Service Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Government Regulation 505 of 1 September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2009</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Employment and Migration (formed from the State Committee for Migration and Employment)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Presidential Decree 425 of 26 October 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

221 Law 85 of 18 June 2012
### Part C.2. Institutional and organizational framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Department/Service Description</th>
<th>Authority</th>
<th>Regulation Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>External Migration Department (migration issues were transferred to the MFA,)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Government Regulation 122 of 20 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2013</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Migration and Youth (transformed from the MYLE)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government Regulation 109 of 5 March 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2015</td>
<td>State Migration Service (migration issues transferred from the transformed MLMY)</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Government Regulation 854 of 11 December 2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As noted by the authors of “Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the EEU: influence on migration processes”, “constant departmental reorganization has had a negative impact on migration policy, as institutional instability has been reflected in poor institutional memory and lack of capacity of the institutional mechanism to fulfill its functions in a quality manner. The weakness of the institutional mechanism has led migration issues, like before, not being regulated adequately and continuing to be cobbled together. Transferring management of migration issues to a ministry with several functions has led to actual ‘dilution’ of migration policy among the other priorities of the ministry.”

Today, state migration policy is implemented through complex work and approaches of various state bodies which are components of the institutional migration management mechanism in Kyrgyzstan (see the graph in Appendix 5: “Institutional framework of migration policy in the Kyrgyz Republic”). However, the functional incorporation of various government agencies in the institutional mechanism for migration management in Kyrgyzstan is not always clearly spelled out. As a whole, it is fragmented between various immigration laws and regulations. This leads to loss of efficiency in the implementation of certain aspects and functions of migration policy, and lack of understanding in several government agencies of their role in this mechanism. For example, the authors of the Special Report on the Results of Monitoring and Analysing Implementation of the Law “On Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings” state: “Some subjects of implementation of the Law, in particular the Prosecutor General’s Office and the State Customs Service, are initiating their exit from the list of implementers of the Law. This indicates insufficient study of their functional obligations and a clear and deep understanding of the Law.”

The Regulation which again created the State Migration Service under the Government as the authorized body on migration defines the mandate, functions and duties of the agency. These include both policy and governance issues, including:

- Developing and implementing measures for a single state migration policy both within Kyrgyzstan and abroad;
- Developing and implementing laws and regulations for migration and overseeing their implementation;

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223 Ibid. 22
224 Appendix 1 to Government Regulation 854 of 11 December 2015
Part C.2. Institutional and organizational framework

- Monitoring and evaluating the migration situation in Kyrgyzstan;
- Developing a system for organized recruitment of Kyrgyzstani nationals abroad;
- Regulating processes for recruiting foreign labour, bearing in mind the interests of the internal labour market in Kyrgyzstan;
- Adopting measures to protect the rights and legal interests of ethnic Kyrgyz immigrants and Kayrylmans;
- Strengthening the interaction and supporting cooperation between state executive bodies and compatriots abroad on economic, cultural and social development;
- Upholding the rights of refugees in accordance with international obligations, and bearing in mind the interests of national security;
- Participating in prevention, detection and suppression of trade in persons;
- Participating in regulating external migration; and
- Developing international cooperation and international agreements on migration.

There are 30 functions of the authorized body for migration that are divided in the Regulation into “sectoral policy functions”, “coordination and monitoring functions”, “support functions”, and “service provision functions”. This functional groups include provisions which, at a minimum, have an element of conflict of interest: taking key decisions on granting immigrant, Kayrylman and refugee status; participating in defining and (re)distributing quotas for recruiting and using foreign labour across regions and sectors of the economy; at the same time as considering complaints and appeals by individuals and entities, issuing migration issues permits, determining how to use the foreign labour force, and the labour of foreign nationals and stateless persons. There is also a conflict between the responsibilities of the State Service Migration to develop migration policies, to implement them, and to assess the migration situation in Kyrgyzstan. Another of the key functions is also complex: “... in accordance with established procedure, to submit proposals to the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic on annually established quotas for recruitment and use of foreign labour in the Kyrgyz Republic, and distribution (redistribution) of quotas to hire foreign labour between regions and economic sectors in accordance with their needs”. The agency does not have the necessary expertise to assess regional and sectoral labour market needs.

Despite having the full functional capacity to design and implement state migration policy and evaluate its implementation, the State Migration Service has no fixed authority to coordinate the activities of other state bodies to implement state migration policy.
Part C.3. Political framework

Seeing external labour migration as the only way to resolve the problem of “extra” people in Kyrgyzstan’s labour market has to a large degree “shut down” the issue in development of national development strategies. Labour migration does not feature as a priority of the National Strategy for Sustainable Development of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2013-2017. And the section of the Government's implementation plan for the strategy on “The labour market and employment” contains only one task for the State to support Kyrgyzstani citizens working abroad. The task is formulated as “widening opportunities and standardization recruitment procedures for work abroad by introducing organized recruitment.” This is to be achieved by concluding agreements between the Kyrgyz Republic and destination countries on organized recruitment, social security and protection for migrant workers, as well as through introducing minimum requirements for employment contracts and concluding agreements to establish training and professional development centres, and so on.225

Development of conceptual approaches and models for state migration policy strategies in Kyrgyzstan are presented in the report on the impact of migration processes on Kyrgyzstan’s entry to the EAEU226 as follows:227

Table 31: Main provisions in the concept of migration policy in Kyrgyzstan in the period of independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory act which adopted / confirmed this document</td>
<td>Presidential Decree 102 of 28 April 2000 (the part concerning migration policy was also deleted on adoption in 2004 of the Concept of migration policy until 2010)</td>
<td>Presidential Decree 151 of 30 April 2004 (both documents are no longer in force in accordance with Government Regulation 485 “On the programme to assist employment...” of 6 September 2013)</td>
<td>Government Regulation 485 of 6 September 2013 (amended by Regulation of 28 November 2014, included along with regulation of external labour migration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main priorities of labour migration policy specified in the document</td>
<td>- Development of migration legislation</td>
<td>- Achieving sufficient regularity of migration processes, taking into account the aims of economic growth and ensuring national security</td>
<td>- Protecting the rights of migrant workers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

226 Ibid, pp. 24-26
227 Ibid, p. 25
### Part C.3. Political framework

| Aims and functions of migration policy | - Reducing migration potential  
- Stabilizing the migration climate and reducing the migratory mobility of the population  
- Activating Kyrgyzstan’s entry into the international labour market | - Ensuring Kyrgyzstan’s active entry into the international labour market  
- Expanding the workforce sent from the country  
- Developing academic capacity to study and predict migration processes | - Creating workplaces in the internal labour market and preserving sufficient professional capacity in Kyrgyzstan  
- Reintegrating returned migrants |

As the author concludes: “analysis of conceptual documents, in particular regulations about external labour migration, has demonstrated that in the last 10-15 years these documents have followed the logic of a country exporting labour”: this is, until now “migration policy in Kyrgyzstan has concentrated to a large degree on external labour migration as an important tool to provide the excess workforce with employment abroad”. In other words, migration policy has focussed on ‘pushing out’ the population for recruitment.

The conceptual documents are characterised by insufficient specificity on policy measures, an abundance of declaratory provisions and, most importantly, a lack of costings for implementation of the migration strategies and programmes developed and, consequently, a lack of sufficient financing for effective implementation.

It seems important in migration policy strategies to present a set of expectations which are assigned to diaspora organizations of Kyrgyzstaniis abroad. Though special laws and regulations regulating the activity of diaspora organizations abroad have not been adopted, the rights of migrants abroad and their non-governmental associations were actively discussed in parliament in 2015, in connection with two mutually-contradictory bills introduced for parliamentary consideration (by the parties Ata Meken and Ar Namys). In addition, in the last three or four years, the functions and status of diaspora organizations have often be discussed at policy level in connection with the Mekendeshter forums. The main aim and expectation of the State from the diaspora is to call on diaspora organizations to mobilize external migrant workers to accumulate funds to invest in the development of Kyrgyzstan...
and specific communities at home, to facilitate more “rational” use of remittances from migrant workers. According to the authors of the report “Migration and the use of remittances for education”, “Remittances are the most visible and immediate means by which the diaspora can support development and poverty reduction in their homeland.”

With knowledge of both countries – source and destination – diasporas can facilitate trade and investment between them. There are several ways to use diaspora resources to mobilize capital through markets: through savings accounts, securitization of money flows, transnational credit, use of diaspora links or direct funds from the diaspora organizations. In many countries diaspora organizations become important sources of transfer technology, knowledge and skills for development and innovation in the host country.

At the same time the state and the potential of Kyrgyzstani diasporas in various countries remains unclear. Researchers who have studied the world’s large diaspora organizations have found that “the diaspora becomes a place for accumulation of unabsorbed migrants”. That is, the stronger the diaspora, the lower the absorption (integration) of migrants in the destination countries.228 In this sense, counting on the diaspora as a mechanism for integration and adaptation of migrant workers in the cultural environment of host countries would seem not to stand up to critical evaluation.

228 Ibraeva et al, “Gender i migratsiya [Gender and Migration]”, 2013
Part C.4. Programme framework

International organizations and local civil society organizations play a significant role in the creation and implementation of Kyrgyzstan’s state migration policy. The key international organizations working with the Government to support migration policy are IOM and UNHCR. IOM assists Kyrgyzstan’s Government to deal with emerging challenges in migration management and to understand migration issues, through exchange of information, training and capacity building. Defining its mandate so broadly, the IOM is the leading international agency that systematically support government policy in the following areas:

- Countering trafficking in persons (prevention, protection, prosecution/return, rehabilitation and reintegration).
- Assisting with the return of migrants (sending refugees and migrants)
- Technical cooperation for migration governance (border management). Another essential component in migration governance for which IOM is providing support is the creation of valid databases and conducting qualitative studies of the migration situation.

UNHCR’s mandate is to protect the rights and wellbeing of refugees, and also to provide opportunities for them to realize their right to seek asylum and settlement in another country, voluntarily return to their homeland if they have the opportunity, and local reintegration or resettlement in a third country.

In addition to these international organizations, implementation of migration policy is also supported by other international organizations: the World Bank (in particular, a project to support MIRPAL, the regional network of migration and remittances practitioners), the European Union (the MIEUX project: migration experience of the EU), the Open Society Foundation (two projects implemented in partnership with AUCA: “Building Enabling Environment to Develop Effective Migration Policies in KR: Promoting Capacity of Migration State Bodies and Enhancing Migration Studies in KR” and “Protecting the Rights of Kyrgyz and other Central Asian Migrants: Utilizing policy analysis, building capacity, and facilitating policy reforms”). The NED has provided significant support for the institutional development of the authorized body on migration. ICCO (the Interchurch Organization for Development Cooperation) in the Kyrgyz Republic has supported numerous projects on migration, including: creation and development of the “Central Asia on the move” Project Partner Platform network, which brought together 25 public organizations in Kyrgyzstan working on (internal and external) migration. The Platform ‘seeks in the long term to promote inclusive citizenship, guaranteed civil and social rights for all workers and their families in Central Asia. In the short term the platform has the following objectives:

a) Community members vulnerable to migration have access to social provision and economic opportunities in their own local environment
b) Include internal migrants in the policy processes to receive public services where they live and work
c) Problems related to non-observance of illegal external migrants’ rights are recognized and decisions are taken by national and regional decision-makers in receiving countries

One of the first organizations to work with Kyrgyzstani diasporas abroad and assist with the protection of the rights of compatriots was the Zamandash association. Today this organiza-
tion has a particular place among the non-governmental structures engaged in formulating, implementing and evaluating migration policy.

In recent years the Mekendeshter Forum was created as a permanent space to evaluate the effectiveness of Kyrgyzstan’s migration policy and the challenges for emigrants from Kyrgyzstan and migrant workers abroad. The forum has already become a brand of Kyrgyzstan’s migration policy and is becoming another important “player” in the development of national migration policy, helping to unite diaspora associations of Kyrgyzstanis abroad and optimize their influence on their homeland’s development.

Despite the many projects of international organizations supporting initiatives and plans for migration policy, the project and programme activities of international organizations, for the most part, remain fragmented and scattered, and often do not lead to sustainable institutional changes for state and non-governmental players in migration policy. This is largely because of the lack of a coordination body for migration governance, and the weakness of political will for efficient and effective financial management of migration policy. The lack of capacity of the authorized body for migration to resolve this level of issue demonstrates eloquently that in the development of various strategic documents and development priorities migration remains “forgotten”, and migration policy as a whole has not become part of the overarching national strategies for economic, demographic, social and other policy. One example of the lack of sensitivity to migration is the development and adoption of the National Sustainable Development Strategy for 2013-2017, which was coordinated by the Ministry of the Economy, and the Government collegiately.

There are some problem areas of migration policy in which many actors work, while there are also some that are almost absent from the migration “agenda”. The “popular” areas of activity for international organizations, NGOs, state bodies and private recruitment agencies include informational activities.

The “Gender and migration” study commissioned and financially supported by ICCO found that a significant number of projects and programmes focusing on external migrants work on the assumption that migrants become illegal because of their lack of information about migration legislation in the host country, and lack of awareness of procedures to legalise their status. However, the report’s authors argue convincingly that the regulatory system and practice in the host country themselves construct the illegality of migrant workers in a whole range of ways. Therefore, even very well informed migrant workers may not be able to overcome the barriers to achieving legal status.

Many organizations also work in the creation of referral systems for external migrants who are victims of trafficking in persons and/or labour exploitation and slavery. Activity in this area is particularly supported by the IOM and requires continued support and expansion, as to create an effective and sustainable referral system requires strengthened capacity in all parts of the system. It is important to provide shelters and other infrastructure, as well as a system of expert advisory support. The initiative to bring together non-governmental organizations working in the field of migration is in need of further expansion and support: a unified platform that strengthens their voice in the decision-making process and allows them to achieve synergies in resource management, meet their goals and tasks to support various categories of migrants.
The experience of human rights organizations and other migration policy actors seeking to protect the rights of migrant workers demonstrates the importance of two factors: the expansion of practices to protect both universal human rights beyond national / citizens’ rights, and to involve players with unique mandates and capabilities to protect labour rights: a new type of trade union that would not be limited in its work by national borders but will include the rights of migrant workers in the scope of its work.

One of the key functions of state bodies is to make migration legislation more efficient. This relates to the aforementioned duplication, conflict between regulations, fragmentation of legislation, and so on. In this regard, it would seem prudent to inventory legislation and consider codification, which would help to link different sectoral areas of migration together and articulate clearly the complex institutional mechanism for management of migration. Such measures are in the making because of the forthcoming introduction of a unified system for recording cross-border migration to improve the regulation of external migration, develop measures to track entry and exit of foreign nationals and stateless persons and their movement in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the automation of inter-agency exchange of information and strengthening of the fight against terrorism, transnational crime, illegal migration and other challenges and threats to national security.
Part D. Conclusions and recommendations

Part D.1. Migration in Kyrgyzstan: current trends

Given historical migration processes in Kyrgyzstan, it is important to note that the largest and most dynamic flow of internal and external migration continues to be labour migration. The main reasons for labour migration are largely economic and political, and are linked with inadequate development of the employment system and demographic indicators of labour, the effectiveness of state governance of labour and employment issues, and increasing the efficiency of labour and the quality of workplaces.

The predominant reason behind internal migration between 2010 and 2014 is extreme inequality in regional development and poor development of the land and capital markets. These determine the vector of internal migration: from the regions to Bishkek and the surrounding Chuy oblast. This “unidirectional” internal migration further deepens a whole range of socio-economic problems: the inflow of large numbers of internal migrants does not just intensify the struggle for limited resources in the area and increase tension in the overcrowded city and its surroundings, but also worsens the prospects for regional development and stimulates growth in conflict potential because of the inflow of “creeping” migration from border areas of the country, and significantly changes the ethnic make-up of regional populations.

Despite rhetoric about the need to regulate migration, internal migration continues to be anarchic and undocumented. It is possible that the reason for inactivity in state migration policy, like for external labour migration to Russia and Kazakhstan, is the cheap accessible labour needed to support the economies of the destination regions of the migrants, and also reduced social pressure of unused labour in the regions because of difficulties providing employment in local labour markets.

As a result of the dominance of economic considerations and market interests on migration coverage, the dominant discourse on internal migration links it to “socio-economic issues”: ensuring social security, access to social services and benefits for internal migrants, the “criminalization” of the migrant environment, and so on. Preserving the legitimate right of citizens to freedom of movement as guaranteed in legislation is not a priority. This leads to high social and human costs to migrants.

Even the economic effects of internal migration on households in the regions remain invisible to the state and society, as measuring remittances from internal migration is difficult to do and has not been studied.

Of the social factors pushing migration, it is important to consider the influence of the household and family, as decision making on labour migration does not rest with an individual man or woman. Instead, the decision is a distinctive family strategy, intended to diversify income sources, minimize risks to households and widen access to financial resources. The benefits and interests of households are the reason for equal opportunities for men and women from households involved in migration, unlike other countries in the region where rational arguments about households do not significantly change the traditional gender culture. Nevertheless, women (particularly young women) leaving Kyrgyzstan as migrant workers face significant (compared to internal migration) negative attitudes and
barriers, like in other countries in the region. In total, the proportion of women engaged in internal migration is higher than that of men.

In this context it is important to note that migration has had a real impact on the gender regime and relationship of the sexes, both in the flow sent out and in the remaining society. The internal migratory behaviour of men and women is asymmetric: gendered migration risks lead to a fall in migration by men in periods of economic crisis, when women become more active.

Changes in the proportions of female and male external and internal migrants and their age composition are major factors behind changes to the labour market and the “marriage market”. The asymmetry of migration models (when women take on the role of senior executive and main breadwinner and leave as migrant workers) is a factor widening “marriage markets” not just as traditionally for men, but also for women.

There is a contrast between the array of legislation governing immigration and labour migration in Kyrgyzstan with public discourse: the most discussed issue in the media and among politicians is external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan, internal migration issues are not very popular, and the immigration flow into the country is in even less frequent theme. The idea that Kyrgyzstan is a country almost exclusively sending migrants is firmly rooted in popular consciousness. In practice, the country’s migration policy focuses on the regulation of immigration flows.

In Kyrgyzstan’s information and media space the topic of labour immigration and illegal presence of foreign migrant workers mainly appears in terms of corruption in migration governance or the national security threat posed by illegal immigrants (who in this case are generally seen as having criminal intentions).

In response to growing xenophobia in the population and discriminatory practices against migrant workers, politicians often characterize immigration in a similar way to external labour migration from Kyrgyzstan in terms of economic benefits (focussing on the proceeds from immigration quotas and work permits, and opportunities for local people to be employed in companies and institutions financed by foreign capital). The Government even justifies exporting educational services on the grounds of “enduring it” for the economic benefits: “The export of educational services generate billions of dollars through spending on tuition and various fees, living expenses and discretionary spending. The export of educational services is creating new jobs and increasing state revenues.” This approach hinders the study of social and cultural aspects of immigration to Kyrgyzstan, dehumanizes the migration process and fails to ensure protection of the rights and support for the human potential of immigrants in accordance with the international treaties on migration ratified by Kyrgyzstan.

Policy

There is an abundance of legislation, particularly secondary legislation, because the key migration legislation contain many reference rules, generalized and declarative provisions that are often simply redundant, given the extensive regulatory framework of international conventions and protocols ratified by the country. Much of the legislative base on migration often duplicates itself, such as provisions regulating the work of foreigners and stateless
Part D.1. Migration in Kyrgyzstan: current trends

persons in Kyrgyzstan. Sometimes Kyrgyzstan’s immigration and labour migration regulations at different levels are in conflict: the Laws “On the Investments of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “On Concessions...” clearly articulate the lack of maximum quotas for recruiting foreign labour for local labour markets and the right of economic operators to determine such rules by agreement in each particular case, while the annual Government Decision on the foreign workforce in practice establishes such permitted limits.

Despite the vast regulatory framework for migration in Kyrgyzstan, domestic policy contains no definition of the legal status of migrants, international legal specifications or legal regulation of this issue. Lack of clarity about the legal status of mobile persons makes them vulnerable and complicates the job of determining the extent of international migration.

Analysis of the array of laws and regulations on migration passed in recent years leads to the conclusion that internal migration has not been “mainstreamed” in the agenda of national legislation, and that the development of migration law as a whole is not derived from actual migration processes, but from administrative requirements and interests. Visualizing the process of law drafting on migration shows a trend of development in national migration law: secondary legislation predominates over laws, particularly when it comes to regulation of immigration and external labour migration to Kyrgyzstan.

Despite the “rationality” of the limited number of laws and regulations on external migration, because of the limited opportunities to affect the situation of migrants from Kyrgyzstan abroad, the state has also largely abstained from regulating issues affecting returning migrants.

There is a range of challenges hindering development of an institutional mechanism for governance of internal and external migration in Kyrgyzstan:

• There is a difference between the de jure and de facto models of interaction of mechanisms: a number of key state bodies do not implement their real de jure responsibilities and mandates for migration policy governance, while the authorized body lacks the authority needed for effective coordination. Because of the differences between the de jure and de facto activities of the institutional mechanism for migration governance, functions such as integration of immigrants (including Kayrylmans) and reintegration of migrant workers are not fulfilled either by the Ministry of Culture, Information and Tourism or by international organizations.

• Despite the fact that in Kyrgyzstan’s years of sovereign development its institutional framework on migration has been fragile, the authorized body on migration has often rightly been determined to be the Government structure regulating labour and employment in the country. In turn, migration is primarily understood as being linked to labour mobility, economic performance and employment. But regulation of migration policy has focussed on oversight and policing functions, the law applied in the field of labour relations is shifting from ensuring labour standards to using instruments of oversight (work permits, registration, and so on) in the field of labour migration policy.

• The mandates of key structures in the institutional mechanism for migration governance are not always clearly defined, with regard to internal migration. In practice this leads to problems for migrants. For example, the State Committee for National Security and
the Ministry of Internal Affairs perpetuate the idea that migration, including internal migration, should be looked at from the perspective of terrorism risks, threats to national security and the struggle with criminal elements. Migrants, already marginalized by their spatial mobility, suffer stigma and discrimination.

The activities of certain components of the institutional mechanism (for example employment centres in the regions) are uncritically perceived as significant and unavoidable, but no impact analysis has been conducted over more than two decades, and no corrective steps have been made to their existing strategy.

Despite the fact that several studies on internal migration have highlighted one of the main causes – the failure to resolve issues in labour and capital markets – to date there is no record even of attempts to address this issue in legislation.

Administrative capacity, given existing political will and political culture, means that upholding citizens’ rights and providing social protection for immigrant Kayrylmans are not taken into account in the legislative process. This has resulted in practical problems obtaining citizenship and rights, and access to basic social services. The State has not implemented measures for the integration of Kayrylmans: this leads to a disaffected environment for migrants, and creates tensions between locals and Kayrylmans.

Despite having full functional opportunities to develop and implement state migration policy and evaluate its realization, the authorized body for migration, nevertheless, lacks an enshrined mandate to coordinate the activities of other state bodies for implementation of state migration policy.

The inflow of foreign investment and human resources into Kyrgyzstan are rarely the subject of socio-economic and political analysis. In terms of benefits and costs, it seems that the efficiency of foreign investment in development is debatable. The data shows that enterprises with foreign capital account for a large share of the Kyrgyz economy, but less than a quarter of exports, while increasing the proportion of imports by more than a third.

Direct foreign investment cannot serve as the main source for development of Kyrgyzstan’s economy. Kyrgyzstan’s existing financial and monetary policy has led to a chronic shortage of domestic investment resources. The level of liberalization of investment legislation in Kyrgyzstan does not correspond to the level of development of the national economy and creates additional risks both for investors and for the economy.

**Statistical reporting**

The recording of internal migration is based on the Russian model of a legislative distinction between place of residence and place of stay and reflects an attempt by the State to minimize its responsibility for regional development, planning, management of resettlement, deployment of productive forces, and the timely development of important energy, transport, information and communications infrastructure.

Residence registration instruments – lists of arrivals and departures – do not present a full picture of internal migration. A citizen moving from one village or town to another area of the country has no effective incentives to go through the procedures for signing out and registering.
The lack of significant research or analysis on immigration and immigration policy in Kyrgyzstan means that the data available does not allow us to provide a socio-demographic portrait of immigrants (foreign nationals, stateless persons, refugees and asylum seekers, and Kayrylmans), what they are doing and how they fund their stay. This uncertainty leads to a lack of understanding of their requirements and interests, prevents evaluation of their protection needs, and reduces opportunities to prevent conflicts related to migration.

Population censuses, household sample surveys, labour force surveys and other approaches for obtaining data about internal migration (and potentially labour and other immigration) have a cost in terms of resource consumption (which means they are infrequent), and also are unreliable, because of relying on information provided by the respondent.

Local self-government bodies, state structures, civil society and the international community have tested different models for measuring the irregular flow of internal migrants, to help ensure that internal migrants have access to social benefits and services. However, there has been no attempt to collate these initiatives and to learn and adopt the most effective strategies to be used as a basis for state policy on internal migration. Rigidity on this issue has led to a widespread perception of local authorities receiving corrupt benefits from undocumented migration, and reduces confidence in the governance structure.

The methodology used by the State Border Service to register border crossings, and the lack of an inter-departmental information system and a single electronic database, make it impossible to understand the true picture of Kyrgyzstani and foreign nationals entering and leaving the country. There is no effective labour immigration data gathering in Kyrgyzstan, and it is not possible to get data on gender, profession, goal, time of departure and other characteristics of foreigners.

There is no effective system to register labour migration in Kyrgyzstan, and it would be practically impossible to introduce one because of the lack of high-quality and effective methodology to collect data at entry and exit points to the country that is disaggregated by sex, profession, objectives, time of departure and other characteristics of foreign nationals.
Part D.2. Migration from Kyrgyzstan: current trends

By volume, political value and short-term economic benefit, external labour migration has a dominant position in Kyrgyzstan’s migration policy.

The main destination countries of external migrants in the CIS continue to be Russia and Kazakhstan. At the same time, the circle of countries outside the CIS is gradually widening. However the difference in the volume of external migration from Kyrgyzstan to countries outside the CIS compared to within the CIS is linked to the following factors: the language barrier, limited information about recruitment, lack of experienced agencies in the regions for recruitment abroad, experience of finding jobs and living in labour importing countries, fierce competition in the labour markets of western countries, weakness of ethnic migration networks in the recipient countries, and also the existence of visa regimes and other measures to record and control unregulated migration.

Labour migration to the Russian Federation, which accounts for more than 90 per cent of the total flow from Kyrgyzstan, leads to a high degree of political and economic dependence on Russia and its economy.

The current socio-demographic characteristics of Kyrgyz migrant workers abroad, primarily in the Russian Federation, are as follows:

- External migrant workers are predominantly of working age, but an increasing number leave the country before reaching the age of majority.
- A high proportion of migrant workers to Russia and Kazakhstan are young men, though the proportion of women and girls is the most significant in the region.
- Of the migrants to Russia, more than 65 per cent are residents of southern oblasts of Kyrgyzstan. In certain regions, such as Batken oblast, almost 35 per cent of the working age population has left or has experience of work in Russia.
- The average length of stay in Russia is almost 25 months, just over two years, and about 20 per cent of migrants leave for longer periods (almost five years). Over 40 per cent of respondents would like to acquire Russian citizenship and stay in the country permanently, seeing Russia as their country of permanent residence. Another 20 per cent plan for a long stay in the country and then to return. Only about 30 per cent of migrants want to earn money quickly and return home.

For a certain percentage of emigrants from Kyrgyzstan to Russia, whose parents acquired Russian citizenship decades ago and settled there, a radically new situation has developed: if returning temporarily or permanently to Kyrgyzstan, they require support to adapt and integrate there. In most cases the “return” of migrant workers to Kyrgyzstan gives rise to a new round of migration or perpetuates the existing cycle of poverty and unemployment, as the country still lacks effective measures to develop employment and local labour markets, and promote return migration and adaptation of returning citizens to local markets.

The view that external labour migration is conditioned by poverty and unemployment is contradicted by a number of facts and arguments:

For young people the problem is not always unemployment, as can be seen by the growth of the share of the economically inactive population of working age, as well as the existence
Part D.2. Migration from Kyrgyzstan: current trends

of regions with populations with limited mobility (such as Naryn oblast and parts of Issyk Kul oblast) in the context of the worst indicators of employment, unemployment and poverty.

A number of negative trends have arisen concerning external labour migration: worsening labour productivity in Kyrgyzstan, increasing discrepancy between the rate of growth of labour productivity and wages, and an increase in the proportion of unskilled workers and the share of the population without professional education. Neither the internal nor the external labour markets are providing incentives for development of a skilled Kyrgyzstani workforce. Reductions in the educational potential of external migrants will in the long-term cause fundamental risks against the backdrop of an impending global crisis, and lack of qualifications can also be a barrier to future modernization and development.

In this connection, more rational governance of educational (e)migration would be forward thinking (including analysis of the reasons for the brain drain and barriers to the return of skilled migrants).

IOM data show that Kyrgyzstan has the sad fate of being one of the countries in the region with the highest levels of trafficking in human beings. Kyrgyzstan is a country of origin, transit and destination for human trafficking for labour exploitation, slavery and sexual exploitation of women, children and men. The countries of destination of labour exploitation and slavery of men, women and children from Kyrgyzstan are mainly Russia and Kazakhstan, more rarely they are Turkey or the United Arab Emirates as well as Kyrgyzstan itself (this happens especially in agriculture, forestry, construction and the textile industry). Most Kyrgyzstani nationals who fall victims to trafficking are women.

One of the key factors in the vulnerability of Kyrgyzstani migrant workers to Russia or Kazakhstan is the model of migratory behaviour: only a third of external migrants have previous experience of internal migration. Primarily from rural areas, migrants arrive in large cities and face culture shock. In this context, social networks of compatriots play an important role in adapting to change, though this high dependence among migrants on arrival can become a barrier to future integration of the migrants in the host community (this consequence of diaspora associations is one of the reasons behind creation of ghettoized niches and ethnic segregation of labour markets, housing and so on).

Additional research is needed into possible forms of destabilizing influence in communities of migrants from Kyrgyzstan (criminal relations, growth of violence, disintegration of traditional ethnic trust and so on).

Remittances from migrants clearly have a positive influence on the macroeconomic indicators of the source and destination countries (reduced poverty levels, better living standards in the communities left behind, significant contributions to GDP in the host country, direct financial benefits from the issuing (sale) of permits, funds for transfers in banking structures, expenditure on living expenses and food during the time of stay, and so on). However, at the micro and meso levels it can also have negative consequences:

- There is some evidence of inflationary pressure from remittances in sectors not related to trade (land and property);
- There is proof of a trend to replace income from labour with transfers, which indicates incentives for the working population to become economically inactive;
Part D.2. Migration from Kyrgyzstan: current trends

- There has been an increase in expenditure on celebrations among families who receive transfers; and
- There is evidence of the disintegration of traditional family structures and norms under the influence of migration and remittances (violence, loss of traditional values and ways of interacting and so on).

Remittances cannot be seen as an investment, as is proved by the expenditure policy of households receiving remittances, where consumption prevails over investment. However, researchers have differing opinions on this, and findings may vary depending on how investment is defined. For example, house repairs can be seen as an investment, and a significant proportion of remittances are specifically spent on this.

Unproductive use of remittances and poor investment in children’s education and health can be attributed in part to the limited supply of services in the regions (poor quality education services, the devaluation of education in the labour market, and so on).

Research on remittances has identified significant regional differences in the structure of incomes of the population. In particular, residents of southern regions have the highest proportion of their incomes from remittances. This necessitates a differentiated account of the impact of migration on poverty and other economic indicators.

The economic situation is traditionally better monitored at macro level, using key macro-economic indicators. But practice shows that understanding the macroeconomic situation does not always mean that the situation of households and individuals can be understood. Micro studies and/or more detailed research into the relationships with other macroeconomic indicators are also necessary.

A number of aspects of the interaction between migration and development factors require close examination and rejection of myths and assumptions. These include, for example, the issue of population aging and depopulation of the regions, and the impact of immigration flows into Kyrgyzstan on the “marriage market” and the birth rate.

Migration changes the configuration of the labour market and the level of innovation, and also distorts certain professional niches.

**Policy**

Frequent changes of government and modification of structures have a negative impact on institutional memory and the consistency of the activities of state bodies on migration, and also leads to rapid “obsolescence” of laws and regulations and a constant need to change them to fit the new government configuration. This is a real problem for migration law and practice.

Kyrgyzstan’s legislation includes norms that contradict the norms of the receiving countries. For example, legislation and the authorities in Kyrgyzstan are tolerant of dual citizenship for emigrants, as reflected in the Constitution and the Law “On Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic”, while conversely Russian legislation has tightened control and sanctions against persons who obtain Russian citizenship without relinquishing Kyrgyzstani citizenship. In such a situation, the State has not initiated effective steps to conclude bilateral agreements with Russia on liberalization of this issue.
In the field of external labour migration, the State’s strategy is to develop private employment agencies and/or interstate intermediary structures for recruitment. Of the legally constituted private employment agencies in 2010, a large proportion focused on work in Russia (50%), the United Arab Emirates and Persian Gulf countries (28%), US military bases in Afghanistan (12%), Turkey (2.5%), the Czech Republic (2.5%), Finland (2.5%), the USA and Canada (2.5%). The proportion of persons recruited through private employment agencies is not statistically significant, but previous experience of “organized recruitment” to Russia has not developed and has not been studied.

Public policy has attempted to give diaspora organizations the responsibility for mobilizing the investment potential of foreign migrants, protecting migrants’ rights, and reproducing civic and ethnic identity abroad. However, research evidence suggests that the diaspora is functionally unable to meet such expectations. The potential role of other actors, such as trade unions, is not included in the government policy agenda.

Statistics

There are methodological difficulties in evaluating those with dual citizenship (Kyrgyzstani and Russian, Kyrgyzstani and Kazakh): in practice it is not possible to count the number who have acquired Russian and Kazakhstani citizenship.

Statistics in the field of educational emigration are incomplete (less than 1%). The scattered data across countries in fact only accounts for migrant students supported by state grants. Those who study at their own expense, in countries that are not “leaders” for the export of educational services for citizens of Kyrgyzstan, are not counted at all.
Part D.3. Recommendations

On effective recording of migration flows:

1. It would be advisable to create an inter-agency information system with a single database that would involve state bodies (the State Committee for National Security, State Border Service, the State Registration Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and others), organizations (Manas International Airport, Kyrgyz Railways), and companies (airlines, hotels and so on) that are linked to external and internal migration. The recording instrument should include all socio-demographic characteristics of mobile persons. From the moment the recording instruments are introduced it is important to automate the data processing process for the information collected with it, to ensure that analytical and statistical data can be generated.

2. If foreign nationals change their declared motive and length of stay in Kyrgyzstan, it is important to study the reasons behind this and the socio-demographic profile of such foreign nationals, in order to optimise immigration policy.

3. It is advisable to introduce at governmental level an alternative registration system for Kyrgyzstani nationals (based on arrival / departure sheets). This could be in the form of an electronic database of biometric data using an “identification number” as a prerequisite for all financial and other transactions with the state and business. This would ensure that up-to-date and precise information could be obtained about the internal movements of citizens. Such an electronic system to record citizens should accompanied by a personal data protection system, to prevent risks. At the same time it would be useful to introduced per capita financing for the system for provision of state and municipal services based on “ID numbers” with clear and transparent reporting and monitoring.

4. As with identification numbers for Kyrgyzstani nationals, when granting resident permits to foreign nationals, stateless persons and asylum seekers, digital codes should be issued through which they can receive access to services provided by the state and local government. When introducing digital codes for foreign nationals and stateless persons, for the purposes of analysis and recording it would be useful to have different codes for working foreigners, students, those who have come as religious missionaries and other categories of entrants to Kyrgyzstan.

5. Enhance exchange of information and statistical data, and improve methodologies for collecting statistical information on the most important issues pertaining to migration to / from Kyrgyzstan. It is particularly important to include a gender perspective in data collection and development of methodology.

6. The statistical registration system for foreign nationals and stateless persons should include disaggregation by sex, age, country of origin, and so on. This will facilitate clearer understanding of the specifics of migratory behaviour of foreign nationals.

7. Including all competent structures in the system for reporting migratory movements, and coordination on data exchange will enable better tracking of the movements of Kyrgyzstani nationals (and therefore more effective planning and provision of state and municipal services), and also provide more complete information on the movements of foreign nationals and stateless persons in Kyrgyzstan. In particular, a requirement for local government bodies to provide data about the movements of foreign nationals and
Kyrgyzstani nationals in an “e-region” system will provide alternative data for the information system on national statistics. In addition to acquiring an additional administrative information source, such an innovation would accelerate the introduction of electronic government and increase the transparency and efficiency of governance at local level.

8. To facilitate better and fuller use of statistical data from the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey, the Labour Force Survey, and other regular surveys, access should be opened to databases for migration researchers, while ensuring data protection for personal information.

9. Explore the possibility of granting the authorised body for migration the function and duty of collecting data from all interested state and municipal bodies.

**On drafting and optimising migration legislation, and policy and strategy development:**

1. Conduct a review of migration legislation from a critical perspective to assess the relevance of various duties in the regulation of internal and external migration, and, based on this, develop recommendations to optimise migration policy, including the institutional mechanism for migration governance.

2. Consider codifying migration legislation in order to resolve duplications, remove conflicts and include regulations on “bottlenecks” in migration governance. The migration code should be based on a balance of the key objectives of an effective migration policy: economic pragmatism of the state, national security and protecting the human rights of citizens.

3. The drafting and development of migration laws and regulations should form part of an integrated state approach to regulating employment, economic activity, unemployment, and wage policy in Kyrgyzstan.

4. Develop and introduce an integrated medium-term Government plan for migration governance (internal and external) that includes concrete policy measures in the related fields of unemployment, employment, wage policy and labour, social protection, integration and adaptation of migrant workers and immigrants in Kyrgyzstan, information policy, and so on. This should include costings.

5. Increasing demographic pressures necessitate finding new and effective approaches to shift focus from job creation to creation of quality jobs that could be an alternative to emigration.

6. Based on migration policy experience, develop and implement effective tools to determine the need for foreign workers (including labour market tests, lists of professions with shortages, quotas linked to the size of the economically active population, and so on) and to regulate foreign labour in enterprises in Kyrgyzstan. In particular, it is important to consider introducing acceptable rules to recruit foreign workers both by economic sector, and for individual enterprises created with foreign capital.
Part D.3. Recommendations

On researching various aspects of migration to optimise migration governance policy and practice:

1. Research the impact of the land market on migration behaviour by Kyrgyzstani nationals (by geographical area) and develop a package of recommendations to develop legislation and practice on land use.

2. If the declared reason for and length of stay by foreign nationals in Kyrgyzstan changes, it is important to study the reasons and the socio-demographic profile of these foreign nationals, in order to optimise immigration policy.

3. Consider conducting an integrated assessment of the effectiveness of national policy regarding Kayrylmans and developing recommendations to ensure equal opportunities for receiving the status and realising their rights.

4. Include in the medium and long-term strategies and plans research by state academic structures into current issues in migration to and from Kyrgyzstan (including changing population dynamics, territory, the “marriage market” and so on).

5. Because of the significant amount of data presented in the migration profile, consider publishing a thematic series of publications on migration issues.

To enhance the effectiveness of institutional mechanisms for migration governance:

1. Consider issuing a Government decision to charge various governance bodies with implementation of aspects of migration policy that are not today implemented, or are on the periphery of the Government’s attention. This includes integration of Kayrylmans of all ages, genders, employment statuses and so forth; and reintegration of migrant workers and their families after their return from a long period abroad. More active involvement of local government bodies in the institutional framework for managing migration is also important. Given the supranational nature of human rights, the ombudsman’s mandate should include the duty to protect the rights of immigrants.

2. International organizations, the Ministry of Culture, Information and Tourism, and the mandated body on migration must develop an action plan and strategy to integrate immigrants and re-integrate returned migrant workers (help to realise the needs and interests of immigrants studying in Kyrgyzstan, guarantee non-discrimination and observance of human rights in the creation of state information policy, and so on).

3. Government action plans on migration policy should clearly set out short-term and medium-term objectives, and process indicators and results.
Admission – The granting of entry into a State. An alien has been “admitted” if s/he passed through a checkpoint (air, land or sea) and is permitted to enter by border officials. An alien who has entered clandestinely is not considered to have been admitted.

Assimilation – Adaptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another. Assimilation means the subsuming of language, traditions, values and behaviour or even fundamental vital interests and an alteration in the feeling of belonging.

Asylum (diplomatic) – The refuge which States may grant beyond the boundaries of their territory in places which are granted immunity from jurisdiction, to an individual seeking protection from the authority who persecutes or claims him or her.

Asylum (territorial) – Protection granted by a State to an alien on its own territory against the exercise of jurisdiction by the state of origin.

Asylum seekers – Persons seeking to be admitted into a country as refugees and awaiting decision on their application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

Citizenship – Legal bond between an individual and a State.

Crude death rate – Indicator that determines the intensity of mortality. It is the ratio of the total number of deaths in a year to the average population. It is typically calculated per 1000 population.

Depopulation – A systematic reduction in the total size of the population of any country or territory as a result of narrowed reproduction of the population, when the next generation is numerically less than the previous (the death rate exceeds the birth rate, high emigration, or circumstances that cause great losses of people - for example war). That is, during depopulation population decline is observed.

Deportation – The act of a State in the exercise of its sovereignty in removing an alien from its territory to a certain place after refusal of admission or termination of permission to remain.

Diaspora – Refers to any people or ethnic population that leave their traditional ethnic homelands, being dispersed throughout other parts of the world.

Discrimination – A failure to treat all persons equally where no reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured. Discrimination is prohibited in respect of “race, sex, language or religion”

Emigrant – National of the Kyrgyz Republic who has left the Kyrgyz Republic to the territory of another State with the objective of permanent residence.

Emigration – Departure by a national of the Kyrgyz Republic from the Kyrgyz Republic to the territory of another State with the objective of permanent residence.

Exploitation – The act of taking advantage of something or someone, in particular the act of taking unjust advantage of another for one’s own benefit (e.g. sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs).
Family reunification/reunion – Process whereby family members already separated through forced or voluntary migration regroup in a country other than the one of their origin.

Forced migrants – Persons who are forced to move from their country of citizenship because of circumstances that represent a real threat to their lives such as armed conflict, internal clashes, interethnic conflict or systematic violations of human rights, and who need assistance resettling in their country of citizenship.

Forced migration – General term used to describe a migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).

Foreign national – A person belonging to, or owing an allegiance to, another State.

Frontier worker – A migrant worker who retains his or her habitual residence in a neighbouring State to which he or she normally returns every day or at least once a week.

Immigrant – An individual who is a foreign national or stateless person who enters the Kyrgyz Republic lawfully with the objective of permanent residence.

Immigration: The entrance of a foreign national or stateless person to the Kyrgyz Republic for permanent residence

Infant mortality – The death of children under one year of age.

Integration – The process by which immigrants become accepted into society, both as individuals and as groups. The particular requirements for acceptance by a receiving society vary greatly from country to country; and the responsibility for integration rests not with one particular group, but rather with many actors: immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and communities in the host country.

Internal migration – A movement of people from one area of a country to another for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration).

International migration – Movement of persons who leave their country of origin, or the country of habitual residence, to establish themselves either permanently or temporarily in another country. An international frontier is therefore crossed.

Irregular migrant – Someone who, owing to illegal entry or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe a country’s admission rules and any other person not authorized to remain in the host country (also called clandestine/illega/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation).

Irregular migration – Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is illegal entry, stay or work in a country, meaning that the migrant does not have the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations to enter, reside or work in a given country. From the perspective of the sending country, the migrant does not have passport or travel document or he does not comply with the administrative requirements for leaving the country.
Kayrylman – An ethnic Kyrgyz who is a foreign national or stateless person, who voluntarily resettles in the Kyrgyz Republic and receives Kayrylman status.

Kayrylman status – Temporary legal status before obtaining citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic

Labour migration – Movement of persons from their home State to another State for the purpose of employment. Labour migration is addressed by most States in their migration laws. In addition, some States take an active role in regulating outward labour migration and seeking opportunities for their nationals abroad.

Legalization – The act of making lawful; authorization or justification by legal sanction.

Life expectancy at birth – The number of years that on average a person will live from birth, if throughout life mortality at each age remains the same as in that period.

Life expectancy for persons who have reached a certain age is the average number of years expected to be lived from this age given the mortality levels of each subsequent age group.

Lookout system / watch list – A State’s official list, usually (but not necessarily) automated, of persons who should be prevented from entering the country or who should be arrested upon arrival. A lookout system (also called a “watch list” system) is typically an inter-agency project, which receives input from all law enforcement, intelligence, and migration agencies.

Mardiker – hired labourers, day labourers. From Farsi “mardikor” – “a brave worker” or “men’s work”. Generally recognized as willing to do any kind of work for a small payment, mardikers are the most vulnerable group of workers.

Migrant – person participating in a migration process. Every migrant leaves the source territory and arrives in the destination territory.

Migrant worker – A person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a national.

Migration – A process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people, and economic migrants.

MIRPAL – A community of experts and practitioners in the field of migration and remittances, working for governmental and non-governmental structures. The countries belonging to the MIRPAL network are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Natural population growth – The difference between the number of live births and the number of deaths in a defined period.

Naturalization – Granting by a State of its nationality to an alien through a formal act on the application of the individual concerned. International law does not provide detailed rules for naturalization, but it recognizes the competence of every State to naturalize those who are not its nationals and who apply to become its nationals.

Net migration – The difference between the number of arrivals in a given territory over a given period and departures from the territory.
Nomadism – A form of economic activity and an associated lifestyle characterized by constant movement.

Quota – A quantitative restriction. In the migration context, many countries establish quotas, or caps, on the number of migrants to be admitted each year.

Refugee – A person who is not a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic and applies to the Kyrgyz Republic for recognition of refugee status, and who is outside the country of his/her citizenship owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions, membership of a particular social group, or also real fear of suffering persecution in armed and international conflicts, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country.

Reintegration – Re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or a process, e.g. of a migrant into the society of his country of origin.

Repatriates – Persons who for economic, social or personal reasons voluntarily resettle in their country of nationality or origin with the intention of permanent residence.

Repatriation – The personal right of a refugee or a prisoner of war to return to his/her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments.

Return – Refers broadly to the act or process of going back. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country, as in the case of returning IDPs and demobilized combatants; or from a host country (either transit or destination) to the country of origin, as in the case of refugees, asylum seekers, and qualified nationals. There are subcategories of return, which can describe the way the return is implemented, e.g. voluntary, forced, assisted and spontaneous return.

Return migration – The movement of a person returning to his/her country of origin or habitual residence usually after spending at least one year in another country. This return may or may not be voluntary. Return migration includes voluntary repatriation.

Seasonal worker – A migrant worker whose work by its character is dependent on seasonal conditions and is performed only during part of the year.

Shuttle (cross-border) labour migration – regular travel by Kyrgyzstani nationals to neighbouring countries and travel into Kyrgyzstan by foreign nationals with the aim of working while living permanently in the source country.

Slavery – The status or condition of a person over whom any or all the powers attached to the right of ownership are exercised.

State of origin – The State of which the person concerned is a national.

 Stateless person – A person who is not considered as a national of the Kyrgyz Republic and has no proof of his/her affiliation to citizenship of another state.

Temporary migrant workers – Skilled, semi-skilled or untrained workers who remain in the receiving country for definite periods as determined in a work contract with an individual worker or a service contract

Total fertility rate – Indicator that determines the intensity of fertility. It is the ratio of total number of live births in a year to the average population. It is typically calculated per 1000 population.
Total fertility rate (women’s fertility rate) is calculated as the sum of age-specific fertility rates of women aged 15-49 years and shows the average number of children a woman would bear throughout her life, if at every age the birth rate remains at that of the year for which the coefficients are calculated.

**Trafficking in persons** – The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.

**Transit** – A stopover of passage, of varying length, while travelling between two or more countries, either incidental to continuous transportation, or for the purposes of changing planes or joining an ongoing flight or other mode of transport.

**Urbanization** – Growth of cities through resettlement of the population of urban areas in pursuit of better work and better living conditions.

**Victim of human trafficking** – An individual who is a victim of the crime of trafficking in persons.

**Working permit** – A legal document giving authorization required for employment of migrant workers in the host country.

**Xenophobia** – At the international level, no universally accepted definition of xenophobia exists, though it can be described as attitudes, prejudices and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.
International conventions and other human rights and migrant rights instruments ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic / Multilateral and bilateral agreements of the Kyrgyz Republic on migration

UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948);
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965);
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979);
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

Slavery Convention of 1926 (Kyrgyz Republic Law from 1996);
The International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of 1950 (Kyrgyz Republic Law from 1997);
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956 (Kyrgyz Republic Law from 1997);
ILO Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labour of 1957 (Kyrgyz Republic Law from 1998);

The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Protocol) (Kyrgyz Republic Law from 2003);

ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (number 97), ILO Recommendation 86, Annex on Model Agreement.
ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention 1975 (number 143)


The ILO Conventions and the UN Convention set out a comprehensive regulatory approach to promoting and protecting the rights of migrant workers. In 2006 these instruments of international law were supplemented by a document entitled the “ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration.” This Framework contains non-binding performance standards and guidelines for labour migration, which were agreed in the framework of the ILO’s tripartite structure, comprising representatives of government, employers’ and workers’ organizations.

The Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families from Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States was adopted on 14 November 2008 in Chisinau and ratified by the Kyrgyz Republic Law 305 of 26 November 2009. The benefits of this Convention compared to other international instruments are as follows:

- The Convention was designed for the 12 CIS countries, i.e. It has a narrow territorial focus. For the Kyrgyz Republic 80 per cent of outward migration is directed to Russia and Kazakhstan, and the Convention protects the rights of migrant workers and their families in CIS countries;
• Article 17 of the Convention provides for cooperation between the parties on health insurance for migrant workers;

• Article 19 of the Convention provides that in order to avoid double taxation with respect to taxes on income and property of migrant workers, the competent authorities of the Parties are guided by the provisions of international treaties to which they are party;

• In this Convention, there is a pre-requisite for bilateral work on pensions for migrant workers and their families.


1994 CIS Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Labour Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers

This defines the basic concepts in the field of labour migration, declared the mutual recognition of diplomas and other certificates of education, qualifications, and work experience, it envisages the provision of documentation on the duration of work and wages in the host country at time of exit; gives a list of mandatory requirements for an employment contract and the taxation procedure for migrant workers in order to avoid double tax collection. Its well-functioning provisions include those relating to visa-free entry, and the rights to import and export private property and transfer earnings to the homeland. To a large extent the provisions on the recognition of documents on education and training are working.

The Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families from Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Chisinau Convention).

This is a detailed international legal instrument in the field of labour migration, which largely focuses on the rights of migrant workers. It has a substantial glossary of terms, includes a wide range of economic and social rights, and recognizes the rights of both migrant workers and their families, although the standards concerning the rights of migrant workers in the Chisinau Convention are elaborated to a much lesser degree than in the 1990 UN Convention. However, the main opportunities stem from the fact that it includes the countries of origin of migrants, including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the destination countries of labour migration flows from Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Russia).

The Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union of 2014 establishes:

1) agreeing common approaches and principles in the field of labour migration; 2) exchanging regulations; 3) exchange of information; 4) implementing measures to prevent the spread of false information; 5) exchanging experiences, internships, seminars and training courses; and 6) cooperation in advisory bodies.


Agreement between the Governments of the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan on labour activity and the social protection of migrant workers employed in agricultural work in border areas, 9 July 2002.


Agreement between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation on a Simplified Procedure for the Acquisition of Citizenship, 26 February 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agreement between the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Government of the Russian Federation on regulating the migration process and protecting the rights of displaced persons, 18 July 1995</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agreement on cooperation between Ministries of Internal Affairs on the return of minors to their countries of residence, 24 September 1993.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 2

Migration Legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic, Regulating Immigration, Refugees and Resettled Persons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour migration to Kyrgyzstan / immigration / transit of foreign nationals through Kyrgyzstan / refugees and Kayrylmans in national migration legislation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 19 (1) Foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Kyrgyz Republic shall enjoy rights and perform obligations equally with the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic except for cases defined by law or international treaty to which the Kyrgyz Republic is a party; (2) In accordance with international commitments the Kyrgyz Republic shall grant asylum to foreign citizens and stateless persons persecuted on political grounds as well as on the grounds of violation of human rights and freedoms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 20 (4) Prohibition (3) on slavery and human trafficking; (5) Prohibition on limitation to the right (10) of a citizen to unimpeded return to the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 23 (1) Slavery and human trafficking are prohibited in the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (1) Any person committing crime within the Kyrgyz Republic shall be held responsible under this Code; (2) In the case of a crime committed outside of the Kyrgyz Republic, responsibility shall take effect hereunder if such crime is accomplished or prevented within the Kyrgyz Republic; (3) Should a crime be committed within the Kyrgyz Republic by a diplomatic representative of a foreign states or other person outside the competence of the Kyrgyz Republic courts according to current laws and international agreements, such matter shall be resolved diplomatically based on international law provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 6 (1). Nationals of the Kyrgyz Republic as well as stateless residents permanently resident in the Kyrgyz Republic committing crimes outside the Kyrgyz Republic shall be held responsible under this Code unless sentenced by foreign state court. (2) Foreign citizens and stateless persons committing crimes outside the Kyrgyz Republic and staying within its area may be extradited to a foreign state to be held responsible or to serve sentence in accordance with an international agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Administrative Responsibility of the Kyrgyz Republic of 4 August 1998 (as amended by Law 96 of 26 June 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 6. A person who commits an administrative offence in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be liable under the present Code. Administrative offences committed on the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic are those which are initiated, completed or suppressed in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic; Committed in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic with consequences outside; or Constitutes in conjunction or combination with another action administrative offence, part of which is committed within the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. In the case of an administrative offence in an air or water vehicle, which is outside of the Kyrgyz Republic in the territory of a foreign state, administrative liability occurs under the present Code, if the ship is travelling under the flag of the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 7. A person who commits an administrative offence bears responsibility on the basis of legislation extant at the time when and place where the administrative offence was committed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Law “On the Legal Situation of Foreign Nationals in the Kyrgyz Republic (December 1993, with amendments from 11 October 2011)

Article 5 – the distinction between legitimate reasons for permanent residence and temporary stay of foreign nationals.

Article 6 - the supremacy of international obligations to provide asylum for political reasons or human rights violations.

Articles 7 and 8 guarantee equality of labour rights (excluding employment and positions for which only citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic are eligible) and time off, and equal responsibility in labour relations.

Article 9 guarantees equal access to healthcare assistance for permanently resident foreign nationals, while the procedure for providing healthcare assistance to those temporarily staying is regulated by the Ministry of Health.

Articles 10-17, 19 and 23 guarantee equality of access to social security and educational property rights; freedom of conscience; the right to participate in (non-political) social activities; equality in family and marital relations; the inviolability of the person, home and other personal rights; equality in tax and non-tax levies; and equal responsibility for crimes and offences.

Article 18 guarantees freedom of movement with the possibility of restrictions for reasons of national security and so on.

Articles 21 and 22 set limits to foreign nationals’ rights in electoral matters and to military service.


The main purpose of this Law is to promote the stimulation of investment and tourism, and comprehensively revitalize bilateral relations with the countries listed in an attachment to the Law, whose citizens unilaterally are made eligible for visa-free travel, and to analyse the effectiveness of this change. Under the Law, the visa-free regime was introduced unilaterally.

The law establishes the grounds, conditions and procedure for acquisition and termination of citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic, and also regulates other issues related to citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic.


This Law defines “refugee” and establishes procedures for receiving refugee status, the rights and duties of refugees, and the consequences of violating legislation.


Along with the definition of key concepts, this Law clearly distributes functions among agencies, some of which are seeking to withdraw from the list of actors (General Prosecutor’s Office and the State Customs Service). Article 6 specifies that the authorized body to prevent and combat trafficking in persons will be determined by the President, but this has not happened in the 10 years the Law has been in force.


|Government Resolution 87 “On Approval of a List of Foreign States whose Citizens are Subject to a Simplified Visa Regime” of 7 February 2009. |
|Government Resolution 156 “The Procedure for Registration and Issuance of Visas for the Kyrgyz Republic” of 10 March 2009 N 156 (as amended on 29 December 2014). |
|Presidential Decree 174 “Regulation on the Citizenship Commission under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic” and “Regulation on the Procedure for Considering Issues of Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 10 August 2013. |
|Government Resolution 188 “Regulations on Work with Refugees in the Kyrgyz Republic” of 4 April 2003 (as amended by Government Resolution 3 of 8 January 2013). |
|Presidential Decree 213 “The Composition of the Citizenship Commission under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 4 November 2013. |
|Government Resolution “On the Setting of Quotas for Labour Migration, Limiting the Number Foreign Nationals and Stateless Persons Arriving in the Kyrgyz Republic to Work, by Sectors and Regions of the Kyrgyz Republic in the year ____” (Annual). |
|Government Resolution “On Setting the Immigration Quotas for the Cities of Bishkek and Osh and the Regions of the Kyrgyz Republic in the year ____” (Annual). |
|Migration issues in Kyrgyzstani legislation for which the subject is not the regulation of migration Law 256 “On State Youth Policy” of 31 July 2009. This specifies the status of “a difficult situation for a young person” to include being a refugee or IDP, and ensures equal and non-discriminatory access for all young people to education and healthcare. |
|Government Resolution 571 “Regulations on the Return to the Kyrgyz Republic of Children who are Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, who are without Parental Care and Outside the Kyrgyz Republic” of 21 October 2013. |
|Government Resolution 530 “On the Medical Care of Foreigners” of 15 June 2000 (as amended by Government Resolutions 530 of 28 August 2000 and 44 of 31 January 2005). This establishes the procedure for providing medical care to different categories of foreign nationals (the Ministry of Education provides access to medical care for foreign students and teachers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the diplomatic corps and international organizations), provides a list of authorized medical institutions to serve foreign nationals, and sets the price list for medical services. |
|Ministry of Internal Affairs Order 196 “On the Exemption from Registration at the Police Department of Foreign Nationals of 28 Countries” of 16 April 2003. |


### Legislation on internal migration within the Kyrgyz Republic

#### External labour migration and emigration in national migration legislation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legislation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2010, Article 25(1). Everyone shall have the right to freely leave the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law 61 of the Kyrgyz Republic “On External Migration” (as amended by Law 214 of 9 December 2013) Article 49(3) Registration of Kyrgyz citizens abroad (when leaving for more than three months): deadline for registration up to 15 days. Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic are guaranteed protection and patronage abroad. The right to free travel, including emigration, is guaranteed excluding cases established by criminal, criminal procedural or administrative codes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Law 1333-XII “On Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic of 18 December 2007, as amended by Law 70 of 21 May 2007. Citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic entails a permanent political and legal connection between the individual and the Kyrgyz Republic, expressed by mutual rights and obligations. Equality of rights of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic is provided in all areas of economic, political, social, cultural and spiritual life. No citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic can be deprived of citizenship and the right to change his/her nationality. According to this law: (1) A citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic who also has another citizenship is considered by the Kyrgyz Republic only to be a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic, except for cases stipulated by this Law and entered into established order by virtue of international treaties to which the Kyrgyz Republic is party; (2) Acquisition by a citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic of another citizenship shall not entail termination of citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
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<td>Government Resolution 670 “On Approval of the Concept for Development of the Pension System of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 24 November 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreement “On Readmission” of 11 October 2012 signed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Resolution 407 “Confirming the Regulation, Description and Presentation of the Certificate of Return to the Kyrgyz Republic” of 30 July 2008.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Resolution 787 “Confirming the Regulation, Description and 2006 Template of the Passport of a Citizen of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 10 November 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Resolution “Programme to Promote Employment and the Regulation of Labour Migration to 2020” of 6 September 2013 (supplemented by Government Resolution on 28 November 2014). This covers both external labour migration management and internal migration issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legislation on external labour migration from the Kyrgyz Republic and emigration

External labour migration and emigration in national migration legislation

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## APPENDIX 5
### Institutional framework for migration policy: functions and services of key government structures involved in implementing migration policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency / regulation</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Migration Service</td>
<td>20 functions:</td>
<td>- assists citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic to find work abroad in the framework of state programmes, intergovernmental and other official agreements;</td>
<td>The Service was created in December 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Resolution 854 “On Issues of the State Migration Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic” Of 11 December 2015</td>
<td>- implements the main objectives and priorities of state policy in the field of migration;</td>
<td>- issues registration certificates for applications for asylum and refugee certificates;</td>
<td>It’s objective is: to implement state policy in the field of migration and ensure that national migration legislation is complied with.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- develops and submits drafts of normative legal acts regulating public policy issues in the field of migration according to established procedure to the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic;</td>
<td>- issues certificates for Kayrylman;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- submits proposals to the Government on setting of annually established quotas for the recruitment and use of foreign labour in the Kyrgyz Republic, and distribution (redistribution) quotas for recruiting and using foreign labour across regions and economic sectors in accordance with their needs;</td>
<td>- issues permits following procedures established in national legislation;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- analyses, forecasts, monitors and evaluates migratory processes in the Kyrgyz Republic;</td>
<td>- assists in providing ethnic Kyrgyz and Kayrylman with the state guarantees provided for in national legislation;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ensures implementation of state programmes to assist ethnic Kyrgyz and Kayrylman immigrants;</td>
<td>- considers complaints and statements from individuals and entities on migration issues in the prescribed manner;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- registers applications for refugee status in the Kyrgyz Republic and decides on granting refugee status in accordance with national legislation and international agreements to which the Kyrgyz Republic is party;</td>
<td>(six services which are presented in the Regulation as “service provision functions”)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- registers applications to recognise Kayrylman status in the Kyrgyz Republic and decides on granting Kayrylman status in accordance with national legislation;</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- ensures implementation of state policy on socio-economic adaptation of ethnic Kyrgyz and Kayrylman immigrants;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- examines applications by physical and legal persons for permission to recruit and use foreign labour in the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the right to recruit citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic for work abroad;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- decides on granting the status of immigrant to the Kyrgyz Republic in accordance with national legislation;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- keeps records of asylum seekers and refugees, Kayrylman and foreign nationals who have permission to work in the Kyrgyz Republic</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- holds consultations and negotiations in the prescribed procedure, concludes international agreements and organizes interaction with relevant authorities of foreign states, international and public organizations on matters within the competence of the Service;</td>
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<td>State Registration Service</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Government Resolution 240 of 6 May 2013</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

32 functions, including:
- ensuring the development and coordination of implementation of a migration card system;
- taking part in recording refugees, asylum seekers, ethnic Kyrgyz and Kayrylman immigrants and foreign nationals who have permission to work in the Kyrgyz Republic;
- creating a database on matters within the competence of the Service;
- carrying out state tendering for research and development in its area of activity;
- advocates for implementation of state migration policy.
- monitors international treaties, national and state programmes designed to support citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic working abroad and Kayrylman; to prevent trafficking in persons; to oversee the stay of foreign nationals working in the Kyrgyz Republic;
- cooperates with relevant ministries, state committees, administrative departments, local state administrations and local authorities on dealing with migration issues.

Eight services, including:
- registers and records citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, foreign nationals and stateless persons;
- creates documents concerning acquisition of citizenship of the Kyrgyz Republic and relinquishing of it, in accordance with established procedure;
- provides, prolongs and cancels visas;
- prepares documents for obtaining residence permits and travel documents for temporary and permanent residence outside the Kyrgyz Republic in coordination with the authorized state bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- carries out state registration of birth, marriage and deaths.

The Service was created by Government Resolution 708 of 17 November 2009.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

52 functions, including:
- organizing within the Kyrgyz Republic and abroad consular activities, including protection of the rights and interests of individuals and legal entities from the Kyrgyz Republic abroad and citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic who are working abroad, in accordance with the legislation of the Kyrgyz Republic and international law;
- promoting and maintaining relations and contacts between the Kyrgyz Republic and the Kyrgyz diaspora and compatriots living abroad;
- assisting in the implementation of state migration policy of the Kyrgyz Republic, including by participating within its competence in the development and implementation by relevant state bodies of measures to prevent and combat illegal migration and manage immigration control;
- participating in considering requests for voluntary resettlement, protection of the rights of immigrants and granting the status of voluntary migrant;
- Participating in decisions about the applications of foreign citizens and stateless persons, as well as their family members, for immigration status, in accordance with national legislation;
- making proposals to the relevant authorities to adopt legislative and other measures to assist law enforcement agencies to more effectively prosecute offences related to smuggling and human trafficking in the Kyrgyz Republic, with wide coverage in the media;
- maintaining relations between executive bodies and the legislative and judicial branches, as well as local government in the Kyrgyz Republic, in order that they and their officials comply with the principle of a unified foreign policy activities and the implementation of the international obligations of the Kyrgyz Republic;
- carries out state registration of rights and restrictions on real estate; - creates and maintains the State Land Inventory of the Kyrgyz Republic, conducts inventory survey and formation of real estate, as well as a technical survey of real estate units, provides technical passport and documents certifying the right to land plots;
- allots land in kind (on site), confirms the boundaries of land used by legal entities and individuals, and calculates losses of agricultural production, and loss of profits during acquisition of land for non-agricultural purposes.
- accredits diplomatic staff, journalists and others, registers the vehicles of diplomatic missions and also provides visa services

Objective of agency activities: effective implementation of the foreign policy of the Kyrgyz Republic, and the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and other national interests of the Kyrgyz Republic in international relations
### Ministry of Internal Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>22 functions, including:</th>
<th>Security services, issuing permits and licences for weapons, etc., searching and issuing certificates of criminal record, traffic police services, cargo tracking, and so on.</th>
<th>Agency tasks:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- implementing national legislation on citizenship, migration, entry and exit, on the legal status of foreign nationals and stateless persons</td>
<td>- Ensuring public order and the security of the individual and society;</td>
<td>- Ensuring public order and the security of the individual and society;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- conducting proceedings on administrative offences;</td>
<td>- Fighting crime;</td>
<td>- Fighting crime;</td>
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<tr>
<td>- establishing and implementing administrative supervision, in accordance with legislation</td>
<td>- Implementing criminal penalties and administrative penalties within their competence;</td>
<td>- Implementing criminal penalties and administrative penalties within their competence;</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### State Border Service

| - taking measures to prevent, detect and respond to attempts to illegally cross the state border by citizens, foreign nationals and stateless persons, and illegal armed groups; as well as the illegal movement across the state border of prohibited items and substances, including weapons of mass destruction, materials and technologies related to them; | - Implementing control and licensing measures in the field of road safety. | Defence and protection of the state border; border control; prevention and suppression of violations of the state border, attacks on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country; upholding the state border policies of the Kyrgyz Republic. |
| - informational-analytical and scientific maintenance of the activity of the Border Service, conducting analytical studies in the field of defence and protection of the state border, preparation and submission of informational materials on these issues to the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic, and other interested state bodies of the Kyrgyz Republic; | | |
| - providing departmental statistical reporting forms: N2 (quarterly) “Report of the arrival (departure) to (from) the Kyrgyz Republic of Persons across State Border Crossing Points by Purpose of Travel.” and N3 (monthly) “Report on the Numbers of Persons Crossing the State Border of the Kyrgyz Republic at the Checkpoints for Foreign Nationals.” | | |
Ministry of Education and Science

As amended by Law 168 of 30 March 2015

58 functions, including:
- assisting compatriots living outside the republic with obtaining education in the state language, in the prescribed manner in accordance with international agreements in force to which the Kyrgyz Republic is Party;
- developing the procedure of nostrification of educational documents (acceptance by the Kyrgyz Republic of educational documents issued in other states) in the prescribed manner in accordance with international agreements in force to which the Kyrgyz Republic is Party.
- confirms the authenticity of documents issued in the Kyrgyz Republic on primary and secondary general education;
- issues certificates to Kyrgyzstani nationals who study in educational institutions of foreign countries;
- issues duplicate licences and certificates to engage in educational activities.

Agency tasks:
Creating state policy in the field of education, academia, scientific and technical activities.

Ministry of Labour and Social Development

Government Resolution 121 “On Issues of the Ministry of Social Development of the Kyrgyz Republic” of 20 February 2012.
(As amended by Government Resolution 252 of 7 May 2013, and Government Resolution 570 of 18 October 2013) – there is not yet a new provision that takes into account the reorganization of agencies and linking with labour

40 functions, which do not specify even one aspect of social security for foreign national migrant workers in the Kyrgyz Republic or the provision of pensions to migrant workers from Kyrgyzstan.
De jure equal social security for foreign nationals on an equal basis with citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic is guaranteed under the Agreement On Readmission between the Governments of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation.
The 1949 ILO Convention on Migrant Workers guarantees equality of nationals of host countries and of foreigners or stateless persons in the field of social security. As a signatory to the Convention, the Kyrgyz Republic should comply to it with respect to the nationals of any other State which has signed this Convention, providing equality in social security, regardless of length of stay in the country. Commitments made, if the Parties so choose, may include one or more social guarantees: healthcare, disability benefits in the case of loss of ability to work, temporary disability benefits, unemployment benefits, etc.

According to the Unified Register (list) of public services rendered by executive bodies and their structural subdivisions and subordinated institutions (Government Resolution 85 of 10 February 2012) the Ministry provides 21 public services.

Agency tasks:
Creating state policy in the field of education, academia, scientific and technical activities.

The Ministry was reorganized from the Ministry of Social Development and the into the Ministry of Labour and Social Development by Government Resolution on 16 November 2015.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ministry of Health</th>
<th>45 functions, including:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- developing drafts of laws and regulations in the field of health and submitting them for consideration to the Government;</td>
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<td>- determining the volume and conditions of healthcare;</td>
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<td>- taking measures to optimize and restructure healthcare organizations;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- monitoring and evaluating the activities of providers of medical and pharmaceutical services, regardless of ownership;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>According to Article 9 of the Law “On Prevention and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings”, “the Ministry of Health of the Kyrgyz Republic develops programmes for the provision of medical, including psychiatric, assistance to victims of trafficking, as well as providing medicines to specialized institutions.”</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<th>Compulsory Health Insurance Fund</th>
<th>24 functions.</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under Article 5 of Law 1296-XII “On the Legal Status of Foreign Nationals in the Kyrgyz Republic” of 14 December 1993, “Foreign citizens may reside permanently in the Kyrgyz Republic, if they have permission, formed as residence permits issued by the authorized public authority in the field of public registration of rights.” If they have residence permits, foreign nationals / stateless persons can receive healthcare services in public healthcare facilities in the same way as nationals of the Kyrgyz Republic.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- draws up and disseminates compulsory health insurance policies, with mandatory extension of coverage of compulsory health insurance;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- within its competence defends the interests of insured citizens in the framework if implemented programmes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- provides medical supplies, medical equipment and medical products through the Programme of State Guarantees and in the compulsory medical insurance system, through purchasing, storing and distribution</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- increases the population’s awareness of their rights in the field of healthcare.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agency tasks: Protecting and strengthening the health of citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency objective: To guaranteed provision to citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic of high-quality medical and preventive care in the framework of the State Guarantee Programme for providing citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic with medical supplies via mandatory health insurance programmes.</td>
<td></td>
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Eurasian Economic Commission
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